|
DPMF Publications: |
|
Reflective Account of the Plenary Session Day One |
Since the
1980s Africa’s quest for democratic rule and good governance has gained
greater ascendancy. This new drive has had the backing of the OAU in the
adoption of the African Charter on Popular Participation and Development in the
late 1980s. This new-found desire for democratization was reinforced by the OAU
in 1990 by the adoption of the Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government on the political and economic situation in Africa and the fundamental
changes taking place in the world. The efforts were not in vain as they bore
fruits in the early part of the 1990s with many African countries making the
effort to hold “free and fair elections” and to institute some form of
“democratic governments”. The overall current picture, however, shows that
the continent remains in turmoil, plagued by instability and conflicts. If the
early 90s saw greater progress towards democratic rule in some parts of the
continent, the latter part of the 90s can be characterized as a period of
instability and armed conflicts. The continuous armed conflict in the Southern
Sudan, the overthrow of President Mobutu in the former Zaire, followed by armed
rebellion in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the return of Sasso Ingueno
to power in the Congo by military insurrection, the rebellion/armed mutiny in
Lesotho, and the ongoing rebel incursions into Sierra Leone, represent a few
examples of how the African continent has remained in turmoil.
As its
contribution to the debate on the democracy in Africa, the Development Policy
Management Forum has been organizing annual conferences on democracy and
governance. The 7-10 December 1998 Conference, the second in a series, must be
seen as part of the ongoing search for answers to the undemocratic tendencies on
the continent.
The
Plenary Session involved the opening speeches, the Keynote Address as well as
three Guest Speakers. Mr. James Nxumalo, Director, Development Management
Division, ECA chaired the opening session.
The opening addresses were delivered by Ms Victoria Oku, Director of
Administration who represented the Secretary General of the OAU; Ms. Lalla Ben
Barka, Deputy Executive Secretary, ECA; Dr. Petros Olango, Deputy Speaker of the
House of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia; and Mr. S. Nyambi, UNDP
Resident Representative. Professor Archie Mafeje of the American University of
Cairo gave the Keynote Address. The four Guest Speakers were, Mr. L. A. Darga,
Former Minister of Housing and Environment in Mauritius; Professor H.Othman,
University of Dar-es-Salaam; Dr. E. Kimani, Kenyatta University, Kenya, and Ms
Joyce Mends-Cole, of the UNDP.
All
speakers during this session were of the view that democratic institutions are sine
qua non if Africa is to move out of its present predicament. The Opening
Addresses, the Keynote speech, as well as the contributions by the Guest
Speakers were unanimous in stressing the need to maintain the few democratic
achievements on the continent and improve upon the existing ones. The emphasis
was on the need to strive to improve upon what has been achieved, and also to
pursue the legitimate goals with a view to removing all outstanding impediments
to the realization of the optimum level of democratic development on the African
continent.
Divergence
of opinions, however, emerged in respect of the brand of democracy which is
suitable for Africa. Some participants were opposed to the imposition of the
western type of democracy on the peoples of Africa. For this school of thought,
individual African countries should be free to develop their own brand of
democracy. However, the danger in this approach is the fallacious assumption
that democracy has the chameleon type of image and changes to suit particular
circumstances (Frimpong, 1997a). While, some limited, but cosmetic variations
may be permissible, democracy, irrespective of where it operates, has certain
prerequisites which are common to all the environments in which it is planted,
be it in Africa, America, Asia, or Europe.
Any attempt to permit leaders to determine what they perceive as their
own brand of democracy has always played into the hands of African
“dictators”. They will choose to deflect any criticism against “their
control of power” and justify their authoritarian rule, particularly by
relying on the so-called African indigenous institutions. The same argument has
been used over the years in favor of one party state and the so-called African
socialism (Ayittey, 1991). Just as Africa cannot afford isolationism in the
global economic advancement, she cannot opt out of the game of democracy by
trying to insist on its own brand.
