DPMN Bulletin: Volume IX, Number 3, June 2002

Contrary to the high expectations of peace, security and development within Southern Africa after the major global and regional transformations of the early 1990s, the past decade has not been kind to the region. Civil wars and internal turmoil with spill-over effects and involvement by external actors continue unabated in a number of countries, whilst indices on human development indicate a deterioration in quality of life in eight countries in the region between 1995 and 1998 — Angola, Botswana, DRC, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The region is furthermore plagued by exceptionally high incidences of HIV/AIDS with up to 20%+ of the populations of some states (notably South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe) being infected.

SADC’s 1992 Treaty states clearly that the consolidation, defence and maintenance of democracy, peace, security and stability is one of the main objectives of the organisation Yet a disquieting trend has come to the fore during recent years: not only do many countries in Southern Africa suffer internal unrest and a deterioration in quality of life and governance, but in many instances these conflicts see the intervention of neighbouring countries and other external agents that often exacerbate matters and complicate attempts at preventing and solving conflicts.

This paper presents a brief analysis of the main problems facing the SADC region, concentrating on issues surrounding conflict and conflict resolution. These problems/issues are divided into domestic problems of individual states, strategic and political concerns, and institutional factors related specifically to the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS).

A number of individual SADC countries are either experiencing severe internal tensions or may be expected to fall prey to societal tensions and violence in the near future. Amongst these are:

· Swaziland: the continued lack of democracy and reluctance on the part of the royal family to move decisively towards a more open, accountable and democratic dispensation are pinpointed by many analysts as endangering peace and stability in the Swazi kingdom.

· Lesotho: the country will go to the ballot box again in the near future, yet the problems surrounding its Westminster-style first-past-the-post electoral system have not been solved yet. It is not inconceivable that SADC might be called upon again to intervene in the mountain kingdom to quell revolt and violent uprisings.

· Zimbabwe is considered by many to be on the slippery slope towards authoritarian rule in the guise of a façade democracy and to be facing economic ruin (there is already talk of food shortages looming, the need for importing maize and wheat and the lack of foreign currency to pay for these commodities) and it would be difficult for the country to recover its former economic stability and to restore international confidence in its government and economy.

· Malawi may undergo high levels of tension in the run-up to its presidential elections with some indication that its president might also make a bid for an anti-constitutional third term. Furthermore, the land invasions in Zimbabwe have had spill-over effects into Malawi and may in future turn violent. SA is also experiencing tension over land redistribution in certain areas.

· In Angola the civil war continues unabated, and it is not clear whether a peaceful solution is in the offing or whether it would be possible to end the war through a defeat of UNITA. Furthermore, the war has become thoroughly entangled with that in the DRC, with UNITA forces using bases in South-western DRC. It has been pointed out by one commentator that what would be needed is a joint operation on the part of SADC in order to fully destroy these bases for there to be any hope for an end to the civil war. There is little hope that Angola would fully withdraw from the DRC in the face of continued UNITA attacks from inside the DRC. Given the differences in opinion between the two "camps" in SADC with regard to the use of force (see subsequent discussion), it is doubtful whether a SADC force would be employed for such a task.

· The advent of the young President Joseph Kabila in the DRC has raised hopes of a peaceful settlement that would be brought about mainly through an inter-Congolese dialogue. Such a scenario would have to entail a withdrawal of all foreign forces from the conflict. There is, though, little indication that the concerns of these forces, particularly those supporting the rebel groups, would be laid to rest upon their withdrawal and the UN Secretary General has already expressed concern about the continued safety of certain groups in the DRC should foreign forces withdraw completely. In the mean time of course, as is also the case in Angola, the extent of suffering of the civilian population is increasing. The very deprivation suffered by people might in itself prevent peacebuilding in that conflict over scarce resources might result in a resumption of hostilities in the medium term. There also seems to be a lack of external support, especially in the form of much-needed financial resources, to implement decisions regarding an inter-Congolese dialogue. From a SADC perspective, matters are being complicated by the fact that some of the external forces involved in the conflict, viz. Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, are not SADC members.

