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DPMF Publications: |
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Democracy, Civil Society and Governance in Africa: The Case of Botswana
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The first
DPMF Conference on Democracy, Civil Society and Governance in Africa was held in
Addis Ababa in December 1997. The
second conference, scheduled for 7-11th December 1998 is a follow up
to this first conference and its objectives have been outlined as follows:[1]
(a)
to assess and evaluate the progress of democracy and good governance in
specific African countries the so called early starters – Senegal, Cote
d’Ivoire, Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and
Mauritius.
(b)
to develop comparative criteria for such assessment of the progress of
democracy and good governance
(c)
to involve senior civil servants and politicians is serious discussions
with civil society group (six) and researchers on this important issue.
This
specific paper is a contribution to the above conference.
Consistent with guidelines on the preparation of case studies for this
conference paper addresses the three conference objectives outlined above.
Defining Democracy and Outlining a
Criteria for Measuring Progress with Democratization
Although
pursuit of democracy remains one of the preoccupations of many modern societies,
its definition continues to be problematic.
Part of the problem with defining democracy has to do with the fact that
real democracy is an ideal towards which many nations are indeed aspiring.
It is not an absolute concept.
However,
an examination of the literature suggests some key features worth noting.
These are the features, which we have used as criteria in measuring
progress in Botswana. Thus, a
democratic policy is one with the following features.
(a)
Responsive and participatory democracy – in a democracy, the government
is responsive to popular will. It
appreciates the fact that it is there to serve the people, and thus has to be
responsive and sensitive to their views on issues of major concern to them.
By and large the regime should make all attempts to ensure that people
have an input in whatever decisions are made.
(b)
Respects human rights – most preferably, these rights and freedoms have
to be enshrined in the constitution and such a constitution has to be respected
by the regime.
(c)
Civil Society has to have the space and freedom (i.e. legal and political
space), to exist and to organize freely without fear of discrimination.
(d)
There has to be rule of law – decisions of the courts have to be
respected even in situations where they have decided against the state.
(e)
Free and Fair Elections – free and fair elections have to be held
periodically. This period has to be
provided for in the constitution to ensure that no one, can or will decide
otherwise. In a democracy, the will
of the people should form the basis to govern.
Elections are one important mechanism through which this will is
expressed in a democracy.
(f)
Presence of a viable and effective opposition.
A democracy without an effective opposition is a weak democracy.
(g)
A free and independent press must be part and parcel of any democracy.
Otherwise the checks and balances necessary within such a system will be
lacking, and where they are lacking, corruption becomes the order of the day,
and human rights abuses get trampled upon.
The above
criteria or elements constitutes the minimum of what has to be in place for a
country to qualify as democratic. This
is the yardstick we have applied in assessing the progress Botswana has made so
far.
The 1990s
will go down in the history of Sub-Saharan Africa as representing a significant
period indeed. “In the years 1987-1997, 22 African countries organized
national elections with some kind of competition for the first time.
Accordingly, a total of 38 – more than three-quarters of the 48
Sub-Saharan nations have now held such elections at national level and may be
regarded as in some sense, democratic” (SIDA,
1998:23).
In
Southern Africa, the end of one party rule in countries like Malawi, Tanzania
and Zambia, as well as the end of minority rule in South Africa and Namibia have
all marked the ushering in of this new era of hope and renewal.
Although DRC, as well as the violence and anarchy which followed the May
1998 elections in Lesotho have been notable setbacks in the region, there is
still reason to believe that the democratization wave which has been sweeping
the region since the 1990s has not lost momentum.
Botswana
is a unique case in Sub-Saharan Africa. It
is perhaps one of the few countries that upheld a multi-party democratic system
at a time when many countries in the region were either under military or one
party regimes. This does not mean
however that the new democratization wave sweeping Sub-Saharan Africa during the
1990s has left it untouched. As we
shall seek to demonstrate later in the paper, the 1990s in Botswana have marked
a significant period too. During
this period, important political developments have occurred in Botswana.
Political competition has intensified; the franchise has been extended to
eighteen-year-olds, an independent electoral commission has been set-up, etc.
Actually the story of Botswana’s democracy is largely a story of
positive developments.