On this
particular issue, it was pointed out that the OAU must share the blame for the
failure to live up to its responsibility. The OAU favors the democratic wind of
change, which is supposed to be sweeping across the continent, and this is
commendable. However, while its pronouncements are in the right direction, its
actions and inaction’s do not suggest any serious concerted efforts to bring
about democratic rule on the continent. For example, the OUA cannot be seen to
be serious in its opposition to military interventions in the affairs of
civilian governments when it turns a blind eye to military dictators who have
self-styled themselves as democrats. It is not only an affront to the whole
concept of democracy, but also a mockery to allow military dictators to try to
topple another one in order to bring about democracy in Sierra Leone. Such
ambivalent positions have encouraged military adventurists to continue to
overthrow civilian regimes with impunity. The recent case of the Gambia readily
comes to mind. When Captain Yahya Jammeh overthrew an elected civilian
government in 1994 and subsequently organized presidential elections, which
turned him into a civilian president, no opposition was raised by the OAU.
Similarly, while the OAU was busy in trying to restore a civilian rule in
Sierra Leone, Sasso Ingueno in Congo was also busy in overthrowing a civilian
regime. This did not receive even a condemnation from the OAU. Is Congo
different from Sierra Leone?
The danger
with this inconsistent and incoherent policy on the part of the OAU towards
unconstitutional changes of government breeds contempt for the Organization and
encourages other coup-plotters to continue to destabilize the continent. If X in
county Y has been allowed to retain his coup by claiming to have won elections
which returned his country to civilian rule, what will prevent A in country B
from trying to emulate his example. But, as some delegates pointed out,
presumably we are expecting too much from the OAU.
What we fail to realize is the fact that, at the end of the day, the OAU
is made up of the Heads of State whose own interests are at stake. Any serious
condemnation emanating from the African leaders will amount to the OAU
condemning itself, which will be suicidal. The ambivalent and inconsistent
policy towards democratic rule is therefore the normal expectation from the
Organization since most of whose members do not own their positions by what can
be described as free and fair elections.
Delegates
were very emphatic in their condemnation of all forms of unconstitutional
changes of government, especially through military interventions. It was argued
that any attempt to change civilian government unconstitutionally reverses any
gains along the democratic ladder. In view of the serious threats that
unconstitutional change of government poses to the fledging democracies on the
continent, delegates were called upon to make serious recommendations which
might provide a lasting solution to the problem. In response to this quest and
as a means of counteracting this growing threat to democratic aspirations,
especially from military adventurists, delegates were urged to adopt a policy
which would seek to punish any person who had ever overthrown any lawfully
constituted government.
Pseudo-democratic
regimes, which are springing up and masquerading around the globe also came into
the spotlight. The question arose regarding the true democratic status of some
of the so-called democratic governments on the continent, particularly the
manner in which they are deemed to have attained the democratic status.
In this regard, the election process of determining democratic
governments was subjected to scrutiny. It was contented that the method of
declaring elections allegedly to be free and fair has to be re-examined. The
participants felt that the practice, adopted by the international community, to
declare that elections have been free and fair, by merely attesting to this from
the observations of selected voting stations on the day of the elections only,
does not provide a realistic tool for determining truly democratically elected
governments on the continent. The
role of NGOs in this regard, although laudable, was in many respects not very
helpful. Participants therefore advocated a rapid transformation of the whole
electoral system to ensure the operation of genuine democratic governments
within the affected countries. This will rely on the voters themselves having
the opportunity to assess the genuineness and legitimacy of elections, rather
than to be dependent on foreign assessment.
The
relevance of free and fair elections was emphasized. Whenever elections are not
freely and fairly conducted, the citizenry are cheated and not properly
represented. Any government born out of deceit and fraud breads contempt,
incompetence and instability. It is morally unacceptable for any person who has
unconstitutionally seized power and remained in power to be a candidate for the
return of the country to a democratic rule (Frimpong, ibid.). There is no way
that any election emanating from that regime with the leader still a candidate
can be free and fair. It is a verified truism that African governments, even
when supposedly democratic, control all institutions which are material in the
democratic process: the electoral authority, the security agencies, the
judiciary, and the media.
As a means
of ensuring that elections are free and fair in all countries on the continent
the practice of “leveling the playing-field” (which has been practiced in
South Africa), but is gradually gaining popularity in many parts of the
continent, should be adopted. One important requirement is an independent
electoral office to conduct the elections. It has to have the full authority to
ensure that all contesting political parties have equal chances, particularly
equal access to the media. More importantly, any person who has come to power by
unconstitutional means should be debarred from contesting elections that seek to
return the country to a democratic rule. As a deterrent against any future
military adventurist, it was strongly argued that any person who uses any
unlawful means to overthrow a lawfully constituted government, should be
debarred from ever holding public office. Furthermore, he should be pursued,
prosecuted and punished for the treasonable conduct, without any reference to
any statute of limitation (i.e. irrespective of the period that has elapsed
since the treasonable action took place) (SAUSSC, 1997) or any exemption
provisions.