Both the Angolan and Congolese wars clearly favour the few — local and foreign political and economic elites — whilst continuing to wreak havoc and catastrophe on the vast majority of ordinary people in these societies. Increasingly one sees the growth of "war economies" situations of internal violence and strife that thrive on economic agendas to the detriment of peaceful solutions and peacebuilding. In this regard, former President Ketumile Masire (facilitator of the peace process) has remarked that "[i]nitial motives are lost as conflicts degenerate into crude struggles for diamonds, precious metals and other mineral resources by a powerful elite, who have a vested interest in continued conflict and disorder that would allow them to sustain their continued patrimonialism."

These problems also implicitly or explicitly impact on regional security as issues of internal security may turn countries inwards and consume time, attention and resources, shifting regional concerns towards the bottom of the security agenda. Furthermore, many, if not, all domestic problems in southern Africa in one way or another are or become regional problems. The war in the DRC has attracted involvement by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola on the side of the Kabila government, whilst three non-SADC countries — Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi — are involved on the sides of the rebel forces (see later section).

Apart from some of the above-mentioned problems, particularly those concerning the civil wars in Angola and the DRC, various other problems bedevil attempts at regional security and community building in the southern African region:

· The inclusion of the DRC as a member of SADC has brought with it a host of problems. The two main problems as far as conflict is concerned are a) the very low level of development in that country (particularly with regard to the lack of infrastructure), making communication with it, integration with the rest of the region and attempts at conflict resolution well-nigh impossible and b) its inclusion immediately brought extra-regional actors, viz. Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, and to some extent the Central African Republic and even Libya, into the fray at a stage when the region was still trying to consolidate its own boundaries, membership, rules of engagement and modus operandi.

· The region has not yet fully defined (or designed) its approach to security. There still seems to be doubts as to whether the region is in favour of a collective defence system, or of a collective security system. Involvement by some members in the DRC points to a collective defence system; lack of involvement in Angola shows how difficult it would be to operate a collective security system. Collective security of course, does not mean "only" the use of armed force to maintain or ensure security, but also other means (cf. Chapter VII of the UN Charter), such as sanctions, etc. Yet, despite threats to the peace in a number of countries, few measures have been employed in the service of collective security, with the possible exception of the interventions in Lesotho in 1996 and 1998. The SADC Blantyre summit of 2001 mandated the organisation to redouble members’ efforts in tightening oil sanctions against Unita and to investigate the deepening political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe — both indications of a move in the direction of collective security. Of urgency in this regard is that the region should explore the doctrine of collective security in order to adapt it to the needs of its various members and the region as a whole: collective security pertains, traditionally, to interstate relations, whereas most of the conflicts in the region (at least at point of origin) are intrastate.

· The need for an early warning system with a view to conflict prevention (rather than management/resolution) has often been articulated. However, the region probably has, in various guises, a sufficient early warning system already. Ample warning, and facts to support warnings, exist, though without any sign that early warning can or does have much of an impact on behaviour. Rather, it would seem that the region needs some broad strategy, and with it the political will to act accordingly, as to how to deal with potential flash points and problems that might threaten security. The problem is not lack of early warning, but lack of a strategy and will to prevent conflict from breaking out.

· In addition, the region has not yet developed a broad peace support doctrine, something that is related to the previous remarks. Such a doctrine would have to be based on the region’s approach to and philosophy of security and would serve to underlie and clarify positions on collective defence/security, early warning and strategies with which to address potential and actual problems. The development of a peace support doctrine is closely related to institutional and structural issues, dealt with in the following sub-section.

