Towards an OAU Framework for Conflict Prevention 

The decision by the Founding Fathers to create the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963, was in large measure “inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among [African] peoples and cooperation among [African] states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences.”[1] In the same vein, the Founding Fathers were convinced “that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained.”[2]  

Several decades after the adoption of the Charter instituting the OAU, African leaders continue to work assiduously to fulfill its mandate and purposes. Article II of the OAU Charter enunciates the latter as follows: 

(a)           to promote the unity and solidarity of African States;

(b)          to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;

(c)           to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;

(d)          to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and

(e)           to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[3] 

The OAU has undoubtedly achieved notable successes in the fulfillment of its decolonization mandate, as well as the eradication of the apartheid regime in South Africa.  The continental organization has survived the political divisions and ideological polarization of the Cold War era, and has managed somewhat to overcome debilitating divisions among its Member States, who now include nearly all the independent African countries. Meanwhile, the activities of the pan-African organization and its overall performance in the attainment of the Charter’s objectives are subjected to greater scrutiny on the part of Member States, as well as African and international partners. 

If the OAU appears to justify its raison d’être on the political front, much remains to be achieved in the economic and security domains. African leaders were conscious of this lacuna already in 1990, when they issued the landmark declaration on the political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the world.[4]  Five years earlier, the OAU, in cooperation with the United Nations Department for Disarmament, organized a regional ministerial conference in Lome, Togo, from 13 to 15 August 1985, on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa.[5] At the end of its deliberations, the ministerial conference adopted what came to be known as the “Lome Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa.” In the Lomé Declaration, the OAU recognized for the first time “the close interrelationship and interdependence between the objectives of Security, Disarmament and Development, not only in Africa but world-wide,” and expressed “its conviction that their realization is essential for durable peace and security everywhere in the world.”[6]  

In the 1990 Declaration, African leaders basically reaffirmed the close relationship between peace and development. They declared that “the possibilities of achieving the [development] objectives [they] have set [since the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action] will be constrained as long as an atmosphere of lasting peace and stability does not prevail in Africa.” The Heads of State and Government also renewed their “determination to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all the conflicts on [the] Continent.” They expressed their conviction that “the resolution of conflicts will be conducive to the creation of peace and stability in the Continent and will also have the effect of reducing expenditures on defense and security, thus releasing additional resources for socio-economic development.” African leaders were “equally determined to make renewed efforts to eradicate the root causes of the refugee problem [as they were convinced that] only through the creation of stable conditions can Africa fully harness its human and material resources and direct them to development.”[7] 

The 1990 Declaration laid the foundation for the 1993 Cairo Declaration establishing within the OAU a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In his report on conflicts in Africa, which proposed the institution of such a mechanism, the OAU Secretary General insisted on the necessity to create “an acceptable framework within which countries could be brought into convergence of view and allow for resolution of conflicts.”[8] Guided by the purposes and principles embedded in the OAU Charter, the proposed mechanism, said the OAU Secretary General, “would have the three-fold objective of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. It would be built around the Bureau of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government, as the political body responsible for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, as well as the Secretary-General as the operational arm of the mechanism.”[9]           

After intense debates among themselves over the value of such a framework, first at the Dakar Summit in 1992, and, a year later, at the Cairo Summit in Egypt, African leaders finally instituted the OAU Mechanism with a narrow mandate limited to “the anticipation and prevention of conflicts” (para 15).  In their 1993 Cairo Declaration, the Heads of State and Government duly recognized that “no unique factor has contributed more to the present socio-economic problems in the Continent than the scourge of conflicts within and between our countries.”[10] They acknowledged that these conflicts “have brought death and human suffering, engendered hate and divided nations and families, [as well as] forced millions of our people into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope.” Resolved to “work in concert in the search for speedy and peaceful resolution to all the conflicts in Africa,” African leaders established the OAU Mechanism with a view that it would be an “opportunity to bring to the processes of dealing with conflicts on our continent a new institutional dynamism, enabling speedy action to prevent or manage and ultimately resolve conflicts when and where they occur.”[11] 

The OAU Mechanism has since deployed strenuous efforts to achieve its mandate. Yet nearly seven years after its establishment, several conflicts still persist in Africa, and new ones are emerging. Meanwhile, the institutional tools that the OAU Mechanism needs to effectively perform its preventative mandate are still inadequately developed. The early warning system that constitutes the foundation of preventive action is yet to be developed, and its network with regional and sub-regional organizations remains undeveloped.  