Many
researchers today have come to appreciate the fact that the notion of democracy
does not lack roots in Africa. Therefore,
any effort which is aimed at understanding the process of democratization should
not just start at independence as customarily is the case.
This is the focus of this section.
Therefore
present day Botswana became a British protectorate in 1885; the country was
inhabited by several ethnic groups. Most
of these are Tswana speaking groups such as the Bangwato, Bakwena, Balete,
Batawana, etc. There are also some
non-Tswana speaking groups such as the Bakalanga, Basubiya, Bayai, Bambukhushu,
Basarwa, etc. Each of these groups
had its own traditional political system. Here
we focus on the political system of the majority, the Tswana, since they are the
most dominant numerically and culturally.
The
various Tswana groups were each headed by a chief whose position was hereditary
and ran along the male line. Chiefs
exercised extensive authority over their subjects.
A chief was “a ruler, judge, maker and guardian of the law, repository
of wealth, dispenser of gifts, leader in war, priest and magician of the
people” (Schapera, 1970:2). Unlike
with the liberal democratic system which is based on a separation of powers, the
traditional political system was designed differently.
Power was fused in one office, that of the chief.
Despite
this fusion of power, there were limits and responsibilities that went with his
powers. Practice recorded from
Botswana’s past, as well as some cultural expressions shed light on what was
expected of the chief as he exercised his authority.
First, the chief ruled with the guidance of and in consultation with his
advisors. Most of these were from
the royal family although some respected village elders also qualified to
provide such advice.
Decisions
affecting the tribe were made at a village assembly called the kgotla.
The kgotla is a traditional
meeting place. Some of modern
researchers from the West have referred to it as the traditional parliament.
On major political decisions, the chief was expected to (after due
consultations with those who qualified to be consulted) “go to the kgotla
to announce his likely decision and hear the public reactions” (Holm,
1996:99).
Another
writer has summed up the role and the significant of the kgotla as follows:
In short, the traditional assembly
was, still is, a public forum for the Botswana leaders and their subjects to
announce laws and discuss matters affecting the village.
In addition, the villagers had the opportunity to air their views.
This exercise could probably be regarded as some form of participatory
democracy in that an atmosphere existed where the people could exchange their
views and could influence final decisions affecting the polity at large (Mgadla,
1998:5).
It has to
be noted that participation at the kgotla
was limited to elderly males from the tribe.
Women, the youth, and people from the dominated tribes such as the Basarwa
were not allowed to participate.
There are Tswana
expressions which spell out the way a chief was expected to behave.
These are as follows:
1.
“Kgosi
ke kgosi ka batho” – means, “a
chief is with the consent of his people”.
Through this idiom, it is clear that chiefs were expected to be
accountable to those they led.
2.
“Mafoko
a kgotla a mantle otlhe” – means
literally that “all words spoken at the kgotla
are beautiful”. This one means
that anyone who spoke at the kgotla
had to be given a hearing without exception because all issues discussed at this
forum were to be heard – were important.
This implies that there was a recognition that everyone had the freedom
to air his views at the kgotla, no
matter how unpopular such views could have been.
3.
“Mmualeba
o bua la gagwe” – means
“everyone is entitled to their own views/opinions no matter what they are”.
This is very much the same as the one referred to above.
British
Protectorate brought with it significant changes to the traditional system of
governance. For example, Holm (1996) has noted that “During the
colonial period (1885-1965), the British made some attempts to change Tswana
political and social structures in a democratic direction. They sought to give the kgotla
more power vis-à-vis the chief by using it to appoint chiefs and to constrain
and depose ineffective ones”. According
to Mgadla, “The protectorate administration also gave advisory people the
opportunity to complain against individual dikgosi.
In 1916 for example, Sechele II was forced to accept three councilors to
help him rule the people because the people recognized his administrative
inefficiency” (Mgadla, 1989:51). Chiefs
were also striped of some of their powers.
For example, by 1910, chiefs could no longer try murder cases, or grant
mining concessions.
After
independence, the new Botswana Democratic Party Government did not abolish
chieftainship as an institution as was the case in some other African countries
such as Guinea or Tanzania.
Through
the Chieftainship Act of 1965 and the subsequent Act of 1987, the state further
stripped the powers of chiefs, some being given to the newly created land
boards; district councils, and customary courts.