Professor
Mafeje in his Keynote Address, Democracy, Civil Society and Governance in
Africa, challenges African countries to adopt a
critical approach towards the concept of democracy. He contends that “liberal
democracy” is not what Africa needs. In
his opinion, ‘liberal democracy’ as a concept is not appropriate for Africa.
Instead, we should advocate “social democracy”. He argues that liberal
democracy does not ensure social equality. Professor Mafeje emphasizes
that even in the developed countries with very well entrenched democracies, such
as the United States, the absence of social democracy results in the
marginalisation of a section of the population and thereby undermines the
democratic institutions. The same
can be said about South Africa with its fledging democracy. Because of the absence of social democracy in that country
there is a problem of income distribution. While a small minority abides in
abundance of wealth, the majority of the population continues to live in abject
poverty.
Under
“social democracy” the nation is preoccupied with the responsibility of
development and maintaining “national accumulation” (Darga, 1998) for
equitable distribution among the citizenry. Professor
Mafeje sees social democracy as becoming popular and eventually being widely
practiced. He, however, does not believe in social democracy that is imported,
but rather defined and applied within the environment it operates. In this sense
it has to be planted, germinated, rooted, and nurtured within the African
context.
It will be
presumptuous for anyone to assume that democracy, in its final analysis is an
abstract entity. The ultimate goal is the translation of its gains into the
promotion of the advancement and the welfare of the peoples of the countries
involved. The whole essence of the demands for the pursuit of democracy is the
belief that it will provide a tool for the rapid economic transformation of the
countries of Africa (Darga, ibid.). The assumption is that through democratic
institutions there will be stability that may operate as a catalyst for the
rapid economic growth which will remove the apparent economic stagnation of the
continent. Democracy, the argument goes, is therefore not the ultimate goal of
the proponents of the policy, but rather the economic empowerment and the
development of the countries.
This can
be deduced from IMF and the World Bank policies toward Africa. Where the
countries are able to implement their policies and progress in the economic
field, the two institutions have turned a blind eye and not insisted on
democracy as a prerequisite for assistance; but allowed dictatorial regimes to
benefit substantially from their aid programmes. The two classic examples are
Ghana and Uganda where dictators were in power and since they were prepared to
implement the IMF/World Bank policies of structural adjustment, the absence of
democracy did not pose any problem to the two institutions in dealing with those
countries (Darga, ibid.). This led to an “incongruous relationship” (Frimpong
1997b) between the international financial institutions and undemocratic
governments.
It is a
fallacy to link democracy with economic development and transformation. The
facts around the globe depict a different story. There is no doubt that
democracy can provide a tool for economic development as a result of stability
and the ability to attract domestic and foreign private investment. It is,
however, erroneous to assume that democracy per
se can bring about development. There are a number of democratic countries
whose socio-economic performance has been a failure. Similarly, a number of
undemocratic countries exist which have been successful economically. It is
therefore unfortunate that both the IMF and the World Bank have made democracy a
condition to the latter’s lending programme, and more so for the fact that
those institutions do not adhere strictly to this policy.
Mr. Darga,
in his presentation, Mauritius-Governance Challenges in Sustained
Democracy in a Plural Society, cited the cases
of both Rawlings and Museveni as examples where their regimes, even though not
democratically elected had the full backing of the IMF/World Bank economic and
financial power. This ambivalent position has itself seriously undermined the
true democratic aspirations in some of the countries. The IMF/World Bank policy
of sustaining and propping up dictatorial governments had the unfortunate
consequence of weakening and even destroying the genuine aspirants for
democratic reforms as they were branded as the “enemies of the economic
reforms initiated by the governments with the support of the international
lending institutions”. Those dictatorial regimes, on the other hand, enjoyed
the international reputation for the “so-called success stories” (Frimpong,
ibid.). The consequence of this was that any opposition to the regimes was seen
as undermining their achievements. The opposition that offered what could be
seen as the aspiration for true democracy to those regimes, was therefore not
accorded any respect in the international media and were seen as impediments to
the progress of their countries. In the process the opposition was weakened,
fragmented and even destroyed. The outcome of this was that the regimes not only
continued in their domination of the political as well as economic scenes, but
that their leaders also managed eventually to succeed themselves as heads of
state in the alleged return to civilian rule. Rawlings of Ghana, Museveni of
Uganda, and Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia became Presidents of their countries with
the approval and the blessings of the international community.