This paper offers some reflections regarding the concept of early warning and conflict prevention, and suggests the ways in which it can be operationalized and made into an effective policy instrument for conflict management in Africa. 

The Quest for a Definition 

“Early Warning” generally refers to the set of activities that aim to collect, collate and analyze data in order to detect and identify the signs of an emerging crisis before the latter explodes into uncontrolled violence. I use the term “data” in lieu of information for the very simple reason that, barring very exceptional cases, “early warning” does not per se provide information in a form that is ready for dissemination. Rather, it is the outcome of an intellectual exercise carried out by the data collector or the person in charge of collating and analyzing such data.  

People in the intelligence world are familiar with several data collection techniques. Data they so collect does not always say much about the person or the event it is being collected on. Intelligence data becomes information only when it unveils trends and patterns. This usually happens as a result of the ability of the intelligence analyst to link a particular datum to another, larger set of data, following his/her intuition, knowledge, experience, or the peculiarity of the present context or circumstances.  

Early warning is therefore more than the mere exercise to identify the structural characteristics of an event or a phenomenon. It is the product of the ability of the analyst to establish relationships, to link what is not linked directly by observation, to bring together what seems unrelated. In a very basic sense, early warning is what one makes of it. This point is worthy some emphasis, because the signals that appear indicative of an impending crisis to one analyst may not be so to another. This problem is not solely due to the quality of the data collected, and probably not so much to apparent personality differences. It resides, I believe, in the differing interpretations given to early warning signals and the nature of the political and personal interests at stake in any given crisis.  

“Conflict prevention” is another, common expression, that makes the title of this thought piece. Generally, this expression refers to preventive action undertaken with the express intent to anticipate or forestall the possibility of its escalation into generalized and uncontrolled violence, whether between two groups or at the level of society at large.  

However, care should be taken in the usage of the expression “conflict prevention.” There is a general agreement that there are several sources of tensions and conflicts in our daily life. Some people genuinely argue that conflict is the gist of life, as it spices it up, tasks people’s imagination and forces our creativity by pushing our inventiveness beyond our regular thinking routine. The point here is twofold. First, that conflicts are not always or necessarily “bad” in the normative sense. Few are those social systems that can handle serious differences among their members and reproduce themselves over time and space solely on the basis of consensus. Second, conflict management reveals in a dramatic fashion, the capacity and capabilities of a given society to absorb, without disintegrating itself, the social turbulences and adverse shocks caused by a particular crisis.  

For these few reasons, I propose to look at conflicts not just intrinsically, in and by themselves, nor in functional terms (i.e. the impact they have on society’s will to live together). I suggest that conflicts should be considered as social processes during which, to paraphrase a famous writer, the old is slow to die and the new yet to emerge. In this sense, conflicts transform even while they destroy. What matters much, therefore, is the absorptive capacity of the given society where conflicts take place, i.e. the ability of the social/political system to regulate this transformative process and the forces that brought it about or which it has generated, all the while without too much structural damage.   

Indicators and Tools 

The primary measure of the effectiveness of an early warning system, aside from the mere function of data gathering, is to “trigger” rapid reaction to a degenerating crisis situation. For such a reaction to be possible, analysis of early signs of impending crisis should combine several indicators, including the following: 

1.             Political indicators. They focus on the nature of the internal political dynamics, the political actors, structure, institutions and processes. Here, one can investigate the level of popular participation in (and exclusion from) the decision-making processes and institutions. One can observe elections in order to identify what category of the population is allowed to vote or stand for election, and who is excluded and for what reasons. Citizenship may be another point of focus, particularly when the analysis unveils the identity of the winners and the losers in the existing political order.

