Multiparty Democracy and Ethnic Divisions in African Societies: are they compatible?
By Archie Mafeje sociology department American university Cairo, Egypt

Dissensions

In view of the persistent state of civil strife and political disintegration in Africa over almost two decades, it is not surprising that topics such as the title of this paper recur in African intellectual discourse and that numerous workshops/conferences are held on democracy and governance in the region. But there is always the danger that these could degenerate into therapeutic rituals among compromised, self-seeking African intellectuals and a hypocritical donor community. Why is it that, in spite of repeated international denunciations on a plethora of fora of the iniquities and excesses of despotic African regimes, the support for anti-democratic forces in Africa continues to be overwhelming? Despots such as Mobutu, Abacha, Arap Moi and murderous regimes in Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo are never short of political and military support from western democracies. In the circumstances why should any serious and self-respecting African democrat take the hue and cry about “human rights” among western leaders seriously? If the issue is real politic, then the least potential revolutionaries in Africa can ask is to be left alone.

Such a stance would entail rejection of western liberalism and paternalism. However, it would be foolish to interpret this as a rejection of all forms of international cooperation. Principally, it would be a rejection of insidious western intellectual imperialism which seems never to cease and an insistence that those who are historically associated with imperialism do not impose their terms of reference on those who wish to liberate themselves and by so doing transform the whole. Such authentic representations imply generation of new concepts and research protocols. Above all, they imply interrogation and deconstruction of conventional western notions of democracy, human rights, multi-partyism, and liberation. While any “dialogue between cultures” cannot be denied apriori, it is important to note that current processes of globalization which aim at homogenization are antithetical to such a dialogue. Monopolarity subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union seems to have given western imperialism a new confidence to silence other cultures and to deny in advance alternative or novel styles of life even by violent means in the name of world peace.

Africa is having more than its fair share of civil strife but not without the connivance of western powers. This takes the form of covert political and military support to favored factions in search of client states or in defense of existing ones. The French complicity in Rwanda and in the Congo and the American duplicity in Angola and the Congo are some of the recent examples which drew hardly any protest from western democracies. Instead, they were met with a conspiracy of silence. In the meantime, the western media was whipping up a hysteria about the scourge of “tribalism” or “ethnicity” in Africa. Not as much was said about Bosnia. On the contrary, western powers were morally indicted for having failed to prevent such atrocities as genocide and ethnic-cleansing in Bosnia. In depicting the bestialities which were committed by contending factions in Bosnia western commentators came nowhere near drawing parallels with Africa and in invoking their usual ideologically-loaded terminologies such as “tribalism” and “ethnicity”. It transpires, therefore, that in order to liberate themselves democratic modern Africans have to contend not only with their political heritage but also with the political and intellectual iniquities of western imperialism - protests to the contrary notwithstanding. Implicit in this is a call for a change of political and intellectual terms of reference - a deconstruction of hegemonic forms of political behavior and thought, an African renaissance in defiance of the prevailing Afro-pessimism.

Interrogations

Are there ethnic divisions in African societies? or are they imagined or invented? If so, by whom? Since the publication of Benedict Anderson’s pioneering book, Imagined Communities (1983), there has been a spate of publications on the theme and a sustained debate among social and revisionist historians about the theoretical status of such notions as “tribalism”, “ethnicity”, and “tradition”. Among such studies may be mentioned The Invention of Ethnicity (Sollors, 1989), The Invention of Tradition (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983), The creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (Vail, 1989), The Invention of Africa (Mudimbe, 1988), “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa” (Ranger in Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983), “The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe” (Ranger, 1985), “Politics, Ideology and the Invention of ‘Nguni’” (Wright, 1985), “The Invention of Tradition Revisited” (Ranger, 1994) and a number of similar works. Suggestive as these new departures by historians have been, they have hardly had any impact on political scientists. Generally-speaking, African political scientists under the influence of the American empiricist school persist in treating the so-called “tribalism” and ethnicity” as things in themselves. These conceptions are illusory and need to be de-constructed and replaced by radical or transcendent thought-categories which are attuned to the reality of contemporary Africa. Consequently, our first task in this essay is to interrogate the concept of “ethnicity” in Africa and second to explore the question of whether “multi-partyism” by itself and in itself implies “democracy”.

Although the term “ethnicity” is often used interchangeably with “tribalism”, in fact it is semantically a successor of the latter and in social science discourse is presumed to be less offensive or more respectable than the term “tribalism” which got associated with Africa in western minds. Yet, its ideological connotations are not dissimilar. Perhaps, what it has in its favor is the fact that Africans have no objections to it. Indeed, unlike “tribalism” which is generally spurned, African scholars use it freely, as is shown by its frequent invocation in their social scientific discourse. Even this new orthodoxy will neither suffice for nation countries such as Somalia, Lesotho, Swaziland nor for multi-lingual countries such as Tanzania and
Mauritius. Above all, it does not explain why “ethnicity” is strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in Africa and elsewhere. All this leads us to believe that “ethnicity” is not what it is presumed to be. Rather, it is a metaphor for things which could be understood otherwise.

Therefore, in our interrogation, while acknowledging the fact that “ethnicity” has become a pervasive problem in Africa, we will try to dispel the supposition that it is attributable to the existence of a multiplicity of natural units of affiliation called “ethnic groups” within African countries. Since social science propositions are highly debatable, in times of controversy it is always advisable to return to basics in order to solve any apparent paradox. Such a puzzle can only be solved by digging deep into the ethnography of contemporary African social formations. First, with reference to the so-called ethnic groups, it is worth recalling the distinction made in classical sociology between a social group and a social category. Social groups are characterized by necessary patterns of social interaction. A lineage, an association, a political faction or a religious sect would be good examples. In contrast, while characterized by a common identity, social categories exhibit no necessary or regular patterns of interaction. This is true of what is called “ethnic groups”, members of the same religious faith, race or sex.