The
African intellectual or academic community was singled out for criticism for the
role they have been playing in the democratic aspirations of their countries.
Many participants held the view that the military as well civilian dictators
have relied heavily on the intellectual community in perpetuating their
dictatorial rule. It is not uncommon for many intellectuals to resign from their
positions at the Universities to accept appointments by military officers who
have overthrown the civilian governments. This has not been limited to military
rule. The proponents of the one party rule were academics in the ruling party.
Similarly, they were in the forefront in advocating the so-called African
socialism and defending the need for a different kind of democracy on the
continent. It is therefore not surprising that the soldiers have very little
respect for the African academics whom he despises, in spite of his so-called
learning, since for bread he will kowtow to any situation without any qualms. It has been pointed out
that the intellectual community in AFRICA has not sufficiently
addressed itself to the social, economic and political problems on the continent
through appropriate research and dissemination of scientifically informed
conclusions and recommendations and has on a number of occasions compromised its
role in society by identifying itself for selfish interest with the undemocratic
governments (SAUSSC, 1997).
Participants
strongly argued for a change of attitude on the part of the African
intellectuals in adopting principled positions on matters of national
importance.
Even if it is conceded that
democratic rule has gained some roots in certain parts of Africa, the consensus
among participants was that good governance has been lacking. The importance of
“governance” in the democratic processes in the world has been stressed in
many fora. As a working definition, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
associates governance with the “exercise of political, economic and
administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all
levels. Governance comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their
differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations” (UNDP 1997a:iv).
Governance has also been seen as an essential tool for both political progress
and economic development. The Global Coalition for Africa at its meeting in
Benin in June 1993 “argued that improved governance was important not only for
its own sake as it is related to economic development, but also to build
political support for necessary reforms, attract private investment and
encourage international development assistance” (GCA Secretariat, 1998:1).
Under good governance, a predictable legal environment is expected to flourish
which enhances private sector confidence in the economy and encourage
public/private sector partnership in national development (Frimpong, 1998).
Considering
the importance that good governance can play in the development of Africa most
participants urged countries to adopt concrete measures to ensure that their
countries improve upon the governance situation. Darga (1998), however, argued
against the imposition of any foreign conditionalities in determining the level
of governance. He preferred the populace as the best barometer for the
assessment of governance since they are the best indicators as to whether the
government is delivering or not. The danger in this proposition is the fact that
it is not uncommon for the citizenry to be manipulated by the government in
power. A combination of both the
international and the local assessment is therefore a better option in
determining the governance situation of a country. In this regard, the
“Self-Assessment” guidelines prepared by the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA,
1998) can be used as a working tool.
On the sensitive issue of ethnicity, Professor Mafeje argued
that nations have varieties of ethnicity, as there is no nation that can be said
to be purely ethnically based. He
reminded participants that Africans have spent the past 15-20 years dealing with
ethnicity, (a term which he found less ideologically loaded than tribalism),
without reaching any clearly defined goal.
He felt that the definition of tribe itself can be problematic: is it by
objectivity to determine its existence or not, or is it an issue of identity
which is used to determine the tribe? Professor
Mafeje however, believes that ethnicity has been used in many parts of Africa,
and even in other parts of the world, for political purposes. He gave as an
example the case of Rwanda, especially during the recent massacre of the unarmed
civilians.
Ethnicity
per se is not a negative concept and therefore the
popular explanation that ethnicity is the cause of African problems should be
rejected. It is rather its abuse and misuse that has been a problem for
the African continent. This is supported by Professor Mafeje (ibid.) who
stresses that the real problem is how best
to share power. He argues that there can be no nation state in Africa, but
rather only a multiplicity of identities. He contends that this is only a
utopian idea, and that a nation state in Africa is impossible as this is not
possible even in Europe, which, with very long history of nation building has
not been able to attain that. He does not think that federalism offers the
answer either. He cites Nigeria as
an example, where an attempt at federalism has not produced a lasting and
coherent nation. In any case, Professor Mafeje stresses that Nigeria is not a
federal state in the true sense of the word, but a unitary one which dominates
others. As a solution, Mafeje believes that regional integration should be
pursued as it has the capability to defuse tensions, as was done in Rwanda. But
the danger in this proposition is the possible domination of smaller ethnic
groups.
