DPMN Bulletin: Volume IX, Number 3, June 2002

Conflicts are multi-dimensional and usually have several causes, some of which are specific to the country where they take place. Hence it would be futile to search for any "one size fits all" instrument or method of conflict management and equally naive to expect what worked in one part of the world at a particular historical juncture to have the same benign effect elsewhere and under different historical circumstances.

Nevertheless, there may be some lessons to be learned prom past experience in Europe and elsewhere. Properly digested and with due respect for the detail in which the devil usually resides, some of them might prove helpful in coming to grips with the numerous and seemingly intractable conflicts of Africa. Some of these lessons may relate to regional and sub-regional organisations, where Europe does indeed have a long and partly successful history of "trial and error."

Judging by the institutional setup of both the OAU and the African Union (still in statu nascendi) and sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC, African leaders have actually drawn some inspiration from Europe.1  Indeed, one might occasionally get the impression that they intend to create "carbon copies" of European institutions. In what follows it shall be argued that this is probably unwise, as the points of departure of the two continents simply differ too much for organisations such as NATO or the European Union to be suitable models for emulation in Africa. What African leaders might do is rather to look at the much less grandiose CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and its successor, the OSCE. In addition to this, they might be well advised to cast their look to the East where the format of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) may hold some promise.

An African NATO?

NATO was created as an alliance intended for three different purposes, as formulated by then Secretary General Lord Ismay: "To keep the Americans in, the Germans down and the Russians out." However, for the duration of the Cold War (1947-1990) the latter was the decisive purpose and, in a certain sense, the one that made the other two important.

The USSR was perceived as a threat, the deterrence of which was believed to be beyond the capabilities of the European countries, even if they pooled their resources for collective defence in the framework of an alliance.2  German rearmement was indispensable, but nobody was quite comfortable with it in view of the less than confidence-inspiring recent past. NATO sought to square the circle by meticulously "embedding" the Bundeswehr in NATO’s integrated military structures. It was also deemed important to ensure the "coupling" of the United States to the defence of Western Europe, not only through political obligations (the North Atlantic Treaty, especially article 5) but also and military, in casu through the stationing of troops and weaponry (including nuclear weapons) in Europe.

After the collapse of first the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union itself in 1989 and 1991, respectively, one might have expected NATO to have dissolved itself after "a job well done." Instead, NATO embarked on a quest for new missions as well as new members, thereby providing itself a new raison d’être.3 

The alliance appointed itself to the guarantor of "stability" in all of Europe, entailing inter alia a certain obligation to help bring about peace in the former Yugoslavia, i.e. in what was effectively (albeit not in legal terms) intrastate conflicts, whereas the alliance had been tailored for interstate war. Hence in both Bosnia and Kosovo NATO "blundered into disaster" in the erroneous belief that threat diplomacy and aerial bombardments would do the trick. They did not, even though the eventual capitulation of Serbia allowed NATO to uphold the illusion that its strategy worked.4  Moreover, the attack against Serbia in 1999 was a clear breach of international law and as such did little to allay fears, especially in Russia, as became apparent when the issue of NATO enlargement gained momentum and lead to the granting of membership to three former Soviet allies in April 1999, i.e., while the war against Serbia was still in progress.

As a corollary of its two Balkan "victories," NATO also had to go into the "business" of peacekeeping, mandated by the UN but outsourced to NATO in IFOR and SFOR (in Bosnia) and KFOR in Kosovo. While several NATO countries (e.g., Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Canada) had a long experience and considerable skills in such missions, they have all acquired these outside the NATO framework. Other NATO members have more modest experiences and the "alliance supremo" (the USA) has virtually none and a clear propensity to get it wrong whenever it tries.

An African counterpart of NATO seems to be neither called for nor feasible. First of all, there are no significant external threats to Africa which would call for security guarantees. In fact, ever since independence the continent has been remarkably free of interstate conflicts (with the recent war between Ethiopia and Eritrea as one of the few exceptions) which all but eliminates any need for traditional security guarantees. Intrastate conflicts, on the other hand, have abounded in Africa, and many of these have seen a "creeping internationalisation" through "spill-over" into neighbouring countries.5 

While some of these conflicts might call for external assistance, very little seems to be on offer, and the task is usually much more complex that in traditional wars. The only African states possessing any significant power projection capability (a sine qua non of implementing security guarantees) are Nigeria and South Africa, both of whom have intervened under the auspices of their respective subregional organisations, i.e., ECOWAS and SADC—Nigeria in Liberia and Sierra Leone and South Africa in Lesotho.6  However, none of these interventions were really successful, and the various interventions in the DRC (by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in support of the government and Uganda and Rwanda in support of the rebels) seem to have done more harm than good.