Although it might come as a surprise, the same is true of what is generally referred to as “political elites” in Africa. Their dominance does not necessarily give them coherence. They are a loose category which historically has always comprised different social factions. It is the persistent internecine struggles among these which gave rise to accusations of “tribalism” in Africa after independence and of late of “ethnicity”. It is also arguable that the members of the “African elite” in any given country are too loosely organized and their interests too personalized to constitute a class in itself and for itself. Historically, it is unimaginable that members of a hegemonic class would engage in unbridled mutual extermination and preside over the destruction of their supreme instrument of social control, the state, as has become the order of the day in Africa. However, the issue is whether such internecine struggles necessarily derive from “multi-ethnicity” in African countries.

In pursuance of our absolute denial of such a supposition we would posit that existence is not necessarily limited to systems of social classification, that is, ethnic existence does not connote “ethnicity”. Here, in the same way that we distinguished between “social groups” and “social categories”, a sharp distinction could be drawn between “categorical” and “structural” relations. Insofar as systems of social classification are notional and taken for granted by their bearers they are passive and non-binding whereas socially structured relations are not only binding but are also purposeful and dynamic. Thus, people with different socio-cultural identities can co-exist amicably, without experiencing ethnic antipathy or exhibiting “ethnicity”. However, in times of structural conflict not between whole social categories but between interacting groups this could occur. It is under these circumstances that perceived identities of difference are called into play. In other words, perceived ethnic identities are used as an excuse for structural conflicts which are extrinsic to them. Foremost among the latter are discrimination, deprivation, marginalization and competition among aspirant national elites.

From the above it is apparent that “ethnic conflict” or “ethnicity” is a result of greater interaction among people with different socio-cultural identities within the same geo-political space. In other words, it would not be unreasonable to postulate that “ethnic conflict” and “ethnicity” are a consequence of processes of state formation in post-independence Africa. Unlike pre-colonial and colonial wars of conquest, subordination and rebellion, they are not struggles for autonomy but for relative advantage within the same set-up. They are, thus, in theory non-transcendent. This supposition is confirmed by the very fact that “ethnic conflicts” are intermittent but recurrent and that “ethnicity” is invoked most frequently in times of crisis of state power. In due course, they become part of the existing political culture, a determinant ideological medium for seeking relative advantage.

From the above perspective, it is apparent that “ethnic conflict” or “ethnicity” is directly related to centralization of power and to the competition it engenders. However, it does not seem that at the popular level ethnic competition necessarily means “ethnic conflict”. For instance, under normal social circumstances certain communities get specialized in specific fields of endeavor e.g. pastoralism, arable agriculture, trade, iron-works, fishing and martial arts. The specialists might be in competition with one another for access to resources but also by virtue of their specialization they need to cooperate with one another. In this sense ethnic diversity could contribute to a greater social division of labor in the new African states. This is positive attribute and does not connote fissiparous conflict. Secondly, whatever conflict might occur in this context normally does not involve every member but only particular groups. At this level antagonisms between groups within given ethnic communities cannot be and have not been referred to as “ethnicity”. The term, “ethnicity”, does not refer to mundane activities at the local level but to political competition and antagonisms at the national level. It first appears in discourse on Africa in the post-independence era and has thoroughly negative connotations, irrespective of who uses it. It refers to a negative state of African national politics, to a perversion of the objectives of the nationalist movement and a negation of nation-building, as was envisaged at independence.

Thus, “ethnicity”, is an offspring of modern African politics and not of African antiquity. As far as space and time are concerned, there is no organic link between it and what is called “ethnic groups”. However, there is perceptual concurrence between “ethnicity” and what people are called or call themselves. But this occurs on the ideological plane. While “ethnicity” is unambiguously authored and invoked by modern African political elites so as to gain relative advantage, it receives resonance from the popular masses because they are themselves predisposed towards such manipulation by their own taken-for-granted classificatory systems or categorical identities. These political elites know this and take advantage of it when they cannot achieve their ambitions by other means.

But in both cases, like in any other ideology, there is a certain falsity because they obscure an objective world of reference such as class differentiation and group conflicts among the same people, and enduring cooperation among people of different ethnic origins. Certainly, the political elites never refer to their real interests such as quest for power and wealth when they invoke ethnicity. Although the ordinary citizens often suffer the consequences of the ideology of ethnicity, they tend to treat this as something different or attribute it to imagined enemies. That is why it is important sociologically to recognize the fact that the social reproduction of ethnic identities is a serious form of indoctrination. The current African political culture which encourages this must be seen as degenerate and socially destructive. But then, why do the African political elites persist in promoting the scourge of “ethnicity”? As has been shown by experience, it does not lead to anything but disaster.

