DPMN Bulletin: Volume IX, Number 3, June 2002

The Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, which was set up in 1975 has as its stated objectives:

to promote cooperation and integration leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent (Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Article 3 (1)).

It is significant to note that the Treaty did not say anything about conflict management and prevention, among its aims and objectives. Paradoxically, it is in the sphere of conflict management and prevention that the organisation has attracted much media and critical attention in the sub-region, Africa and the rest of the international system. For ECOWAS boasts of the most advanced conflict prevention and management mechanism devised by any sub-regional grouping anywhere in the world. Since the Liberian civil war broke out in December 1989 and ECOWAS involvement in that war via its ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operations in August 1990, it is not an exaggeration to say that there has emerged what can be called an "ECOWAS publishers’ enterprise": academic theses, projects, books, journals, magazines and newspaper articles, which focus mainly on the successes and problems associated with the peace keeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In short, the literature on ECOMOG’s operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone is vast and continues to grow. That is perhaps to be expected since the sub-regional organisation rose creditably to the challenges of conflict management and peace keeping in West Africa at a time when the great powers had literally abandoned West Africa, and indeed the continent as a whole, and focused their attention on Bosnia in Europe.

In short, then, ECOWAS and ECOMOG have rightly or wrongly received unprecedented international exposure and media attention since the 1990s. I shall not go into the politics of ECOMOG’s creation, for that has been adequately covered in academic treatises and other writings. What is worth stressing here is that it is possible that the founding fathers anticipated some conflict prevention and management roles for ECOWAS, although such a role is nowhere to be found in the Treaty establishing it. For as early as April 1978, three years after its creation, the heads of state and government adopted a Protocol on Non-Aggression, in the Nigerian capital, Lagos.

According to Article 1 of the Protocol:

Member States, shall, in their relations with one another, refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the organization of African unity against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member States.

Three years later, 1981, ECOWAS adopted a Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, in the Sierra Leonean capital, Freetown. Article 2 states "Member States declare and accept that any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community." (Chapter II Article 2). However, it was Article 16 that attracted attention and controversy because some prominent members challenged the legitimacy of ECOMOG, especially Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, staunch supporters of rebel Charles Taylor in Liberia. Specifically, Article 16 states

When an external armed threat or aggression is directed against a Member States of the Community, the Head of State of that country shall send a written request for assistance to the current Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS… 

Although late president Samuel Doe insisted that he wrote ECOWAS for assistance, it is doubtful if he was really in control of Liberia at the time, for he had been holed in the presidential mansion for several months, and his authority and control did not extend beyond the perimeter fence of the mansion, the seat of power in the country.

Finally, in 1999, ECOWAS once again embarked upon another important conflict prevention and management enterprise, the adoption of Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security. Space constraints will not allow us to discuss this epoch-making document in detail here. Suffice it to say that it contained all the accepted methods of conflict resolution short of war. It is obvious from the foregoing that even at a very early stage, ECOWAS did not want to see itself as an orthodox economic integration scheme, knowing fully well that in a socio-political and economic environment like that in the West African sub-region, economic issues can never be divorced from politics. In other words, West African leaders were simply acknowledging the predominance of politics in intra-and interstate relations in the sub-region. The rest of the paper deviates from the usual focus on ECOMOG, and will examine critically the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which was adopted by the Authority of ECOWAS in December 2001, as a veritable instrument for promoting peace and security in West Africa.

The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, hence simply the Protocol, is certainly the latest and most far reaching attempt by ECOWAS to consolidate peace, security and stability in a sub-region that witnessed two violent and even notorious civil wars within a decade. The Protocol is important for a variety of reasons, not the least because it has the potential of impacting directly and indirectly on the ordinary man in ECOWAS member states, thereby enhancing sub-regional peace, security, stability and economic development. Moreover, it has the long-term effect of redeeming the image of the sub-region, which was badly battered during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars, 1989-1997 and 1991-2002. The Protocol covers a wide range of subjects and is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the Principles; Chapter 2 is on the Modalities for Implementation, while Chapter 3 deals with the General and Final Provisions. In all, the document has eight sections, each of which is devoted to a topical issue in the politics of the sub-region. Thus, Section 1 is on Constitutional Convergence Principles, while Section 11 is on Elections. The rest of the sections deal with the following important issues: i) Election Monitoring, ii) The Role of the Armed Forces, the police and the Security Forces in a Democracy; iii) Poverty Alleviation and Promotion of Social Dialogue; iv) Education, Culture and Religion; v) Rule of Law, Human Rights and Good Governance; and finally, vi) Women, Children and the Youth.

Section 1 essentially tries to introduce uniformity in the constitutions of ECOWAS member states. Thus, Article 1(a) provides for the Separation of Powers—the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary in all member states, while 1(c) proclaims "zero tolerance for power obtained through the use of force or military coup d’etat or remaining in power through undemocratic means." When a member state violates this important principle, the citizens "…reserve the right to assert their sovereignty…" That is, they are obliged to disobey such a regime using peaceful means. Section 1(f) deals with religion, another sensitive issue which has led to a lot of blood shed and horrendous violence in some member states. Accordingly, it upholds the

Secularism and neutrality of the State in all matters to religion; freedom for each individual to practice, within the limits of existing laws, the religion of his/her choice everywhere on the national territory. The secularism shall extend to all parts of the State, but shall not deprive the State of the right to regulate, with due respect to human rights, the different religions practiced on the national territory or to intervene when aw and order break down as a result of any religious activity.