This stripping of powers of chiefs meant overtime that chiefs were
gradually reduced to civil servants, and their powers formal regulated.
However, the government is aware that chiefs still
wield a lot of authority within their communities.
Even after
weakening the institution through using various mechanisms, the government still
had to decide how to accommodate this institution within the modern political
system. Thus, shortly after independence, a House of Chiefs was
created. This institution is purely
advisory. It has no legislative
powers. It has to be noted that
during the colonial period, chiefs served in an advisory capacity through the
so-called Native Advisory Council. Not
all chiefs belonged to the National Advisory Council.
Even today, not all chiefs are members of the House of Chiefs.
According to the Act, paramount chiefs of all the “principal” tribes
are members of the House of chiefs. In
addition, there are four elected members and the specially elected members of
the House. The notion of “principal” tribe has become quite
contentious in Botswana. So
controversial has been the concept that Parliament has finally agreed to amend
the sections of the constitution affecting this issues after members of other
tribes labeled the constitution as discriminatory and undemocratic.
In
concluding this section, it is important to note the following.
First, and more importantly, democracy as a concept is not alien to
Botswana’s political culture. The
system we just described, through limited in terms of who could participate, had
some elements which are currently emphasized by the democracy movement. As Dingake (1998:49) has so aptly noted, “Tswana Policy had
democratic elements, such as free speech, fairness and tolerance”.
Second,
the kgotla as a physical place is
still a defining features of almost all villages in Botswana.
Its traditional role of providing a forum for consultation has continued. Those who were traditionally excluded from participating in kgotla
deliberations such as members of enslaved tribes, women, and the youth are now
allowed to participate. Both
elected officials and civil servants use the kgotla
from time to time either soliciting views of the communities on proposed
developments, or informing communities about any issues they consider is of
relevance to their lives.
Although
the House of chiefs is purely advisory and has no legislative powers, chiefs
have the task of enforcing customary laws while the modern court system enforces
the modern laws.
Botswana
has a parliamentary democratic system established in 1966 when the country
attained independence. For many
years following independence, the country was among the very few countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa which maintained a West-minister type of constitution, with a
multi-party democratic framework entailing the holding of elections every five
years. The system has also been characterized by a universal
suffrage, a separation of powers between the three major organs of government,
namely the legislature, the judiciary and the executive, and the rule of law.
The Botswana constitution has an entrenched bill of rights guaranteeing
among others, the right to association, free speech, equality before the law,
freedom of political activity.
Over the
years, Botswana has received international acclaim for a democratic system which
was seen by many as effective. This
acclaim, which often culminated in such labels as the “shining model” of
democracy etc., came about because of the following:
(i)
Since independence and the introduction of her democratic system of
government, Botswana has maintained these institutions.
When some countries either fell into military rule, or one-party systems,
Botswana remained a multi-party democratic system.
She has never suspended the constitution.
(ii)
Botswana has had multi-party elections every five years as provided for
in her constitution. These
elections have largely been seen as free and fair.[2]
(iii)
The country has maintained a relatively clean human rights records.
Botswana’s
multi-party democracy has always been dominated by one political party, i.e. the
ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The
Table below shows that the BDP has won most of the seats in Parliament since
independence. It also shows that
its monopoly of power was only broken in the 1994 elections when the then major
opposition party – the Botswana National Front (BNF), won 13 out of 40 seats.
The additional four members included 3 nominated ones and the attorney
general.
Table 1 Number
and Percentage of Parliamentary Seats Held by Political Parties, 1965- 1994*
|
Year |
Party |
Total |
|||
|
BDP |
BNF |
BPP |
BIP/IFP |
||
|
1965 |
28
(90%) |
- |
3
(10%) |
0 |
100% |
|
1969 |
24
(77%) |
3
(10%) |
3
(10%) |
1
(3%) |
100% |
|
1974 |
27
(84%) |
2
(6.5%) |
2
(6.5%) |
1
(3%) |
100% |
|
1979 |
29
(91%) |
2
(6%) |
1
(3%) |
0 |
100% |
|
1984 |
28
(82%) |
5
(15%) |
1
(3%) |
0 |
100% |
|
1989 |
31
(91%) |
3
(9%) |
0 |
0 |
100% |
|
1994 |
31
(67.5%) |
13
(32.5%) |
0 |
0 |
100% |
*
Note that we have excluded other smaller parties which contested in the
elections but failed to get parliamentary seats.