In answering this question it is not sufficient to point to self-aggrandizement by ruling elites in Africa. As class history from elsewhere demonstrates, this can be achieved by other means. Secondly, if we are right in supposing that “ethnicity” is an ideological ploy or metaphor for things which could be understood otherwise, then it is incumbent upon us to show what is hidden or lacking. It can be said that what is hidden is not even class interests but sectional interests. The distinction here would be that class interests are vital to the class as a whole, whereas sectional interest, if allowed to predominate, could jeopardize the interests of the whole. In this context it is noteworthy that so far the development of a true capitalist class in black Africa has been the slowest in the world. It is also interesting to observe that, while African ruling elites are full of bourgeois aspirations, they are devoid of any consistent capitalist outlook, discipline, and ethics. Plunder of state revenues is fair game in their minds and corruption is a way of life among them. True as these are, they do not explain the prevalence of such cultural poverty among the African ruling elites. It is as if they are working under a spell to confirm the worst prejudices of their detractors. One suspects that the real problem is their inability to convert state revenues into real capital. The fact that there is no difference in patterns of investment or lack thereof between mineral-rich and mineral-poor African countries is extremely revealing.

Earlier, we suggested that “ethnicity” is an ideological ploy used by African political elites in retreat. It is an admission of failure or an excuse for obvious shortcomings such as were mentioned above. However, if we have succeeded in dissociating “ethnicity” as an ideological ploy from actual ethnic existence, we still have some semantic problems with which to contend. For instance, what is the difference between an “ideological ploy” and true “class ideology”? Our use of the word, “ploy”, to describe the behavior of African political elites is perfectly correct because a ploy is a stratagem, a cunning manoeuver to gain advantage. What makes it “ideological” is not what the African elites believe or do not believe, but its ideational or cognitive status among the target constituencies. All the elites do is to appropriate if for their own purposes. This is an ideological reflex but it is not ideology in itself. The classical definition of ideology as a rationalization of class interests seems still to have a heuristic value. This applies with even greater force to leading or hegemonic classes, as history shows.

In this regard, the word “rationalization” is felicitously ambiguous because it refers both to practical considerations and to normative claims to justify them. Therefore, “ideology” can be used in a positive as well as a negative sense. Consequently, a successful critique of “ideology” cannot rely on this ambiguity because it is true of all preferred alternatives in collective social existence. Critique of ideology is most effective when it is able to exploit the discrepancy between given normative claims and objective reality. The difficulty in the African case is that, while we are able to point to the authoritarian character of African regimes, their venality, and to the kleptocratic tendencies of their bureaucracies, we are not able to find what might be called the guiding ideology of the emergent African elites since the Pan-Africanist movement. Our hypothesis is that it is lack of this broader vision of society and the region which has produced the degenerate political culture of “ethnicity”, clientism, and petty dictators. This makes African political elites particularly uncompetitive in the global setting. It is the same which accounts for the disintegration of the African states and the unparalled decay of their economies.

As far as distortion of reality or mystification is concerned, the role of “ethnicity” is acknowledged by a number of scholars but is not recognized as ideology in itself. Instead, it is the ethnic self-consciousness of certain ethno-linguistic categories that is seen as “ideology” or “collective fictions” (Ranger, 1994). Writers such as Colin Legum (1970) recognize the dependence of competing African political elites on “ethnic sensibilities”. In a very suggestive study Ansa Asamoa (1989) reported that in Ghana “tribal societies” that had been formed purely for socio-economic reasons were “infiltrated or/and influenced in one way or another by tribal politicians and turned into a breeding ground for tribal animosity” (15). As if to correct his own misconceptions, elsewhere in the paper he unambiguously states that: “Desperate they [the ‘bourgeoisie’] resort to tribal politics as expressed in the polarization of political forces during the First, Second, and Third Republics” (18). Still suffering from terminological lapses, he concludes: “They [‘ethnic conflict’] are a universal phenomenon which, in diverse ways, is manipulated in time and space by dominant interest groups. The mass of Ghanaians may not be conscious of its use as a weapon in the class war” (19).

Although still plagued by the illusion of “ethnic consciousness”, Tokpa (1995) writing from the Liberian perspective hits the nail on the head when he asserts that: “... what appears to be the predominance of the ethnic and military factors in the crisis threaten to obfuscate the socio-economic context in which ethnic rivalries have become so Violent” (2). He reaches the same conclusion as Asamoa: “and since it becomes difficult for political interest groups to justify their separate existence on the basis of appeal to socio-economic programmes, factional struggle within the ruling bourgeoisie reinforces the emergence and persistence of ethnic identity and consciousness” (3-4). Likewise, Olukoshi and Agbu (1995) underscore in the Nigerian crisis “the increasing resort by the highly profligate political elite of the Second Republic to ethnic, religious, and regional forms of mobilization; the growing centrality of religion to the national political discourse” (2). Once again, in this case as in the previous cases the emphasis is on resort to given forms of consciousness and not on their invention or authorship as an ideology.

Kazah-Toure (1995), following in the footsteps of Bonat (1990), came closest to abandoning the former position by treating “ethnic” identities as non-causal. He states that: “It should be noted that inter-ethnic contradictions were principally either secondary or tertiary. But it was not in the interest of the ruling classes to let these be seen as such. In their quest to acquire both economic and political power, the dominant forces in the communities intensified their drive for primordial and ethno-religious politics" (18). Whether Kazah-Toure’s “communities” are imagined or real, he clinches his point by stating that “The crave for positions on the mere basis of ethnic and religious representation had by the 1970s become a weapon used by the various segments of the Nigerian ruling class in the competition for government appointments and patronage, contracts, and … what they called ‘scarce resources’” (19).