What Africa really needs is probably a combination of a robust intervention capability for extreme emergencies such the Rwandan genocide and peacekeeping forces to facilitate transitions from war to peace (e.g., in Angola or the DRC). This will require some (rather modest) long-range transport capacity, as well as weapon systems such as armoured personnel carriers, helicopters and close air support aircraft, but above all troops willing to run the risk. There will be no need for any of these in very large numbers, simply because external forces would be virtually unopposed. Reliable estimates thus have it that a force of even 2,500 to 5,000 troops might have brought the horrors in Rwanda to an end.7  As far as PKO is concerned, what Africa needs is above all forces that can be deployed swiftly and which are reliable in the sense of being uncorrupt as well as willing to run (rather modest) risks—and who should not be HIV/AIDS-infected. What NATO might do is to help with transport capaities as well as facilitation of the training of African forces for PKO.

There thus seems to be only little that the Africans can learn from NATO, which takes us to the other (and more genuinely European) institution.

An African EU?

The EU has been remarkably successful in preventing international conflict in Europe, albeit by very indirect means. Ever since the 1952 Schuman Declaration8  the "European project" has all along been motivated by the quest for peace through interdependency and integration. This scheme has already taken the participants way beyond the "Westphalian model," and the EU today is far more than a "pluralistic security community" (defined as a group of states among which war has become inconceivable).9  Whether its progressive amalgamation will eventually produce a new "superstate," or a polity sui generis remains to be seen.

The EU standards and actual membership could easily be extended to the rest of Europe and the very prospects thereof induce "pre-emptive adaptation" in the sense that would-be candidates endeavour to meet the standards by modifying their behaviour, e.g., in terms of human rights and peaceful conflict resolution. The EU’s main contribution to European security is thus not so much to do something as it is to be something, namely an immensely attractive market and community of nations. Moreover, by virtue of its predominantly civilian nature and emphasis on "soft security," it is almost impossible to construct it as a threat, viz. the absence of any objections (e.g., by Russia) to EU enlargement.10 

In connection with the Maastricht treaty of February 1992, the former WEU (Western European Union, a traditional, albeit dormand, alliance) was proclaimed to be "an integral part of" the EU, thus giving the EU a military dimension. In June the same year the WEU formulated its future tasks, henceforth known as "Petersberg tasks," comprising peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and crisis management, which have subsequently been taken over by the EU. What will become of this, however, remains to be seen.11 

The EU would thus definitely be worth emulating, but because of the absence of the requisite material foundations, this does not seem to be an option.12  Neither do African states have a degree of economic interdependence as that developed by the European states over decades (arguably even centuries); nor do they have strong states which can afford the "luxury" of relinquishing sovereignty to supranational institutions with impunity. An African EU is thus, at best, a prospect for the very long term.

An African CSCE or OSCE?

What does seem realistic is to create an African version of the OSCE, e.g. under the auspices of the AU, perhaps by following the path of the CSCE.13 

The CSCE was created during the détente phase of the Cold War, i.e. at a time when both East and West had come to realise that they had to coexist for an indefinite period and that this coexistence had better be peaceful. In the Helsinki Final Act of 197514  a number of principles were formulated, including the "commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and co-operation" and the "right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence" and the inviolability of frontiers. Just as importantly, however, a commitment to respect human rights was laid down which gave fledgling civil society groups in the East a platform from which to wage their struggle against oppression.

Starting with the preparatory negotiations leading up to Helsinki, a process was set in motion15  in which there was "something for everybody" and where states were thus "deterred" (by soft means) from acting as spoil-sports. There was surely a lot of obstruction and feet-dragging in the process, but eventually each obstacle was overcome even in the absence of any institutionalisation. Among the achievements were, for instance, the "invention" of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and, at a later stage CSBMs; i.e., confidence- and security-building measures, tantamount to modest, yet significant, instances of functional arms control.16  The CSCE also provided the framework for the negotiation of the first significant structural arms control treaty in Europe since the Second World War; i.e., the CFE Treaty in 1990 which led to a dismantling of a large part of the huge conventional arsenals on both sides of the former "iron curtain."17 

With the end of the Cold War, what began as a mere process was transformed into a permanent institution, i.e., the OSCE. It remains the most "legitimate" organisation in Europe, not only by virtue of being all-inclusive (except for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia whose membership was temporarily suspended) and the UN’s officially affiliated regional organisation, but also because nobody seriously objects to its authority.