It is not uncommon for politicians to capitalise on
ethnicity for purposes of amassing power at the expense of other ethnic groups.
Such leaders have manipulated ethnicity for political gains as a means of
ensuring their desire to hold on to power. Politicians have been known to rely
on divide and rule tactics by playing one ethnic group against another in order
to ferment trouble as a pretext to impose their will upon the people. Leaders on
the continent are known to have exploited ethnic differences in order to pave
the way for authoritarian rule. Ethnic conflicts which have been common on the
continent are also generally fanned by self-seeking power-drunk politicians who
stop at nothing in their pursuit of power. In the process, many lives have been
lost and countless innocent ones are left bleeding. As Professor Mafeje puts it,
the ordinary people are the ones who suffer and not the leaders. The genocide in
Rwanda offers a classic example, where the ordinary peasants were massacred,
while the politicians escaped. Many African leaders who have participated in
such murderous activities have their hands soiled in the blood of the innocents.
Professor Mafeje discussed the issue of the exercise of
state power. He observed that the
state power has been equated with control. In some instances, it has been used
for domination and marginalisation. This has had the negative effect of creating
factionalism, as the power base does not represent the will of the people.
Such actions, Professor Mafeje argues, do not afford a natural definition
of ethnicity. When applied to democratic rule, ethnicity, in this sense, could
pose a very serious problem for many African countries. Professor Mafeje
contends that democracy itself has its own problems as it operates on the basis
of the so-called majority rule. This
has an inherent element of domination of the smaller ethnic groups by the larger
ones. He gave as an example of Zimbabwe where the Ndebeles
constitute only 20% of the population while the Shonas far outnumber them.
In such a case the Shonas shall always emerge winners.
The Ndebeles, in order to survive, had no option, but to join the ruling
party, thus effectively creating a one party state.
In his opinion, the same can be said about Malawi where the ruling party
tries to play down the issue of domination by claiming to represent the whole
nation.
The
important role that civil society can play in the democratization process, as
well as in the development of the African continent, need not be overemphasized.
Professor Othman, who spoke on Civil Society and Struggle for
Independence, focused on the overall role that
civil society could play in the democratic process and the assessment of
governance. Most participants supported the important role that civil society
plays in various countries in the pursuit of democratic goals. In his earlier
presentation, Professor Mafeje had also touched on this issue. While he believes
that civil society has a role to play in the development of the continent, he
nevertheless thinks that civil society is
weak in Africa and does not make any significant impact on the political,
economic or social situation in Africa. In particular, he takes issue with NGOs,
which are also classified under civil society.
He argues that some NGOs are used to subvert promising governments in
Africa.
While
civil society can play an important role in supporting the democratic processes,
it was observed that the local civil society has generally been very weak in
this exercise. What baffled participants was this apparent weakness emerging
only after independence. In his presentation, Professor Othman noted that in the
struggle for independence all civil society groups were mobilized and involved.
There was no distinction between the youth, old and gender.
The post-independence period, however, has witnessed the emergence of one
party states in many African countries. Ghana
became a de facto one party state in
1959 and Tanzania in 1964. In most
cases the civil society, including the Trade Union Congress (TUC) became wing of
the CPP. In Tanzania the TUC was
banished and eventually became an integral part of the ruling party.
In this process most civil society became part of the ruling parties and
lost their independence and ability to fight for and protect civil liberties.
They were eventually destroyed.
The 1980s
saw the revival of civil society with the emergence of democratic aspirations in
many African countries. The TUC
spearheaded the demands for change as the working conditions had fallen below
acceptable standards. Furthermore,
civil liberties had been trampled upon for far too long and many citizens were
yearning for civil liberties, political freedom, better living standards, and
freedom from oppression. In South Africa, for instance, because the apartheid
system had dehumanized an overwhelmingly large section of the population, the
demand for change was loudest. The trade union movement was in the forefront for change as
other political activities were banned.
Civil society also found room to maneuver as the state withdrew from many activities because of either latent recognition of its inability to continue with such activities or because of the limited resources at the disposal of the state. Among such activities were schools and hospitals run by churches that had previously been taken over by the state at the time of independence. Civil society under those circumstances has taken over the activities from which the state had withdrawn as a vacuum has been creat