It is apparent that all see “ethnicity” as a negative force which is aimed at gaining power through manipulation of sectarian sentiments. For this reason, it can be described as antipathetic. At the same time it is important to recognize sympathetic forms of organization among people of the same ethnic origin. These include such things as mutual-help associations, burial associations and social clubs. They are inward-directed and are most common in African towns where new-comers might suffer anonymity, social and emotional insecurity. Colonial anthropologists used to call these organizations “tribal associations”. But they confused the issue by referring to them at the same time as “voluntary associations”. This was self-contradictory because according to their own admission, tribal organizations were “prescriptive” whereas “voluntary organizations” were discretionary, that is, individuals were free to choose. The latter was seen as a sign of progress or “social change” - a movement away from barbarism to civilization. These colonial prejudices notwithstanding, the important point to grasp is that what was called “tribal associations” were people’s organizations. They were neither vicious by nature nor were they intended to exploit or oppress others. Furthermore, they were not “tribal” but ethnic in a non-tribal social setting. From the point of view of the members, their value was instrumental rather than ideological. Secondly, their relations were personal rather than categorical. It is, therefore, illogical to refer to the solidarity they exhibited as “ethnicity”, which is an evocative, impersonal and pernicious force. It cannot be over-emphasized that "ethnicity" if anything is their negation insofar as it seeks to prevent their mundane and innocent interest.

In social science discourse it is difficult to prove any set of propositions which one may wish to advance. These can at best be looked upon as interpretations of observable acts of men and women in society. If in this there is an inevitable element of subjectivity, it can always be mitigated by illustration. Even in this case it is possible that, while systematized illustrations are critical in theory-building, unstudied illustrations are probably more illuminating sociologically. This is so because they provide clues to the subjective meaning of the actors. It is these that the anthropologists referred to as “exegetic texts”. They are texts authored by living subjects in their own context. So far we have tried to advance our argument by referring to texts by various observers. Now, an attempt will be made to check our suppositions against some verbal reports by those involved in the most recent cases of alleged “ethnic conflict in Africa”. These are very scanty. Yet, if ordinary people are to be accused of “ethnicity”, it seems very important that their voices are also heard. For instance, there are now numerous texts on “ethnicity” in Nigeria and yet the supposed subjects of “ethnic conflict” remain invisible and their representations are conspicuous by their absence in scholarly discourse, as if they are simply automatons. Likewise, in the case of Liberia it is reported that in recent years “ethnic conflict” has become rampant (Tokpa, 1995) but what is used as its indices is only national leaders. This is also true of the Somali case in which intellectual discourse does not go further than the “warlords”. Needless to say, sociologically/anthropologically, this is a very unsound procedure.

From limited exegetic texts from Kenya and Rwanda, we see glimpses of what we are referring to. Their greatest value is that they illuminate what is obscured by intellectual and political rationalizations. Referring to what was called “ethnic clashes”, “tribal clashes”, or simply “land clashes” during the transition from one-party rule to multi-party democracy in Kenya, Theodora Ayot reports that:

This is indirect reporting but makes clear who the instigators of the “tribal clashes” were. However, it fails to reveal the identity of the actual perpetrators of the violence. From the point of view of what became known as “majimboism” in Kenya, which could be construed as “ethnic cleansing”, the driving force behind it was President Daniel Moi’s “ethnicity”. Nonetheless, his “ethnic group” also got hit presumably by association with his dictatorship. The question then is who were the “unknown” attackers armed with “bows and arrows”? Did they represent any particular “ethnic group” or were some of them supporters of multiparty democracy? This ambiguity is almost clarified by Ayot in another passage where she reports that:

The latter confirms Ayot’s earlier observation that: “In their desperate attempt to realize some form of prophecy that the advent of multipartism would lead to chaos, some leaders went out of their way to inculcate in the minds of their people the feeling that there were some groups in Kenya who were referred to as foreigners in their own land” (6).

This is confirmed by yet another Kenyan researcher, Grace Wamue. She reports that:

All the peoples mentioned in these texts are known to have lived together peacefully and intermarried over a long time and now were being incited against one another and forced to break up their marriage ties and enduring neighborly relations. The evidence against Kenyan national leaders is incontrovertible. What is missing in these texts is what by all logic must have been conflicting responses from the affected groups.

In contrast to the Kenyan researchers, in Rwanda Mahmoud Mamdani made it a point to interview the victims of “ethnicity” in our sense of the term. Having got background information on how the Presidential Guard and the Intrahamwe (militia) were brought in to attack one particular community, Mamdani asked his informant about his secteur, who lived in it, how many Batutsi, how many Bahutu, and who participated in the killing. The following was his reply:

When asked if there were any inter-marriages in his secteur, the informant explained:

According to this testimony the division in the community was not natural but socially contrived. The killings were not spontaneous but planned from above and enforced by government agents.

The irony of it all is that while the “Batutsi” became unmistakably objects of the massacre, at the local level some “Bahutu” killers also fell victims of the massacre. They unwillingly murdered their wives, failing which they were murdered themselves or forced to commit suicide. Those who survived were culpable of murder, irrespective of their personal choices. The agony of the unintended victims is vividly depicted by the sad story of the “Muhutu” professor Mamdani encountered at the Universite National de Rwanda. The following is her narrative:

Now, the question is, with the new liberators in Kigali, why do the “Batutsi” survivors of the massacre find it difficult to defend those “Bahutu” who allied themselves with them in their darkest hour? In their perception would this compromise their “ethnic” identity rather than confirm their apparent social and political identification. Or would it diminish the propaganda value of what has been so forcefully projected as “genocide”, without the benefit of ethnographic, demographic, and sociological analysis even among scholars?