-
Also the BIP and IFP merged in the 1990s to form IFP but BIP is an old
party with a presence in the Northwest District.
While the
Botswana National Front was making inroads, the BDP has over the years been
losing ground. According to Table 2
below, the support the BDP lost went to the BNF.
This is the only party that has been growing since independence.
Table 2
Percentage of Popular Vote by Party
|
Party |
1965 |
1969 |
1974 |
1979 |
1984 |
1989 |
1994 |
|
BDP |
80.4 |
68.4 |
76.6 |
75.2 |
67.9 |
64.7 |
54.5 |
|
BNF |
- |
13.5 |
11.5 |
12.5 |
20.5 |
26.9 |
37.3 |
|
BPP |
14.2 |
12.1 |
6.6 |
7.4 |
6.6 |
4.5 |
4.1 |
|
BIP/IFP |
4.6 |
6.0 |
4.8 |
4.3 |
3.0 |
2.4 |
3.6 |
|
OTHERS |
0.8 |
0.0 |
0.5 |
0.2 |
2.0 |
1.5 |
0.5 |
The Break-up of the Opposition (BNF)
Due to the
growth in its support base, many saw the BNF as either a possible winner in 1999
or substantially increasing its seats in parliament.
However, in April 1998, at its annual congress, the BNF got engulfed in a
serious power-struggle. This
struggle finally culminated in the formal break up of the party in June 1998 and
the formation of the Botswana Congress Party (BCP).
All but two of the 13 members of parliament originally belonged to the
BNF defected with their seats to the BCP. It
is now the official opposition in Parliament.
This situation was also replicated at local government level.
Out of a total of 140 councilors which the opposition BNF had in 1998, 83
defected to the newly formed BCP.
The cause
of the split is complex and can be the subject of a long study.
Suffice to say here that the genesis of this problem is (at least
according to press reports) back to 1977 when the party held a congress to elect
a central committee. A group of
veterans of the party many of whom had lost the primaries leading to the 1994
elections, did not get positions in the central committee.
Meanwhile, it was clear to many BNF members as well as other political
observers that the BNF must be headed for victory in the 1999 elections.
On losing the chance to be included in the central committee, the members
formed a pressure group within the party, which came to be known as “the
concerned group”. Since the
formation of this group (outside the formal party structures), there was an
intensification of the internal bickerings within the BNF.
This provided the basis for the physical violence which engulfed the
congress held at Palapye in April 1998. Following
the physical violence, attempts at the reconciliation of the worrying factions
proved futile. Only law suits and
counter suits became the order of the day culminating into a split.
It is too
early to know what the effect of all these developments will be on the democracy
of this country. However, what is
certain is that the presence of the BNF and BCP will definitely split the vote
and pave the way for getting more seats for the ruling BDP.
A few bye-elections have already been held since the split and the winner
has been the BDP even in previously opposition wards.
Certainly, the country headed for a one-party dominated situation, which
is almost graduated after the 1994 elections.
The
dominance of the BDP continues and as Nengwenkhulu (1989) noted; “this
dominance of the BDP has almost effectively negated the acclaimed value of the
multi-party system by making unnecessary the liberal notion of politics as a
process of bargaining and accommodation between political parties.
Botswana is a de facto one-party state.”
Apart from
the disintegration of the major opposition, Botswana’s democracy has had
another key weakness. There has
been a proliferation of opposition parties in the country.
For a population of about 1.5 million people, there are about 11
political parties.
Political
parties definitely have a key role to play in a democracy.
Dingake (1998) has identified three functions of political parties in a
democracy. Firstly, “political
parties provide the machinery within which differing political views can be
formulated and translated into concrete programmes.
This affords individuals the chance to take part in policy making
process. Secondly, political
parties represent various shades of opinion in society. . . Thirdly, the
function of political parties is to govern if they secure the necessary majority
at an election” (Dingake, 1998:3).
Not many
political parties in Botswana can fulfil all of these roles.
