Introduction

One of the critical institutions germane to the survival and stability of the nascent democratic process in Nigeria is the military.  There are two reasons for this. First is that the possibility of a military backlash through military coup is often very real in post-military states such as Nigeria as military officers who have enjoyed enormous privileges, with entrenched interests in the old order, usually do everything to preserve such, including a return to the old order. The second reason is that the military in Nigeria has not acculturated itself to the logic of servile subservience to civil authority. Long years of military rule have promoted a perverse psychology in many military officers that they are the philosopher kings. They conceive of their role not as servants, but as leaders of society. The major challenge confronted by the civilian regime of Olusegun Obasanjo, therefore, as Peter Ekeh aptly puts it is on how to “establish a new relationship between a military order which will be subordinate to civil rule and a new civil rulership that will not receive its mandate from the military”¹. Achieving this goal will require purging the military of its ills and repositioning it for its professional tasks. 

This piece reflects on the efforts of the new civilian administration in Nigeria to reform the military. Interestingly, the current president, General Olusegun Obasanjo (Rtd), is from the same constituency he is trying to reform, the military, as he is a retired military officer. How far has he been able to harness his vast knowledge and insights of the institution to reform it, and to what extent has he succeeded?  

Years of Decline and Decay

It is ironic yet true that one of the state institutions that was badly devastated by long years of military rule in Nigeria is the military institution². At a personal or individual level, there were winners and losers among military officers under military rule, but at an aggregate level, the institution itself was a loser. The military institution was ruptured from without and from within during this period. All the indices of institutional decline and decay became palpable. The institutional culture of military vocation that includes esprit de corps, strict subordination and discipline, and organisational solidarity were all squandered. The struggle for power and position in the state structure by military officers under military rule promoted patronage, disorderliness, inordinate ambition, lawlessness and a high level of distrust in the military institution. Young military officers, who had access to power and wealth, were very arrogant and disrespectful of senior ones; peers and colleagues plotted against each other; and professional mobility was dependent on an elitist network.  As such, a large segment of the soldiers, especially the senior cadre, became political entrepreneurs. The military service was for profit. In this situation, tension swelled, ethnic divisions and manipulations were pervasive, and conflict ensued in the military³. 

Under the Babangida regime (1985-1993), the policy of divide and rule was entrenched as a form of state policy in the military. Ethnic, religious, and communal differences were exacerbated, with the level of internal divisions assuming alarming proportions.  The aborted Orka military coup of 1990, which was hatched against the Babangida regime by some young military officers, explicated the deep divisions quite clearly. The coup plotters alleged  that a cabal of military officers under the regime from a particular part of the country was holding the nation hostage and that these officers were morally bankrupt, committing crimes like drug pushing and homosexualism. Although the coup attempt failed, it explicated the depth of decay, internal crisis and divisions that rocked the Nigerian military.

Apart from the institutional crisis that the military was riddled with, its public profile was also badly affected. Military vocation in the public glare came to be associated with state plundery. This is because many military officers used their proximity to power for primitive accumulation. Even those who were not close to the power arena used their constituency identity to exploit the people and secure undue material advantage in all spheres of the economy. Thus, armed forces personnel, both serving and retired, became a powerful economic force whose activities covered the whole spectrum of the economy, from the import and export business to banking, finance, insurance, agriculture, real estate, and trading. As a result, the public perception of the military became quite low, as it was seen generally as a group of predators and plunderers.

Putting Things Back Together- Policies of Reform

One of the major areas given immediate priority by the Obasanjo administration on the assumption of office was the security sector, especially the armed forces. The logic of enlightened self-interest dictated that the regime had to move fast in this area if its authority and power were not to be undermined. There were swift short-term moves by the regime, and some other longer-term policies designed to reprofessionalise the armed forces. The former actions include the retirement of some category of military officers who had held political posts in previous military regimes, especially those who served as state governors and above. The decision was partly to rid the military of political soldiers and partly to ward off any source of potential threat to the regime from the military.  Similarly, new service chiefs of the army, navy and the air force were appointed. Those who were considered to be professional soldiers as opposed to former political office holders were appointed to these positions.  In the appointments, ethno-political consideration was a factor as officers from minority ethnic groups, especially from the middle belt, were appointed in order to possibly counterbalance the influence and powers of the major ethnic groups in the polity. Hitherto, especially under the Babangida and Abacha military regimes, military command positions were the exclusive preserve of the northern ethnic group.