Suffice it to say, despite any emotional sensibilities, it is clear that the Rwandan situation is sociologically more complex than the various antagonists would like to have us believe or would tendentious historiography indicate. Charles Gasarase (1995), a Rwandan himself, would seem to share this point of view for he states that:

Regardless of what one would describe as conceptual inconsistencies or lack of rigor in the use of concepts in Gasarase’s texts, his substantive argument is borne out by exegetic texts supplied by Mamdani. His theoretical suppositions are basically the same as ours, although he does not use “ethnicity” as a critical concept.

From the above reports, it is apparent that the African predicament resides not in the existence of multi-ethnicity but in the fact that it is those who have the responsibility to deal with the National Question who are the root cause of incessant political conflicts on the continent. As far as “ethnicity” is concerned, it is demonstrably true that competing African elites are its authors and not the bearers of what is called ethnic identity. As has been shown, ethnic identity by itself and in itself is innocuous. Secondly, there is nothing intrinsic about it, as it can be substituted for by other identities such as religion, race, or regionalism but not nationalism which is by definition transcendent, unlike these other identities which in our view are intermittent and non-transcendent insofar as they do not seek to burst asunder existing national boundaries. Non-recognition of the concept of “contradiction” makes it possible for liberal scholars to assume that all conflicts are amenable to the same treatment, namely, rational negotiations. There is everything to be said for a rational approach to social problems but this often runs against vested interests. Rarely are the powerful willing to negotiate away their relative advantage. Therefore, wars of liberation or of resistance are neither irrational nor illogical. They are not amenable to “conflict resolution” until their root causes have been removed or sufficiently ameliorated.

In the context of what is considered to be the primary problem in modern African states, namely, “ethnic conflict”, several rational schemes aimed at reducing tension among warring ethnic groups have been proposed. These range from proportional representation, decentralization, federation, to confederation. All these have their merits but need not solve existing social problems in society. For instance, if it is assumed that African states suffer from chronic instability because of the existence of many competing ethnic groups within their borders, then proportional representation might not only perpetuate these identities but might also condemn smaller ethnic groups to permanent domination by larger ethnic groups. Decentralization might be an improvement on proportional representation insofar as it guarantees local autonomy, irrespective of the relative size of each group. Secondly, decentralization refers more to sub-regions or provinces than to particular ethnic groups. In a situation such as in Kenya it would render majimboism unconstitutional. In Rwanda it would render the supposed division between “Bahutu” and “Batutsi” inapplicable. Under these conditions the point of reference would be residence rather than ethnic origin. This would be consistent with the simple fact that there is a high rate of physical mobility in organic ethnic groups. Historically, the latter is doubtful even in a country like Nigeria where regions are mistaken for actual people. What makes people retain the illusion of a “homeland” is a sense of insecurity in their chosen areas of migration for example, the Igbo in northern Nigeria, about whom Ali Mazrui, using the worse terminology possible, has this to say:

Of course, the Biafran war had nothing to do with “retribalization” or “ethnic interests”. If anything, it was a struggle against both. The defensive conservatism of the northern political elite which hid itself under the cloak of “ethnicity” had become a source of frustration to Nigerian nationalists, among whom the Igbo were foremost. Reflecting on the Biafran case, Diamond (1970) referred to them as “Pan-Nigerian catalysts”. There is no doubt that it was the same forces which were behind the abortive coup of April, 1990 which, according to Olukoshi and Agbu, was planned not only to overthrow the Babangida military dictatorship but also “to expel seven states, predominantly populated by Hausa-Fulanis, from the Nigerian federation allegedly because of unwillingness to live and work with other members of the Federation as equals” (3). They, therefore, see Chief Abiola’s good showing in all regions and in the majority of the federal states during the 1993 elections as a continuation of this undercurrent, “a pan-Nigerian mandate”.

In South Africa it was not the Africans who chose to revert to their “tribal homelands” but the racist rulers of that country decreed it. The Africans hated it and did everything possible to migrate to the industrial centers where they could earn their livelihood. The ones who benefitted from the ethnic divisions introduced by the South African white government were the ruling elites in the Bantustans. The drift towards the cities away from ethnic homelands is not at all peculiar to South Africa. Indeed, the frequent complaint among developmentalists is that the rate of urbanization in Africa is abnormally high. Whether this is a good or a bad thing, economically-speaking, is another matter. What is germane to our argument is that the material base of original ethnic social formations in Africa has been undermined by modern developments. As a consequence of this and despite their persistence, ethnic identities are being used as a medium for forging new social relations and for promoting new social interests. Although it is often argued that lack of commoditisation of social relations in Africa is one of the reasons for the persistence of ethnic identities (Ake, 1987; Nnoli, 1995), this supposition is probably not justified.

If there is anything that capitalism has succeeded in introducing in Africa it is the market system, including sale of labor. Now, trade or circulation is probably competing with agriculture. This is not limited only to national economies. It pervades regional economies, as is evidenced by the so-called smuggling and spontaneous population movements. This leads to extensive acculturation among people with different ethnic origins, which, most importantly, includes learning one another's languages. As is known, language does not only facilitate communication but is a powerful agent of acculturation. As far as this is concerned, it is quite possible that African peoples are ahead of their ruling elites. It would be interesting to check which languages were used during the pro-democracy movement in the various African countries. In South Africa the members of the United Democratic Front (UDF) used Zulu, Xhosa, and Sotho interchangeably. This was also true of the African Trade Unions. In the context of the associations and interactions we have cited, ethnic identities became irrelevant or remained latent, ready for manipulation by any power-mongers.