The immediate aftermath of the Cold War saw a certain euphoria about the possibilities of creating a functioning collective security system on the basis of the OSCE. This would have entailed a substitution of the opposing alliances with a single system based on the principles of non-aggression and mutual assistance. However, this enthusiasm and optimism soon gave way to an OSCE pessimism. Because the West refused to grant the OSCE the requisite authority, its role was quickly reduced to the of oversight of democratisation, and the sending out of election observers, mediation teams, etc. Arguably some of these missions were tantamount to "preventive diplomacy" and quite successful as such, but the very nature of prevention defeats validation—and even more so when undertaken with a deliberately low profile, as is common practice in the OSCE. If they are successful, no violence occurs, but it is difficult (and always counterfactual) to prove why it did not. 18 

This CSCE/OSCE example may be suitable for emulation in Africa. Among the lessons from the process which may be particularly relevant for Africa, one could mention the emphasis on politically binding piecemeal decisions (each of which point forward), the multi-dimensional negotiations, allowing for asymmetrical "payoffs" (e.g., human rights concessions in return for security), and the respect for the sovereign equality of the participating states.

Conclusion

It might be worth considering a combination of the regional organization (i.e. the OAU/AU as the African counterpart of the OSCE) with SADC as a partial counterpart of the EU. The AU could (via sub-delegation from the UN) be the forum for the setting of standards and signing of conventions. It could further be given a certain early warning capacity (beyond the present "Mechanism")19  and the authority to mandate peacekeeping operations, which might then be undertaken by SADC (or "coalitions of the willing" assembled from among its members), in analogy with the EU undertaking "Petersberg tasks" for Europe.

However, it might also be a good idea for the African leaders to realise that Europe is not "the only game in town." It may actually be unique, hence unsuitable, for emulation. Other parts of the world, however, have started from conditions resembling more closely those of Africa, as is the case of the nations of Southeast Asia. ASEAN remains an institution consisting of sovereign states, but it has nevertheless made significant progress in terms of conflict prevention in the region.20 

Notes

1 The OAU charter is available at www.oau-oua.org/oau_info/oaucharter.htm; and the Constitutive Act of the African Union at www.oau-oua.org/lome2000/. The Treaty of ECOWAS is available at www.ecowas.int/; and that of SADC at www.sadc.int/. On the OAU and AU see Eddy Maloka (ed.), A United States of Africa? (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2001). On SADC see also Gavin Cawthra, "Prospects for Common Security in Southern Africa" in idem & Bjørn Møller (eds.), Defensive Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern Africa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 145-162; Van Aardt and Maxi Schoeman, "The Emerging Security Framework in Southern Africa: Regime or Community," Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 19, no. 1 (May 1997), pp. 1-30; Jackie Cilliers, "Building Security in Southern Africa. An Update on the Evolving Architecture," ISS Monograph Series, no. 43 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999); James D. Sidaway & Richard Gibb, "SADC, COMESA, SACU: Contradictory Formats for Regional ‘Integration’ in Southern Africa" in David Simon (ed.), South Africa in Southern Africa. Reconfiguring the Region (Oxford: James Curry, 1998), pp. 164-184.

2 On alliances see Gleen Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

3 Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War," International Organization, vol. 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 705-735; David Yost, NATO Transformed. The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998).

 4 For an elaboration see Bjørn Møller, "Military Options in the Pursuit of Political Goals. Kosovo and the Just War Tradition" in Jörg Calliess (ed.): Vom gebrauch des "traurigen Notmittels" Kieg. Welche militärischen Operationen können welche politische Zwecke fördern? (Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 2001), pp. 121-143; idem, "National, Societal And Human Security—A General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans" in What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century (Paris: UNESCO, 2001),  pp. 36-57; idem, "The Nordic Countries: Whither the West’s Conscience" in Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention. Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), pp. 151-165.

 5 On the spread of ethnic conflict across borders see Edmond J. Keller, "Transnational Ethnic Conflict in Africa" in David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild (eds.), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion and Escalation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 275-292; Stephen John Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa" in Michael E. Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 235-266.