Another major reform by the Obasanjo administration is the reprofessionalisation of the armed forces. The approach of the regime to achieving this is threefold. The first step is to provide civic education for military officers on the need to respect civil authority. Second is stepping up professional training for the armed forces. Third is the procurement of military hardware and equipment necessary to conduct military service. The regime had sought to mobilise both domestic and international resources in this direction. On the international front, assistance and military co-operation has been negotiated between the Nigerian state and some western nations, notably the United States of America and Britain.  The United States support for military reform in Nigeria is estimated at about $10 million and covers areas of military education and training, institutional reform and improving the capacity of civil authorities, especially of the Ministry of Defence, to control the military institution⁴.  In this bilateral assistance package, the United States has adopted a strategy of subcontracting the assignment to American private military companies, one of which is MPRI. 

The use of American private military companies to assist with the process of military reform in Nigeria has generated a lot of public discourse and critique, both from the civil and military populace in Nigeria. Many civil society groups have roundly criticised it, as have top military officers. Questions about preserving national sovereignty have been raised, as have questions about the commitment of private military companies to the process of genuine military reform, especially since private companies are essentially interested only in profit.  Moreover, serious concerns have been raised given the fact that private military companies have in the past played heinous roles in conflicts in Africa and have engaged in illegal arms trade, mercenary activities, and illicit trade in natural resources in conflict zones, mostly in collaboration with  rebels. Thus, the level of co-operation by the Nigerian military with those private military companies saddled with assisting  military reform has been very low. Indeed, the removal of the former Chief of Army Staff, Major General Victor Malu, is not unconnected with his persistent rebuff and public critique of the idea. In his view, the Nigerian military has little or nothing to learn from private American military companies. 

Challenges

While the process of reform of the Nigerian military has begun under the Obasanjo administration, those reforms have not gone far enough, and some of the strategies  are also questionable. The first challenge is determining how to evolve stable civil- military relations by which civil-military co-operation will be negotiated within the context of defined military operational boundaries. This will involve creating a platform of interactions and linkages between the military establishment and the civil populace, especially between the civil society and the political elite. Elected public office holders, especially those serving in the Defence and Security committee of the National Assembly, should be those knowledgeable on military matters and should be given the requisite support, powers and authority to investigate and oversee the defence sector. The National Assembly itself must use the power of the purse that it has in order to ensure a proper reform and functioning of the Nigerian armed forces.

The second challenge of military reform is constitutional. The 1999 Nigerian constitution authored by the military does not have adequate guarantees against the usurpation of power by military adventurers. The constitution must be quite clear and firm on penalties against the illegal seizure of power. Some of the positions articulated by the civil society are that there should be provision in the constitution for civil disobedience in the event of a military coup, and that a military coup should be punishable at all times in the country. Unless there is strict constitutional disincentive for coups, military officers with political ambition are likely to continue to exploit their control of instruments of violence and coercion to dislodge the political process⁵.

The third challenge has to do with the issue of demobilisation. There is a popular perception in Nigeria that the size of the Nigerian military is over bloated. It is contended that the current size of about 100,000 personnel is too large and should be trimmed down. This thinking is largely related to the dysfunctional role that the military has played in the nation’s political process and the amount of national resources used to service the armed forces. The military claims up to about 10% of the national budget while a social sector like health gets less than 3%.  All these issues coalesce to spur public agitation for a cut in military size and expenditure. However, trimming the size of the military can only be done within the context of a well articulated National Defence and Security Policy, which the nation does not have yet. It is this blueprint that will outline the defence needs of the country, and the personnel required for achieving those tasks. 

Conclusion

The Obasanjo administration has started on a good note with regard to the reform of the defence sector. However, more needs to be done in that regard. The military must be reformed institutionally to promote the culture of merit, professionalism and obedience to civil authority. Also, there is need to create a new working relationship between the people and the armed forces. The military should cease to be predatory in its daily interaction with the people. This is the best confidence building measure that can be put it place to engender cordial civil-military relations. Finally, the constitution must set clearly the boundaries of military behaviour such that politicians in uniform do not use the military to achieve their personal ambitions,  thus retarding the little, but steady progress being made in democratic governance. 

Endnotes

1. Peter Ekeh, “Pitfalls in Renewed Transition to Civil Rule in Nigeria.” Democracy and Development (a journal of the Centre for Democracy and Development), Vol. 1, No.1, 1998, pp. 12-14.

2. Said Adejumobi, “Dimilitarisation and Democratic Re-orientation in Nigeria: Issues, Problems and Prospects.” Verfassung Und Recht in Ubersee, Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2000, pp. 26-42.

3. Said Adejumobi, “The Military, Federalism and the Deconstruction of Ethnicity” in A. Momoh and S. Adejumobi (eds.), The National Question in Nigeria: Comparative Perspectives. Aldershot: Asghate, 2001 (Forthcoming).

4. See United States of America Fact Sheet: “U.S.–Nigerian Co-operation on  Peace Keeping and Military Reform” culled from the Internet, http//www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/potus00/factmili.htm.

5.  See Adejumobi, 2000. 

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