These observable processes of social integration not to the contrary, decentralization of power still has its advantages. Firstly, it creates the scope for local initiatives, without denying the local people the freedom to exercise their citizenship rights elsewhere in the country. Secondly, it does not predispose the existing polity toward fragmentation. Strategically and in the long-term, there is no advantage in fragmenting the existing African states. If anything, there is need to bring them closer together. Therefore, in talking about decentralization we could not mean more than delegation of greater authority and responsibility to provincial and local governments. This is in contrast to a federal structure which consists of states within a state. While this maximizes regional autonomy, it could also exacerbate existing regional antagonisms, especially where regions largely coincide with ethnic maps such as are found in Nigeria. It is significant that the Nigerian Federal Government tried to re-draw state boundaries so as to emphasize territoriality at the expense of ethnic identity.

This political arrangement in Nigeria might have failed to achieve the desired effect not because of ethnic identities but because of continuing “ethnicity” at the federal level. The fact that the Northerners seek to dominate the federal government at all costs has provoked the other regions to a point of rebellion. As of now, the country is thithering on the brink of disintegration. Fortunately or unfortunately, the contending regional linguistic collectivities in Nigeria are big enough to go it alone, as nearly happened during the Biafran war. This would be a rational and logical response to the irrationality and “ethnicity” of the successive northern-dominated military regimes in Nigeria. This might be one of the situations in which the suppositions of “conflict resolution” are totally inapplicable. What the Nigerians are confronted with is a basic contradiction between ethnicised politics and democratic pluralism; between an intransigent military dictatorship and a civilian population whose patience has been exhausted beyond repair, and whose only remaining weapon is militancy - short of civil war and secession. Or could it be a war of integration, as is instanced by the Civil War in the United States? In retrospect, some (Olukoshi and Agbu, 1995) saw the Biafra war in this light, although this would be difficult to prove because it was not consummated.

Uganda is another African country which experimented with the federal form of government at independence. But, unlike Nigeria, it had a hybrid structure which comprised a federal state, semi-federal states, provinces and districts. These were in accordance with the power and degree of centralization of each constituent unit. Only Buganda, which resembled the northern Nigerian emirates, qualified for a federal status. Like its Nigerian counterpart, it sought to dominate the federal government, using ethnicity, the monarchy and its hierarchy of chiefs. This misfired because the ruling party, the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), in the federal government was led by anti-monarchy elements who were drawn largely from non-centralized social formations which enjoyed the lowly status of “provinces”. Not surprisingly, when Obote’s constitutional coup occurred in 1966, its primary objective was to abolish all federal governments and to replace them with several provinces which were on a par with the previous provinces within a unitary state. This marked the end of monarchies in Uganda. The “provinces” won, not so much because their leaders were forward-looking but mainly because the federal government controlled the army and the security forces as in Nigeria.

There are, however, two major differences between the two. In Nigeria the alignment of forces is the other way round and the states which are being treated as “provinces” by the Federal Government are at the mercy of the national army. Thus, the odds are heavily against them, as experience has shown so far. Secondly, while the Kabaka and his chiefs in Uganda treated Buganda as their traditional constituency Buganda was, in fact, the crucible of modern development in the country. The same is not true of northern Nigeria. The South might have a greater claim than the North, which is a further contradiction. It may, therefore, be asked: in the Nigerian situation what is the value of having a federal structure if so far the existence of a federal government has given an unfair advantage to a political/military oligarchy from one region? Does not this in practice approximate to a unitary government with the federal states effectively reduced to provinces?

In Uganda the abolition of an uneven federal structure seems to have given provinces greater political opportunities than before. The new regime in Uganda, which had revolutionary aspirations, did not find it necessary to change this. Instead, it tried to strengthen the voice of local constituencies by granting them the right to call back their representatives in the National Assembly if they find them unserviceable. In the absence of political parties, this seems to have sufficed up to a point. Therefore, despite a ban on political parties coupled with unlimited presidential powers, Yoweri Museveni’s regime could still be described as a benevolent dictatorship, compared to Nigeria’s federalism and government-sponsored two-party system. This would put a greater primacy on the political culture or ideology underlying political forms than on the forms themselves.

Coming to the most recent example of power-sharing in Africa, namely, South Africa. In pursuit of its policy of divide and rule, the South African white minority government created what it called “Bantu Homelands”. Later it proposed to grant them “independence”, despite the fact that the majority of them were not viable. When some of them took the offer seriously and began to maximize their autonomy by doing such things as seeking international recognition, an independent military establishment, foreign loans, and contacts with liberation movements, the South African government felt uncomfortable. To ensure its stranglehold, it proposed yet

another scheme which it called a “Confederation of Southern African States”. The scheme fell flat and was overtaken by events, mainly “Peace Negotiations” in Southern Africa. But what is of interest here is that, in spite of its known racist ideology, the South African government always tried to manipulate democratic forms to its advantage. For instance, it had regular elections among the whites, a multi-party system, and a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. This is so much that, despite protests to the contrary by blacks, some western observers began to argue that there was more democracy in South Africa than in most African countries. This sort of argument irked African nationalists but the truth of the matter is that most African countries had neither democratic forms nor social justice.

