|
DPMF Publications: |
|
Editorial: Democracy, Development and Poverty: Some Issues (Dr.Abdalla Bujra) |
|
Democracy, Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction: Are They Compatible?” was the theme of the 6th DPMF Conference held in Addis Ababa at the UNCC from December 4 to 6, 2001. This issue of the Bulletin attempts to provide a brief summary of what transpired at the conference. However, given the limited length of this Bulletin, this summary cannot do justice to the rich debate that took place during the three days of the conference and the 12 papers and presentations commissioned and contributed to it. Only the forthcoming Conference Proceedings and, later in the year, the book containing the revised papers of the conference will truly reflect the richness and usefulness of the conference. Nevertheless, at the closing session the participants expressly requested DPMF to quickly publish a summary of the conference even though such a summary will not adequately reflect the wide-ranging discussion and debate that took place at the conference.
This issue of the Bulletin therefore focuses on the above theme. It contains the keynote address of Professor Ali Mazrui and the statements on the conference theme from the ECA, the UNDP and the State Minister of Finance and Economic Development of the FDRE. For the most part, however, this issue contains the reflective accounts and reports of the discussions that took place in the various sessions of the Working Groups.
This editorial note is not intended to recount the various arguments presented and which were challenged, discussed, and developed. The purpose of the editorial is simply to whet the reader’s appetite by highlighting some of the issues and some of the arguments covered during the rich and in-depth debate.
The first issue was whether there is a necessary linkage between democracy and sustainable development. Is good governance—through democracy— essential for achieving sustainable development and vice versa? Alternatively, can sustainable development be achieved without good governance—without democracy—and vice versa? One challenging argument given on this issue is that the present structures/institutions and their capacity of both the African states and societies are not fully developed to the level of being capable to successfully implement, simultaneously, strategies and policies for institutionalising democracy and sustainable development.
The second issue posed the simultaneity question differently, placing it within a more complex and historical context. It challenged the simultaneity question on historical grounds, arguing that Europe, North America and Japan achieved economic development first and became democratic afterwards. In this century the East Asian (the “Asian Tigers”) and Latin American experience (Brazil, Argentina and Mexico), achieved economic development first (through authoritarianism) and became democratic later. And most intriguing is the contrast between China and India. While China has been achieving a very high economic growth rate (some would call it phenomenal) without any form of liberal or any type of Western democracy, India, which has been proclaimed the largest democracy in the world since its independence in 1947, has had a much slower economic growth rate (approximately half) than China.
Good governance—democracy—is essential for sustainable development. It provides the necessary condition for economic growth. WB/IMF, the UN system and the Donor Community typically fudge their responses when asked why such a linkage is necessary. It is an assumption which, having been stated often enough, becomes accepted without questioning. On the other hand, good governance—a la liberal Western democracy—is vociferously presented as being a morally superior socio-political system. And those states that do not follow the rules of this liberal democracy are considered not only “bad” or even “evil” but are punished (economically or militarily) for such misbehavior. Thus, good governance is a must for African countries, because it is morally a superior socio-political system and, by extension, it has now been accepted as being essential, almost a precondition, for higher economic growth and sustainable development. However, it is to be noted that when SAPs were introduced in the 1980s, it was argued that these “economic reforms” would bring about sustainable development. At the time the WB/IMF did not link SAPs to “good governance – democracy” as being essential for the success of SAPs. In fact, the SAPs were introduced without any form of democratic process such governments consulting their own people on introducing major economic reforms which are bound to seriously affect their social welfare. It was only around 1990 onwards that “political reforms” or democracy/good governance were introduced and linked to sustainable development. Indeed around 1990 the WB was very shy of using the term “governance” because it was a “political” concept, and the WB at the time argued that it had no mandate to be involved in a political program.
The conference did come out with other arguments for simultaneity—the need for both democracy and sustainable development as a means of reducing poverty. The majority point of view of the African participants is that:
(a) African people want good governance (democracy) for its own sake, because (i) most African people had experienced authoritarianism under colonialism and under the post-independence period and they did not like it, and (ii) that authoritarianism did not bring about sustainable economic development, except in Egypt (under the one party socialist system) and South Africa (under the racial dictatorship of apartheid).
(b) Given the present historical conjuncture (the present international economic order, globalisation, distorted African economies, the debt burden, etc.), African countries do not have the option of going through hierarchisation: economic development first and democracy after, or vice versa. Simultaneity is a must. The linkage is necessary and essential. But the question is linking what kind of democracy to what type of strategies and policies, for what type of economic growth?
(c) It was argued that given the necessity and indeed the strong demand by the African people for both good governance and sustainable development—a development that will seriously reduce poverty—it is therefore imperative to be very careful in the institutionalisation of the type of democracy. It should be democracy which will be workable and applicable to all the people, and not democracy which is biased towards the urban-based elite and the wealthy class. Similarly, the economic strategies and policies must be those which will bring about equity in economic growth rather than exacerbate income inequality and therefore increase poverty. It was therefore argued by some that the strong push by the international community for Western liberal democracy is creating class bias and political inequity in the political system which may, in the immediate and medium term, lead to serious difficulties and conflicts in most African countries. Similarly, the experience of most African countries with the donor driven economic strategies based on SAPs, have not brought about sustainable economic growth nor reduced poverty. On the contrary, SAPs have brought about, in many countries, economic stagnation and increased inequality and poverty. Hence, essential though they may be, both the liberal type of democracy and the present SAP driven economic strategies, need to be carefully reviewed in light of the conditions of African countries and, in the case of economic growth, in light of empirical reality. Those who argued this way, also argued that the international community can play a much more positive role in this review in order to facilitate a better and more suitable democracy as well as faster and more equitable economic growth.