Section 11 is on elections, another contentious issue that oftentimes threatened the very fragile political fabric of all ECOWAS states. They generate a lot of heat and sometimes violence in the community, and not properly managed could destabilize the entire sub-region. Thus, according to Article 3(1), "the electoral law shall not undergo substantial modification in the last six (6) months before the elections," Article 3(3) enjoined member states to

take all appropriate measures to ensure that women have equal rights with men to vote and be voted for in elections, to participate in the formulation of government policies and the implementation thereof and to hold public offices and perform public functions at all levels of governance.

The significance of this article lies in the fact that themajority of member states are yet to institutionalise an orderly transfer of political power while politicians do not appreciate that politics is a vocation, a gentleman’s game and not a life and death struggle. If elections were conducted peacefully and freely, it would surely promote peace and security in the sub-region.

Section IV of the Protocol titled "The Role of the Armed Forces, the Police and the Security Forces in a Democracy," targets a very important segment of the citizenry whose role in national politics has, to put it mildly, been retrogressive and meddlesome. It is instructive to note that much of the political instability witnessed in the sub-region, other parts of Africa and the rest of the Third World, is traceable to the intrusion of the armed and security forces into national politics. But if democracy and good governance are to constitute the bedrock of democracy in ECOWAS member states, these coercive instruments of the state must remain apolitical. That is exactly what ECOWAS has tried to do in this section. Thus, the

armed forces and the police shall be non-partisan and shall remain loyal to the nation. The role of the armed forces shall be to defend the independence and territorial integrity of the State and its democratic institutions (Article 20(1).

This point is again stressed in Article 21(1), "the armed forces, the police and other security forces shall be under the authority of constituted civilian authorities." Finally in this section, Article 20 (3) stipulates, "the armed forces, police and other security forces shall participate in ECOMOG missions as provided for in Article 28 of the 1999 Protocol." The significance of this proviso cannot be missed by the perceptive observer, in the light of the historic roles that ECOMOG has played in the sub-region, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone, particularly in the decade following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.

Economic deprivation and marginalisation—real or imaginary—have been at the centre of some of the most violent conflicts in West Africa in the last decade. It is not surprising, then, that ECOWAS has tried to tackle this important issue by recognising in the first place, that "poverty alleviation and promotion of social dialogue are important factors of peace" (Article 26). Accordingly, member states undertake to "fight poverty effectively… "by"…ensuring equitable distribution of resources and income in order to consolidate national unity and solidarity" and "…creating an environment conducive to private investment and the development of a dynamic and competitive sector…" Another important issue is cultural diversity, which under normal circumstances should be a source of strength for West African states. Unfortunately, the opposite seems to be the case in many ECOWAS countries as cultural and religious differences sometimes lead to violence and political and economic instability in the sub-region. Happily, ECOWAS recognizes that "Education, Culture and Religion are essential factors of peace, stability and development in each Member State." To consolidate co-operation and understanding between and among ECOWAS states, "there shall be regular exchanges of students and academics…" who are the future leaders, and who could be veritable agents of integration in the sub-region.

Another important issue addressed by the Protocol is the marginalisation of women in national life. Expectedly, the Protocol made a spirited attempt to mainstream women in ECOWAS countries. Article 31(5) provides that:

Member States shall guarantee women equal rights with men in the field of education and in particular, shall ensure the same conditions for career and vocation guidance, access to the same curricula, access to opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study grants. They shall also ensure the elimination of stereotyped concepts of roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of education

I will close the discussion with a brief examination of Section VII: Rule of Law, Human Rights and Good Governance. The decade immediately following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe witnessed massive violations of the rule of law and gross violations of human rights in some ECOWAS states, which led to unprecedented political instability and in some cases even civil war and unparalleled dislocation of their economies and infrastructure, huge displacements of citizens and record refugee outflows. Thus, "ECOWAS Member States agree that good governance is essential for preserving social justice, preventing ethnic conflict, guaranteeing political stability and peace and for strengthening democracy" in the sub-region (Article 33). The article is no doubt also a direct response to developments in the international system since the early 1990s, especially the unprecedented "third wave" of democratisation that accompanied the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Finally under Article 35(2): "Member States shall ensure accountability, professionalism, transparency and expertise in the public and private sectors" in the sub-region. This is probably intended to checkmate the pervasive politics of exclusion in the sub-region and make government and politics open to all the citizens.

I would like to end the discussion by pointing out that what I have done in the foregoing paragraphs is merely to examine the instruments and blueprint of ECOWAS for promoting peaceful co-existence within and between member states as a sine qua non for consolidating peace, stability and security in West Africa. Whether this very epochal document will in the long run achieve such laudable goals or not is a moot point indeed.

Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

Sesay, Amadu, "Between the Olive Branch and the AK 47: Paradoxes of Recent Military Intervention in West Africa," ISSUP Bulletin, 6/99, University of Pretoria, 1999

—— "West African Military Interventions in the 1990s: The Case of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone," in L. Du Plessis and M. Hough (eds.), Managing African Conflicts; The Challenge of Military Intervention. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 2000.

Vogt, M.A., The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG. Lagos: Gabumoh Publishing Co., 1992

Aboagye, Lieutenant Colonel Festus B. ECOMOG: a Subregional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia. Accra: Sedco, 1999.

Olonisakin, Funmi. Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001.