2.             Personal physical security and daily civil-military relationship. This concerns an inquiry into the nature of the existing law and order system, and the extent to which it insures or fails to insure the protection of all citizens. Banditry, low-level violence (like random shooting and armed robbery) and, as was the case in several African countries in the 1980s, fear of military uniforms and widespread resentment toward the security forces are indicative of the state of personal (in)security.

3.             Military buildup and the proportion of defense and security expenses in relation to non-military items. This indicator targets Government’s military expenditures (when and if they are made public), recruitment in the armed forces and, in general terms, increasing signs of security concerns by the authorities. In this category of indicators one may also include the creation of paramilitary forces, troop deployment, etc.

4.             Militarization of society. One key indicator here is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the extent to which these weapons are readily available for use by the general population. It is also common to add the presence of landmines, as these directly affect the general population. Attention should also be paid to farming implements, as much communal violence is committed in Africa with such weapons.

5.             Social indicators like a country’s demographic makeup, population changes and movements, density, etc.

6.             Economic indicators, including the usual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, economic and financial indicators such as the cost of living, inflation rate and the level of unemployment, scarcities of consumer goods, etc.

7.             Environmental indicators, namely water security, degradation of natural productive systems, natural catastrophes, etc. 

Several tools may be used, alone or in combination, in data collection, collation and analysis. They include: 

1.             Electronic and satellite surveillance

2.             Internet connection to other early warning systems

3.             Printed documents, such as news, views and reports

4.             Inquiries, field investigations and personal observations 

It is only for analytical purposes that I have drawn a distinction between early warning and conflict prevention. In reality, and in policy terms, however, it is absurd to over-emphasize one against the other, or to enhance prevention at the detriment of early detection of tensions and potential sources of generalized violence. Early warning and conflict prevention are closely entwined and, when carried out expeditiously, they can be mutually reinforcing.  

Several activities are required to make early warning and conflict prevention work effectively. In the case of early warning, it is usually asserted that an optimum mix of historical, social, political and humanitarian indices are the ingredients required for an early warning system or mechanism to operate effectively. Still, no positive criteria exist, which will help determine when this “optimum mix” is reached and “good” early warning done. However, it is generally believed that early warning is “good” in the sense of being effective in deterring incipient conflicts when and if it can unveil the internal dynamics of an emerging conflict and provide policy tools to contain it in a timely manner. In this regard, early warning itself becomes a preventive and deterrent factor particularly when it is communicated to the protagonists in a timely fashion.  

Preventive action therefore comprises a host of activities ranging from confidence-building, national reconciliation and fact-finding missions to preventive diplomacy, including mediation, negotiation and facilitation. In preventive action are also included peace initiatives, like the deployment of observer and monitoring missions, the deepening of “democratic values and institutions” through the strengthening of civil society organizations, election monitoring, constitutional reforms and increasingly, some form of economic and financial assistance.  

By its very nature, preventive action is the result of initiatives carried out by several actors and organizations, including national governments, international and non-governmental organizations, as well as individual leaders. These same organizations and actors do undertake early warning activities, as well. Governments that have signed bilateral agreements to this effect may (and do) exchange intelligence. Inter-state organizations, like the United Nations, the OAU or the European Union, regularly send warnings to each other and to their members about impending conflicts. And increasingly, humanitarian and human rights organizations have become the watchdog for all sorts of violation, including those that may in the long run, generate violent conflicts. 

Conflict Analysis: Factors and Pitfalls 

Conflict analysis, like politics itself, is much like an art rather than a set of positive knowledge which one can tap into in order to make sense of what is happening around the world. Obviously, basic intellectual and analytical skills are required to make data collection and analysis a more systematic endeavor. However, what one does with such knowledge is very much a combination of several factors that are not always easy to identify with accuracy. I will limit my reflection to a few of these “objective” factors. 