(d) The issue of democracy was taken very seriously. It was persistently argued that all African people badly and urgently need good governance, through a relevant form of democracy. But it was also argued that this transition or the institutionalisation of democracy is a difficult process. There are some forces that have actually killed or “murdered” democracy in Africa, as Professor Mazrui has argued in his keynote address. After the death of democracy, there were several stakeholders who have been trying to resuscitate democracy in Africa and “it was beginning to breathe.” Then came September 11 and democracy in Africa became one of its casualties. “African democracy is in intensive care.” Mazrui differentiates between “democracy as a means and democracy as an ultimate goal in Africa’s political experience.” He hopes that a new equilibrium will be found between the means and the goals of democracy. Besides this general optimism of Mazrui, very few scholars have so far dared to state clearly what type of democracy will emerge after the long and tortuous transition. Prof. Mazrui and others clearly point out the difficulties of the transition period: the protracted and long-term nature of the process of institutionalising democracy in African countries.
(e) But transition is nothing new to the African people and their countries. During the last fifty years, most African people who are fifty years and older have experienced colonial rule and its oppression as well as the nationalist struggle, the euphoria of independence and the brief Westminster style of democracy, the one party state rule and its oppression, the military dictatorships and their brutality, the rapid economic growth of the 1960s, the deteriorating economies of the 1970s and 1980s, the collapse of states and economies in some countries, the serious negative effects of the SAP programmes in most countries, etc. Yet these phases are not neatly cut off from one another, with past phases being isolated and consigned to history and oblivion. No. These different phases are interconnected and their effects are alive and kicking in most African countries, as evidenced by the distorted economies, the inherited political and administrative structures, the security and military apparatus, etc. Those who have experienced the different phases Africa has gone through in these last five decades ask themselves whether the present transition is going to bring about a new dawn, or whether it will simply be another phase which will soon disappear and cumulatively add more problems to the African people.
(f) The Ethiopian Minister of State’s presentation clearly and beautifully describes the problematic issue of African countries—tackling the carryover of problems from past difficult phases while simultaneously trying to bring about good governance and equitable economic development to a poor, war torn and culturally and ethnically highly diversified country. The Ethiopians have embarked on a largely ethnic based federal system with decentralisation of the economy and with a strategy that they call Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation. But there are many African countries which are against federalism (ethnically based or not) and any form of decentralisation or devolution of powers. Are we therefore faced with a situation in which most African countries would prefer to keep, at any cost, the strong unitary political systems inherited from the colonial powers and with all their attendant problems? Is the present ruling elite in many countries fearful of trying other and more democratic political and administrative structures? What does this say about their attempts at political reforms in order to institutionalise democracy and bringing about good governance in their countries? Hence, it is very pertinent to read several times the Ethiopian experience as outlined by the Minister in his presentation if one is to appreciate the nature of the transition period African countries are going through.
(g) But the issue of transition is even more complicated than this. And that is the issue of the differences, in levels of development, amongst African countries. It was asked whether there is a hierarchy amongst African countries which are at different stages of “political and economic development.” Using the criteria of the presence of “good governance and economic development,” can one, for example, categorise sub-Saharan countries into the following three basic categories?
1. At the top of the ladder: South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana.
2. In the middle of the ladder: Most African countries, although one can rank these countries within this category.
3. At the bottom of the ladder: Somalia, DRC, CDR, CAR, Guinea Conakry and Bissau, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc.
Does this mean that countries in level three must progress up the ladder to level two and eventually to level three? Or can they leapfrog from level 3 to level 1? And what does it take for a country to move upwards from one level to another? Has the international community worked out “socio-economic-political” packages to be introduced in each country so that it can move from one level to another? Or will the driving force for change to transit upward come from within the countries themselves? Will the international community simply play a facilitative role and let each country choose the path of development most suitable to it without any attempt to impose so-called universal values and institutions based on Western experiences? And those countries at the top of the ladder, where do they go next? Do they join the OECD countries, as was the case with Mexico? Or do they try to join the European Union, as Turkey is trying to do? And how long does it take countries to transit from one level to another—through aid packages or through almost autarkic self-reliance—despite globalisation?
The discussion at the conference did not go far with
the important issue of the dynamics of “transition” and its future—transition
to what? This particular issue is also
very vague and was hardly discussed amongst African intellectuals, policy
makers and the international community.
(h) With regards to sustainable development, it was repeatedly argued that (i) the last decade has seen an unacceptable level of increase in poverty, inequality and very low level (often negative) growth rates of many African economies; (ii) this was despite the more than 15 years of donor driven SAPs and reforms of African economies as well as almost a decade of donor driven political reforms – institutionalising democracy. And as globalisation intensifies, it was argued that African economies are continuously finding it difficult to become competitive and are therefore being continuously placed at a disadvantage within the global framework or the new international trading system. Hence, this pessimistic assessment of the chances for sustainable development to be achieved even by some of the more economically developed countries was followed by an appeal (also widely shared) to the international community that it should change its role vis-à-vis African countries by facilitating better access by African countries to the global trading system, through better WTO rules, reduction of debt, etc.
The final parts of the Bulletin are made up of a general reflective account on the Plenary Session and three reflective accounts on the discussions that took place in the three Working Groups of the conference. These accounts tend to reinforce the issues summarised here. But the accounts go beyond them by including other arguments and issues which were the subject of discussions in the Working Groups.
This brief editorial note has thus attempted to highlight some of the issues and discussions that took place during the three days of the conference. The way the arguments and issues are presented here, and the emphases given to them, may differ somewhat from the way they were presented during the conference. I take responsibility for the difference. For those who are keen to follow-up the entire discussion and papers commissioned for the conference, DPMF plans to publish the conference proceedings within the next three months.