The South African black nationalists and others knew that the various political schemes offered by the South African government were fraudulent. However, formally-speaking, the creation of Bantustans in South Africa meets calls by present African democratic-pluralists for decentralization of power and enhancement of local/regional autonomy. Likewise, the idea of a “confederation” of Southern Africa states, although it was imbued with the worst sub-imperialist intentions and was aimed at outflanking SADCC, it had the pretensions of regional integration and cooperation among neighboring states - something to which African democratic-pluralists and Pan-Africanists alike aspire. The white South African case is an extreme example of a discrepancy between political form, on the one hand, and political content, on the other. Although not fully recognized at the time, the South African “Peace Negotiations” turned around this fundamental point. In the negotiations it was necessary that democratic forms were preserved. At the same time, it was imperative that they were matched with democratic contents. The black nationalists were suspicious of anything “separate”, whether it be minority rights, regional governments, or “ethnistans”. This was consistent because, apart from white segregationist policies, they have always been firm believers in a unitary state. Their leaders, who were products of missionary schools and urban industrialism, spurned “tribalism”. This included some well-known chiefs such as Chief Albert Luthuli and Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo who died in exile in Zambia.

On the other hand, whites and other minority groups such as “Coloreds” and “Indians” were afraid or suspicious of black majority rule under a unitary state. Therefore, during the negotiations the unexpected happened. The black nationalists abandoned their state unitarism. Pressures came not from the democrats but from both white and black right-wing groups. Unrepentant Afrikaner racists demanded an autonomous “Boerestan”. Gatsha Buthelezi made a strong bid for a federal status for his former Bantustan which, like his party, had been re-named Kwazulu-Natal. The significance of this compound name lies in the fact that Natal was one of the four provinces of the Republic of South Africa, whereas Kwazulu was a Bantustan within Natal and could not pretend to represent the province. Fortunately for the black nationalists, there is no province in South Africa which is inhabited by one ethnic or racial group. Secondly, party affiliations cut across provinces. Therefore, the adoption of semi-antonomous provincial governments suited them because it ruled out of court that the Freedom Party compete in provincial elections in which it had no captive constituency. This augured very well for the black nationalists and for representative democracy.

But precisely because competition was according to party affiliation and not ethnic affiliation, for the first time potential losers, especially within the ANC, raised questions concerning “ethnic” balance in the selection of candidates for senior posts, knowing that they might be able to swing the vote at the provincial level where certain linguistic groups are demographically well

represented. Nelson Mandela, despite himself, kept the lid on this, making necessary concessions. This certainly compromised the quality of his governing team. Its social and political cost will probably be paid in the next elections. It is conceivable that in anticipation of this the ANC might be forced to take the bull by the horns and confront the issue of sneaking “ethnicity” in to an otherwise cosmopolitan society. In fact, South Africa might prove a test-case for those who blame “ethnicity” on lack of development of “commodity relations”. For the time being, it is arguable that South Africa has a political culture which is inimical to “ethnicity” but not necessarily to racism like the United States of America.

Debates about which is prior, form or substance, are perennial but probably of no avail, as historical experience might provide more than one answer. Nevertheless, the post-independence experience in Africa clearly shows that form played a secondary role to substance. In Nigeria and Uganda federalism got frustrated by the actual balance of forces in society. Similarly, in South Africa a strong belief in unitarism got buffeted around by a number of underlying social forces. In contrast, Museveni’s pragmatic approach seem to have given Uganda the necessary respite. These contrasting perspectives oblige us to stop and reflect. It is conceivable that the biggest mistake African states made at birth was to adopt pre-conceived forms of government which were at variance with the socio-historical reality of their societies. A supreme example of this is the adoption of the nation-state model and parliamentary democracy where the winner takes all. Under African conditions this led to the worst perversions of the model. Although it is often thought that the one-party state was a creation of scheming African dictators, ironically enough, it was a result of certain predisposing factors which aspirant presidents for life took advantage of retrospectively.

At independence African leaders accepted the idea of a multi-party system and an official opposition. But the principle of the winner takes all predisposed the incumbents towards absolute power. This was given substance by the fact that under African conditions the government was not only by far the biggest potential employer but also the sole distributor of national resources. In turn, this created a predisposition among the leadership of opposition parties to join the government’s trains of gravy. The ultimate outcome of this was the one-party state which enjoyed absolute power and could afford to punish its opponents with impunity and to reward its supporters at will. The latter established patron-client relations which narrowed as the economic crisis worsened in African countries and as the crisis of democracy deepened in virtually all. It legitimized corruption and created the ideal conditions for vicious intra-elite struggles and “ethnicity”.

Thus, it could be argued, without prejudice, that the prospects for “nation-building” in Africa were pre-emptied by the bourgeois form of government adopted at independence. Arguments about the incompetence of Africans in general and autocratic traditional political styles cannot suffice because those who might have done better got imprisoned, banned, exiled, executed, or assassinated (not infrequently, some by imperialist agents). Secondly, among the same were those who were opposed to autocratic forms of government, whether traditional who were opposed to autocratic forms of government, whether traditional or modern. This is apart from the fact that autocratic traditional political systems in Africa were probably in the minority (see Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Middleton and Tait, 1958). Interestingly enough, the colonialists favored the autocratic ones and put them in a strong position before their departure. It is the irony of history that this legacy is now seen as a natural propensity of Africans by detractors of modern Africans. On their part, modern African dictators believe, out of ignorance,

that there was no opposition in traditional African polities. At the same time, they rationalize their opposition to multi-party democracy by appealing to anti-tribal sentiments while indulging in the worst forms of “ethnicity”. In the circumstances they have lost all credibility but for the fact that they can always rely on the use of large-scale violence which has ravaged many a society in Africa.