For a crisis to erupt into uncontrolled violence there should be some serious grievances within the group or society. The first task for the conflict analyst is therefore to identify such grievances and determine their nature. However, in and by themselves, grievances do not mean much. People are known to complain, and this universal trait will probably remain unchanged. Under certain circumstances, grievances can be used as a cover for other, less socially or morally acceptable goals, like greed or personal enrichment. Whatever the case may be, one should pay attention to the nature and intensity of grievances as well as the strategic importance of the group articulating them.

Another critical element is the existence of drastic social inequalities. More precisely, one should pay close attention to the consciousness that various groups have of such inequalities. When it exists, such consciousness can engender social polarization and lead to serious inter-group hostilities. 

Communication and direct interaction (or lack thereof) are other important factors to take into account in conflict analysis. Communication takes different forms, whereas the nature and degree of social interaction varies from one society to another. In general, however, it is usually preferable for the lines of communication to remain open rather than shut, even if the words used and the behavior manifested by the parties appear hostile. 

Several pitfalls are to be avoided if conflict analysis is to yield meaningful information. Sensationalism is one such pitfall. By this term, I mean the recourse to “sound bites” and simplistic labels just for the sake of making a point across. The label “ethnic conflict” may be an easy short-cut for a complex social and political problem, but it does not necessarily enrich our understanding of the nature of the conflict, the interests at stake or the identity of the protagonists. 

Generalization is another. This ranges from quick conclusions drawn from very few cases to the grosso-modo application of a label or feature to a whole group, even though only a few members are directly concerned. I have here in mind a recent report written by a US-based NGO on the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The authors of the report claimed to have spent weeks in the region, interviewing a score of local NGOs and people in that area. The report was quickly produced and disseminated with much publicity, but unfortunately for its authors, it did not say anything new. Actually, even before its release, several Congolese NGOs accused the authors of hasty generalizations, narrow mindedness and total ignorance of the local dynamics. 

Precipitation is a third pitfall. Here, I refer to the tendency, indeed the trend now in certain NGO circles, to produce and quickly disseminate “policy analytical” reports with great fanfare, without taking the time to check the facts or verify the reliability of their sources. I once participated in an international “policy informational” meeting aimed at developing a strategic approach for humanitarian assistance to war-torn communities in the Great Lakes. During that meeting, an outside expert, eminent College professor in a US university, recalled a war statement made, according to reliable Internet sources, by the leader of an ethnically based armed group through an international radio broadcasting company. The irony was that, a few minutes before the meeting, I had talked with that gentleman by telephone, who categorically denied having spoken to any media about anything. He even added that he was not in the town where that alleged interview took place on the day it was broadcast. Indeed, the broadcasting company had already denied broadcasting such an interview. 

I will end this brief review of pitfalls in conflict analysis with a warning against reductionism. This is the opposite of generalization, and it is not quite the same as simplification. By reductionism, I mean the tendency to narrow down the “root causes” of a particular conflict to a unique or a limited set of variables, such as poverty. Others are convinced that ethnic exclusion explains it all. Still others point to the lack of democracy. In this frenzied search for unique “root causes,” no systematic distinction is made between causes, triggers or precipitating factors, and the mere manifestations of a given conflict. 

Conflict Prevention: It Can and Does Work 

Conflict prevention does work and can be effective in halting tensions from escalating into uncontrolled collective violence. This section highlights a few of the OAU’s major achievements in the area of conflict management and concludes with a reflection on the type of assistance the pan-African organization needs in its efforts to enhance its capacity at preventing conflicts in Africa. 

At present, the OAU Mechanism serves as the privileged instrument for the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in the continent. Its establishment represents the recognition by African leaders of the necessity to address effectively peace and security issues as a precondition for political stability, economic prosperity and the unity of the continent. The OAU Mechanism is housed in the General Secretariat and comprises the following bodies:  

1.             The Central Organ, which comprises 15 OAU Member States, is the main decision-making organ of the Mechanism. It operates at Summit, ministerial and ambassadorial levels. Membership in the Central Organ is rotational based on geographic representation. Members are elected annually.

