DPMN Bulletin: Volume IX, Number 3, June 2002

The African continent has had a critical impact on defining the limits and possibilities of the United Nations (UN) in the post-Cold War order. More specifically, African conflicts have been among the organisation’s most important and challenging initiatives since the end of the Cold War. In view of these difficulties, the UN Security Council has proved increasingly willing to allow regional, sub-regional and ad hoc initiatives in Africa as complementary ways and means of dealing with conflicts on the continent. This reality, as well as developments in Africa in the form of frequent conflicts (and the tendency of these problems to generate security problems and humanitarian disasters) compelled African role-players to consider and reconsider response capabilities or sub-regional peacekeeping capabilities of some kind.

Generally speaking, sub-regional organisations, whether political or economic, are obliged to play an active role in regional security. In 1992, the then Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, noted in An Agenda for Peace that the Charter of the organisation devoted Chapter VIII to regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with those matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security that are appropriate for regional action. He also pointed out that the UN had encouraged a variety of complementary efforts in this regard and, with special reference to Africa, he mentioned that the OAU joined efforts with the UN regarding the situation in Somalia.1  A number of years later, his successor, Kofi Annan, emphasised the need for co-operation between the UN and role-players in Africa:2 

Within the context of the United Nations primary responsibility for matters of international peace and security, providing support for regional and subregional initiatives in Africa is both necessary and desirable. Such support is necessary because the United Nations lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa… the experience in Liberia shows clearly the contribution that can be made by a subregional organization such as ECOWAS when dealing with so complex a situation, and the key role that the United Nations can play in support of such efforts.

The question is: what advantages and disadvantages are attached to sub-regional peacekeeping in Africa and can sub-regional organisations play a meaningful role in complementing the efforts of the UN in this regard? This article seeks to ‘unpack’ some of the pros and cons of sub-regional peacekeeping, as well as to comment on the need to manage peacekeeping endeavors in Africa on the basis of a sound policy framework.

Traditionally, regionalism implies co-operation among states in geographically proximate and delimited areas for the pursuit of mutual gain in one or more areas. It is often argued that the great advantage of making sub-regional organisations responsible for peacekeeping is that neighbours are more familiar with each other’s problems than outsiders. This implies that neighbours usually have a fairly common culture, common social identity, a common history and similar experience.

In Africa, sub-regional organisations in Africa began featuring as important peacekeeping instruments in recent years as it is increasingly being accepted that there is a need for Africans to take care of their own security requirements. In this regard, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with its "military arm" the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), are perhaps the best known sub-regional organisations as regards involvement in robust peacekeeping endeavors. Well aware of the UN’s limitations to impact upon the continent, African states and specific role-players at sub-regional level shown a clear willingness to prepare for and undertake combined diplomatic and military action. The "indigenous" intervention operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, the DRC and Lesotho are of particular interest, as these would seem to represent a new dimension in the management of African peacekeeping requirements.

While the devolution of responsibility for peacekeeping to sub-regional role-players offers the benefit of alleviating the burden for the overstreched UN, it could be contended that a number of problems and risks are associated with such action. The following is often argued:3 

· A devolution of responsibility threatens to subvert firm UN guidance and control, and thus the impartiality and legitimacy of the UN in the process. Moreover, it could lead to the loss of control of an operation by the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General.

· Regional organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have far greater operational force coherence than any multinational UN force, but this does not apply to sub-regional organisations in Africa where there is little prospect of doctrinal, command and equipment coherence. Furthermore, there are vast differences in the level of skills, training and education between the members of the armed forces of the majority of African states and those of the so-called developed world. Also, in contrast with some Scandinavian countries, for instance, peacekeepers from Africa are not volunteers who are carefully selected and psychologically tested – the cream of highly educated military forces.

· A sub-regional organisation will inevitably be viewed as less impartial than a multinational UN force drawn from further afield. In addition, there is always the risk of the perception of domination by a hegemon.

These arguments are certainly noteworthy and their validity is underscored by certain recent developments in Africa and further afield. Firstly, until a few years ago, intervention operations were conducted under the auspices of the UN and under the banner of peacekeeping and especially peace enforcement. The UN operation in Somalia in 1993 was a typical example in this regard as it was basically a peacekeeping operation based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, recent developments in Africa — specifically sub-regional intervention in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, the DRC and Lesotho — have all pointed towards intervention operations without UN endorsement.

With regard to the second point, the difference between peacekeeping in Africa and in Europe has been highlighted by developments in Kosovo, for instance. In this case, the peace process draws on the support of a number of wealthy nations that are members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Accordingly, the UN enjoys the security framework provided by well-trained and properly equipped peacekeepers. Moreover, the peace process is facilitated by roughly tenfold more troops than the number of UN troops currently deployed in the DRC. This implies that where a peace can draw on the support of a number of wealthy or relatively wealthy (sub-) regional actors, the UN could be successful in conflict resolution and management. It should furthermore be taken into account that NATO members have articulated serious lessons from their experience in the Balkans, and that they are at an advanced stage of doctrinal development for operations in the realm of peace and security. African states, on the other hand, suffer from a colonial heritage that brought a rough divide especially between militaries that espoused French doctrine and militaries that espoused British doctrine.