Ever since 1996 SADC has battled with the establishment and implementation of a "political pillar" in addition to its "development pillar." The OPDS was dormant from the start, reflecting, in many ways, two of the big (related) obstacles to closer regional co-operation in southern Africa: lack of political will (largely a product of lack of confidence and trust) and a seemingly deep division within the organisation between its two "big" members, South Africa and Zimbabwe, and the respective supporters of each. South Africa, with the support mainly of Mozambique, Tanzania, Botswana and Zambia, is sometimes referred to as the "peacemaking bloc" and Zimbabwe (and its allies, particularly Angola and Namibia) as the "defence treaty bloc." These two labels to some extent summarise the different approaches to security within the region.

The problem is that for a security structure to be effective, it is necessary to have a strong leader or group of states that through commitment and example show the way and strengthen the institutions through which security is created and maintained. A regional security structure that is deeply divided cannot be effective. At most, as so often happens in the case of weak international organisations, one or more state or groups of states can use the organisation as a means to realise its/their own interests. The extent to which one can in all honesty refer to either the Lesotho intervention of 1998 or the current DRC intervention as SADC interventions/operations is doubtful.

The problems and friction surrounding the OPDS, its structure and its relationship to the SADC was finally resolved, at least on paper, at the August 2001 SADC Summit in Blantyre with the adoption of the OPDS Protocol, signed by all member states except Angola (due to a legal-technical matter that will probably be resolved in the very near future). However, the adoption of the Protocol does not necessarily mean that the region will then have a functioning and effective security structure. First, the Protocol will only come into force once it has been ratified by two-thrids of the member states. Also, a number of problems may well persist into the medium and long term:

· Should the war in the DRC drag on, there is little chance of the OPDS functioning, and even less of it playing a role in managing or resolving the conflict. This is due to the "bipolar" structure of the region mentioned earlier, which finds it clearest expression in the qualitative and quantitative differences between approaches to the conflict.

· Should the war end, the question of resources in order to operationalise the OPDS Protocol comes to the fore. Where will the financial and other resources come from and what are the chances of one or more states to gain power in or over the organ (whether member states or foreign donors) on the basis of contributions to the functioning of the institution?

· A crucial principle that still needs to be clarified (but this can only happen through example and experience) is whether the OPDS will be used by heads of states and governments to protect each other, or whether, in the spirit of the SADC Treaty, it will be used to protect the people of the region.

· Decision-making within the OPDS is another matter that can have a serious impact on the efficiency of the organ: if it is on the basis of consensus it may result in watered down or even no decisions in the case of contentious issues on the agenda. If a formula is found whereby member states will have to abide by majority decisions within the OPDS there might be more chance of success.

· A last challenge to be mentioned here is that of responsibility for regional security. Up to now the region has tended to "push problems upwards"; i.e., to identify regional conflicts as being the responsibility of either the OAU (soon to be the African Union and/or the UN (except in "easy" cases such as Lesotho). A problem is identified and then "passed on" or dealt with by member states in the name of the organisation, but the region, as a "collective actor," has not yet, it seems, adopted the principle of "the buck stops here."

Given the decisions contained in the Abuja Treaty, as well as the objectives contained in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, there is little doubt that the general thrust towards conflict prevention and resolution on the continent is to utilise sub-regional security groupings as part of the building blocks of continental integration, peace and security. For SADC, therefore, there is little choice but to actively address the various problems discussed above. Something to avoid at all cost is to concentrate all energy and resources on the institutionalisation of the region’s security structure (the OPDS), thereby focusing on structure, rather than on process and on dealing with the actual and very real security problems confronting Southern Africa. Though the relationship between development and security is intertwined and interdependent, the wars in Angola and the DRC clearly show that without stability, and at the very least a measure of effective governance, development will not take place. Vast amounts of money that could be spent on human development go into these wars, making the prospect of peace and security a fading dream. It is time for the leadership of the Southern African region to muster the political will that will make the OPDS a vehicle for the realisation of SADC’s objectives of building a regional community that will enhance the dignity and safety of all its inhabitants.