Let it be stated with the necessary candor that the use of both these terms is prejudicial and intensely ideological. First, the equation of “multi-partyism” with democracy as a universal principle is an unwarranted expression of Eurocentrism. There are enough examples from outside Europe, including Africa, to contradict this supposition. Second, perhaps unwittingly the equation confuses form with substance or is tantamount to use of analogies, without paying due regard to differences in socio-cultural context. Regarding “ethnic divisions”, the first objection is that it is a physical construct rather than a social scientific one. Existing social and historical evidence points to the fact that there is greater ethnic integration in modern Africa though migration and intermarriages than ever before. As was suggested earlier, sociologically-understood, the so-called ethnic conflict or ethnicity is a sign of the imperatives of greater integration or social pressures arising out of a shrinking political arena. Therefore, ethnic divisions as natural categories can hardly be the issue. What is at stake is the manipulation of perceived differences by contending groups to carve out more space for themselves in the shrinking political arena. If by “shrinking political arena" is meant increasing crisis of democracy, then it becomes clear that in the absence of other ideological predispositions the corollary of this is intensified “ethnicity”. If intensified “ethnicity” is an index of absence of democracy, then it stands to reason that our starting point is neither imagined ethnic divisions nor their ideological manipulation in the form of “ethnicity” but the question of democracy itself.

This last injunction is of fundamental importance because since the carnage in Rwanda in 1994 serious debate on the prospects of democracy in Africa has been virtually eclipsed by the mirage of “ethnic divisions”. This has been instigated largely by the hysteria created by the western media for propaganda purposes. Yet, a good beginning had been made in Africa, as is evinced by the democratization process which started towards the end of the 1980s and had been foreshadowed in Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa edited by Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o (1987). Thereafter, the debate intensified throughout the early 1990s in the pages of such African journals as Southern African Political and Economic Monthly (SAPEM) and CODESRIA BULLETIN (for summary see Mafeje in Chole and Ibrahim, 1995). Two basic issues dominated the discussion. The first one was supposing it were granted that the underlying cause for the unceasing internecine struggles in Africa was fierce competition for a limited national cake, would this make development a necessary condition for democracy or was democracy a necessary condition for development. The question so posed could not be resolved either way since history abounds with examples to confirm both experiences.

The impasse reached dictated that democracy be treated as a value and a right in itself. In the event what emerged as a major point of contention was what kind of democracy. Some vouched for liberal democracy (see Ibrahim, 1993) and their more radical opponents contended that not only was liberal democracy passé but that it also predisposed African countries towards neo-colonial solutions (see Mafeje, 1993). Accordingly, it was urged as a matter of necessity that African countries should go beyond formal democracy and commit themselves to social democracy. Claude Ake (1996) in particular did not mince his words in dealing with this particular problem. In his last testament he declared: “... Africa requires something more than the crude variety of liberal democracy that is being foisted on it, and even more than the impoverished liberal democracy that prevails in the industrialized countries” (129). In the belief that liberal democracy is “inimical to the idea of the people having effective decision making power”, he unequivocally advocated: “A social democracy that places emphasis on concrete political, social, and economic rights, as opposed to liberal democracy that emphasizes abstract political rights” (132). Whether or not this was a final verdict, it made it abundantly clear what was at stake.

Parallel to the heated debates about democracy among African scholars, there was an insistent demand among popular classes for “democratic pluralism”. This was an unmistakable social rejection of the autocratic one-party state in Africa. Although this got quickly construed as a call for “multi-party democracy” by liberal democracy advocates and “human rights” crusaders from the West, in fact its focus was on popular participation in decision-making and greater local autonomy. Both these precepts were incompatible with the idea of a unitary nation-state. Instead of being embraced and theorized, people's spontaneous representations got perverted by local demagogues and ideologically-motivated western observers/meddlers. The issue of popular democracy got reduced to “multi-partyism” with disastrous effects, if countries such as Zambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Burundi are anything to go by. The issue of popular democracy was aborted and, instead, the parties in their sordid squabbles sought to use the people only as voting cattle.

Likewise, the idea of decolonizing or de-Europeanizing the African state by recognizing plurality and local interests was totally evaded. Consequently, as of now no progress has been made on the question of social democracy, despite the induced “multi-partyism” in several African states. Ironically enough, it is in those countries which have experimented with non-party states geared towards popular participation where a modicum of social democracy had been attained, for example Uganda, Ghana, Burkina Faso (before Sankara’s assassination) and, strangely enough, the self-declared Somali Republic. Are these unusual experiences of any social and historical significance, setting the usual presupposition about liberal democracy?

The inescapable conclusion that could be drawn from our analysis is that “ethnic divisions” in contemporary Africa are largely imagined and encouraged by those who stand to gain by them, namely, modern political elites whose egocentric struggles for state power have proved inimical to democracy of any kind. It is this ideological manipulation which should be understood as “ethnicity” and not innocent, self-imposing identities which people acquire by historical accident. What makes people is what they do to reproduce themselves socially and not what they are called, that is there is no necessary relation between action and classificatory systems. If the so-called ethnic divisions are illusory, as we have contended, and are, therefore, no measure of the extent of actual social integration in African countries, they can hardly be the basis for any discourse on the prospects of social democracy in Africa.

Secondly, if “multi-partyism” in Africa has so far produced no qualitative change from what existed before, as we have observed, then there are no logical or political grounds for associating it with democracy, except as an ideological supposition born under a different sky. Therefore, it can be said with due respect that the way in which the problematic is formulated for the purposes of our topic is tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. Worse still, it could be looked

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