Thirdly, it could be pointed out that ECOMOG has since its inception been controlled largely by Nigeria. Critics of the organisation often complain that the organisation is a thin veil for Nigerian hegemonic ambitions. This generally accompanies accusations that Nigerians control all the key staff positions in ECOMOG and unfairly divert resources to their fellow countrymen. It also includes allegations that Nigeria lacks a profile of neutrality, which has led to a severe degradation of ECOMOG’s credibility as a role-player in the Liberian conflict. Furthermore, in 1997, to mention a specific example, ECOMOG made international headlines when it intervened in Sierra Leone to reverse a military coup and restore power to elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Nigerian domination was particularly prominent as hundreds of Nigerian troops were sent in with a view to driving out the military regime.

However, a number of arguments may also be raised in favour of sub-regional involvement in African conflicts. In this regard, the following is often contended:4 

· Sub-regional peacekeepers have a knowledge of the local environment and languages. This implies that African customs and traditions are often incomprehensible to European or Asian troops.

· A number of African countries have experience with UN peacekeeping operations. There is, therefore, a considerable pool of experience built up within African militaries.

Firstly, the point that African culture, customs and traditions are often incomprehensible to peacekeepers from other continents is certainly a valid argument. In short, the following statement of a former Australian peacekeeper bears testimony to this:

Another example (during the UN operation in Somalia) arose from the Somali custom of flashing car headlights up and down many times when approaching another car or pedestrian. It is very annoying to westerners but it is the local custom… On one occasion I was in a car when the driver was flashing an oncoming patrol. As we passed, one of the soldiers (from a western country) kicked the car and yelled ‘we see you, you dog’. If the soldier had been aware of this custom and the reason behind it, he might have been more tolerant and not felt the need to insult.5  (Kieseker, 1993: 74).

With regard to the second point, it could be pointed out that Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe and others are all experienced in the field of UN peacekeeping. Currently, a number of African states have subscribed to the UN standby system: Botswana, Chad, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Considering Africa’s international position, it needs to be noted that the overwhelming majority of the top ten contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations worldwide are developing countries — three of them are African states, namely Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria.6 

It could be argued that the few advantages of sub-regional peacekeeping are somewhat negated by the complex nature of operations in the realm of peace and security, especially in the case of enforcement action. Nonetheless, African role-players have to accept that they will have to play a substantial part in peacekeeping endeavors on the continent. Security problems in Africa have led to a situation where the UN now relies on partnerships with willing regional organisations and alliances in Africa as far as the maintenance of peace and security is concerned. This relates to the idea of shared responsibility between the UN and continental stakeholders for the effective management of conflicts in Africa.

Even the fact that a number of African states are extremely poor and do not possess adequate military capacities to take part in multinational peacekeeping action is not likely to change the trend of greater reliance on (sub-)regional security arrangements or "coalitions of the willing." To this end, the respective sub-regional role-players need to consider the proper structuring, functioning and funding of their respective institutional arrangements in the domain of peace and security as top priority. Furthermore, the development of an unambiguous policy and philosophy on how to manage involvement in peacekeeping would seem to be imperative.

Many issues still remain to be thrashed out as regards an ideal arrangement between the UN, the continental level and sub-regional role-players. There are also a number of unresolved issues regarding the present and future conduct of operations in the realm of peace and security. Specifically, it seems that the modalities, legal framework and practical basis for delegating or for sharing the responsibility for peace and security in Africa need to be clarified. Put simply, the challenge remains to establish a legitimate and acceptable basis for UN-African involvement in joint ventures so as to ensure an appropriate response to situations where the security of people is imperilled.

Practically speaking, it would seem that the following unresolved issues need to be addressed:7 

· When and where to intervene.

· Who should intervene.

· How to intervene.

Against this background the need is to achieve more legitimacy and greater consistency with regard to intervention action, conflict management, and resolution. This is not only required in terms of the principles and doctrine that guide operations, but also as regards how to approach conflicts and apply appropriate action with the required resources. What is therefore necessary, is to establish a firm and broad coalition that can respond positively and constructively to security challenges in Africa at a time when the continent stands at a critical juncture in its history

 Notes

1 B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for peace, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, (New York), p. 14.

 2 K. Annan, The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General (1998). Internet site www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afree/sgreport/index.html.

 3 J. Cilliers and M. Malan, "From destabilization to peace-keeping: the potential role of South Africa," Africa Insight (1996), vol 26 (4), p. 339.

 4 Ibid, p. 341.

 5 P. Kieseker, "Relationships between non-government organisations and multinational forces in the field" in H. Smith (ed.), Peacekeeping: challenges for the future (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1993), pp. 66-75.

 6 UN (Department of Public Information). "Contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations: monthly summary of contributors." 2002 Internet site www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/jan02.htm.

 7 M. Malan and C. Lord, "Peace support operations in Africa: the unresolved issues" in M. Malan (ed.), Boundaries of peace support operations: the African dimension. ISS Monograph Series 44, February 1999, pp. 166-174.