 6 On Liberia see Emmanuel Kwesi-Aning, Security in the West-African Subregion. An Analysis of ECOWAS’s Policies in Liberia (Copenhagen: Institute of Political Studies, University of Copenhagen, 1999); Abiodun Alao, John Mackinlay & ‘Funni Olonisakin, Peacekeepers, Politicians, and Warlords: The Liberian Peace Process (Tokyo: UN University Press, 1999); David Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War" in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in International Conflicts (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 157-204; Robert A. Mortimer, "ECOMOG, Liberia, and Regional Security in West Africa" in Edmond J. Keller & Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in the New World Order (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 149-164. On Sierra Leone see idem, "From ECOMOG to ECOMOG II: Intervention in Sierra Leone" in John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in World Politics. The African State System in Flux (3rd Edition) (Boulder: Westview, 2000), pp. 188-207. On Lesotho see Theo Neethling, "Conditions for Succesful Entry and Exit: An Analysis with Specific Reference to SADC Allied Operations in Lesotho" in Mark Malan (ed.), Boundaries of Peace Support Operations: The African Dimension, ISS Monograph Series, no. 44 (Pretoria: ISS, February 2000), pp. 141-164.

 7 Scott R. Feil, Preventing Genocide. How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998). See also Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda at www.un.org/News/ossg/ rwanda_report.htm; The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996. The United Nations Blue Book Series, Vol. X (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1996). The OAU report on Rwanda is available at www.oau-oua.org/ Document/ipep/report/ Rwanda-e/EN-III-T.htm

 8 Robert Schuman, "The Schuman Declaration" in Brent F. Nelsen & Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.), The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 11-12. See also Ole Wæver, "Integration as Security: Constructing a Europe at Peace" in Charles Kupchan (ed.), Atlantic Security: Contending Visions (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998), pp. 45-63.

 9 Karl W. Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 3-9; Emmanuel Alder & Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

 10 Margot Light, Stephen White & John Loewenhardt, "A Wider Europe: the View from Moscow and Kiev," International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 1 (January 2000), pp. 77-88; William Wallace, "From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris? The Transformation of the EU," International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 3 (July 2000), pp. 475-494.

 11 Mary M. McKenzie & Peter H. Loedel (eds.), The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998). All the relevant documents are contained in Maartje Rutten (ed.), "From St-Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents," Challiot Paper, no. 41 (Brussels: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2001).

 12 For an unconvincing argument to the contrary see David Evans, Peter Holmes & Ibbo Mandaza, SADC: The Cost of Non-Integration (Harare: SAPES Books, 1999).

 13 Frank Schimmelfennig, "The CSCE as a Model for the Third World? The Middle East and African Cases" in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 319-334; Laurie Nathan, "Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-Operation in Southern Africa," Southern African Perspectives, no. 13 (Bellville: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1992).

 14 Available at www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/helfa75e.htm.

 15 The various documents adopted along the way are all available at www.osce.org/docs/english/chronos.htm.

 16 John Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1988); idem, Security for a New Europe. The Vienna Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures 1989-90, and Beyond (London: Brassey’s, 1992); John Freeman, Security and the CSCE Process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond (London: Macmillan, 1991).

 17 Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Jane M.O. Sharp and Lawrence Freedman (eds.), The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: The Politics of Post-Wall Arms Control (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996); Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order. The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994).

 18 A full list is available at http://www.osce.org/field_activities/field_activities.html.

 19 On the OAU’s security political roles and instruments see Salim Ahmed Salim, "The OAU Role in Conflict Management" in Olara A. Otunnu & Michael W. Doyle (eds.), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 233-244; B.A. Kiplagat, "The African Role in Conflict Management and Resolution" in David R. Smock & Chester A. Crocker (eds.), African Conflict Resolution. The U.S. Role in Peacemaking (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1995), pp. 27-38; Amadu Sesay, "Regional and Sub-regional Conflict Management Efforts" in Sola Akinrade & idem (eds.), Africa in the Post-Cold War International System (London: Pinter, 1998), pp. 43-72. For various case studies see Adebayo Adedeji, (ed.), Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance (London: Zed Books, 1999).

20 Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum. Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security," Adelphi Paper, no. 302 (1996); Amitav Acharya, "A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era", ibid., no. 279 (1993); Alan Collins, "Mitigating the Security Dilemma the ASEAN Way," Pacifica Review, vol. 11, no. 2 (June 1999), pp. 95-114; Timo Kivimäki, "The Long Peace of ASEAN," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 38, no. 1 (January 2001), pp. 5-25.