2.             The General Secretariat (Secretary-General) is the operational arm of the OAU Mechanism. Within the General Secretariat is the Conflict Management Center (CMC), one of the three divisions of the Political Department, which is the focal point and the coordinating center for the implementation of the decisions of the Central Organ. The CMC was created to provide information and strategic analysis of policy options to the Secretary - General and, through him, to the Central Organ. 

3.             The OAU Peace Fund created specifically to mobilize resources from within and outside Africa, for an effective implementation of the OAU Mechanism. 

Since the inception of the OAU Mechanism in 1993, the OAU has deployed significant efforts to make it robust and work effectively. The Central Organ meets regularly at the ambassadorial, ministerial and Summit levels. The activities of the Conflict Management Center are gaining in efficacy and visibility. However, resource mobilization is not following these dynamic efforts to make the OAU robust and efficient. Member States have made substantial contributions to the Fund, but these remain insufficient with regards to the numerous conflicts that the OAU has to address. As an example, the pan-African organization is presently unable to deploy effectively in the DRC and Sierra Leone. 

Financial difficulties notwithstanding, the OAU has been actively involved, with mixed results, in preventing, managing and resolving several inter- and intra-state conflicts. It did so through the establishment of ad hoc committees and mediation commissions mandated to settle the various border and political conflicts that opposed Member States from the 1960s to the 1980s. Thus, in 1963, the OAU halted a military confrontation between Algeria and Morocco over a border dispute. The OAU efforts culminated with the signing of an agreement ending the border dispute between the two countries at the Rabat Summit in Morocco in 1971. It was involved, again with mixed results (sometimes, with outright failure) in the settlement of several border problems, including those between Chad and Libya over the Aouzou Strip, Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden, or the border dispute opposing Kenya and Somalia. 

The first (and so far only) OAU peacekeeping force was mounted in January 1982, in connection with the civil war in Chad. Since then, the OAU has deployed military and civil observer missions in conflict areas like Rwanda (1991-1993), Burundi  (1994-1996), and very recently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Other initiatives carried out by the OAU include Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, Liberia and particularly the Comoros since 1997. The OAU Secretary - General has undertaken several good-offices initiatives to stave off conflicts. OAU civilian and military observers have been deployed in various conflict areas with relative success. 

As this overly short survey of OAU peace support operations clearly shows, much remains to be done in order to strengthen the OAU capacity to discharge its mandate effectively, particularly in the areas of conflict management. The assistance of all Member States, civil society and non-governmental organizations, African women and youth, scholars and intellectuals, and Africa's friends and partners around the world is necessary for the OAU to remain a vibrant and effective organization. 

More important, however, are the involvement and commitment of various social strata on the continent in the work of the OAU. Obviously, the pan-African organization needs all the help it can get from Africa and abroad to adequately perform its mandate. But it is equally crucial that Africans and the friends of Africa require that the OAU meet the highest standards of accountability and transparency in the performance of its assigned duties to unite the continent, promote the well-being of its people, ensure their security and protect their property. 

Conflict prevention is too important an endeavor to be left to African leaders alone. For too long, the continental organization has been accused of operating in a manner of an exclusive “Club of the Heads of State and Government.” The time has come for it to open up to the peoples of Africa and give them an active role in the management of their own security. Conflict prevention should therefore move beyond the exclusive purview of the Heads of State and Government toward the implication of all the people on the continent. Only this shift can make early warning and conflict prevention truly effective instruments for lasting peace on the continent. 

Selected References 

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. New York: the United Nations, 1992. 

Connie Peck, “UN Preventive Action.” In International Security Management and the United Nations. Muthiah Alagappa and Takashi Inoguchi, Eds. (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999). 

Lund, Michael. Preventing Violent Conflicts: a strategy for preventive diplomacy. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996. 

Searching for Peace in Africa: an overview of conflict prevention and management in Africa. Utrecht, the Netherlands: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999.

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