They tend to be small, regionally based and with very limited capacity to
organize and to articulate a viable programme which voters can compare with that
of the ruling party. Thus, the
choice that voters are presumed to enjoy in a liberal democracy is severely
limited by this reality. In
addition, apart from its own internal problems, the opposition in Botswana
suffers some structural disadvantages as well.
For example, Radio Botswana and The Daily News are
government controlled media. This
naturally gives the incumbent party an advantage over the opposition.
Moreover, the type of electoral system has always favored the ruling
party to the detriment of the opposition. In
the last election, in 1994, for example, the ruling party got 54.5% of the
votes. The opposition got (combined
total) 45%. The figure for the
opposition in parliament was only 35.3% in 1989 and yet its representation in
Parliament was only 90%. These are
distortions which come about because of the winner takes all kind of electoral
system.
The
concept of civil society has become one of the catchwords in discussions of
democracy and governance in Africa. Though
understood differently by different users, we are using it in this paper to
refer to the realm of “voluntary self-generating and organized non-state
organizations” (Molutsi, 1995:5). Liberal
democratic theory essentially assumes a dichotomy between the political sphere,
which is associated with a struggle for political power, and civil society which
constitute the source of mandate for those in the political sphere to govern. In this situation, the state is seen as the mediator of the
various struggles from different civil society groups.
However,
this situation is not straightforward as commonly projected.
As already observed, “a distinction between the political and civil is
theoretical and methodological rather than real.
The two concepts are dialectically interlinked” (Molutsi, 1995:54).
Focus on
civil society and state relations are a recent development in African politics.
It can actually be traced to the 1980s when it was realized that the
state failed to deliver what was expected of it, ‘development’.
Activists and, to some extent, the donor community started to advocate
for the shrinkage of the role of the state and focus on civil society which
offered a possible alternative structure outside the over-burdened and
ineffective state. The neglect of
the role of civil society in political discourse has also been evident in
Botswana. This is partly indicated
by the very limited empirical studies on the role and structure of civil society
in Botswana’s democracy.
Oslen
(1994) has categorized the Basarwa civil society groups into three:[3]
(A)
Groups which emerged and developed as primary self-help organizations
established to promote the welfare, interests and beliefs of their members. Among these are churches, burial societies; social and
sporting clubs and youth organizations.
(B)
Politically active organizations which in addition to providing services
to member, particular minorities, or vulnerable groups, actively seek to
influence government policy. Included
in these are trade unions, women’s rights groups, environmental action groups,
and international human rights organizations.
(C)
The ad hoc or issue specific groups which emerge spontaneously in
reaction to a particular issue of concern.
Included here were the environmental groups which came about in the
Northwest district of Botswana following government’s plans of dredging of the
Okavango.
In the
same piece, Olsen has rightly pointed out that this categorization is not rigid.
For example, ad hoc groups do become permanent and also that the mandate
of groups can change. Perhaps a
good example here is the women’s NGO coalition.
This group came about after women’s groups learnt (through rumor, and
this was never officially confirmed) that the government was contemplating to
conduct a referendum to solicit views of the nation on whether or not the
discrimination of women should be made lawful.
The government had lost a case in which a women married to an American
citizen had challenged the constitutionality of the Citizen Act in denying
automatic citizenship to children of Botswana women who are married to foreign
men. The government lost the case.
The coalition has remained even after the issue has been settled and
deals with other issues pertaining to the advancement of women have been made.
A study
conducted in 1994 by Holm, Molutsi and Somolekae in 1993/94, concluded that
civil society in Botswana was weak in relation to the state and that civil
society in general was primarily concerned with promoting the interests of their
members and not so much with their relationship with the state.
For many years, the state in Botswana projected the civil society
organizations as the ideal castigating those who seek to influence policy. They were labeled either as promoting foreign interests, or
as infiltrated by the opposition. The
same study also noted another interesting feature of state-society relations in
Botswana. The Botswana state has on
a number of occasions initiated the formation of civil society organizations.
This is common among farmer groups as well as civil service groups such
as the Botswana Civil Service Association or the Botswana Teachers Union.
As Molutsi
(1995) rightly concluded, “through this corporatist strategy, the state has
appropriately defined the role and functions of each organization and
circumscribed these such that it becomes easy to label and isolate others as
political. This strategy succeeded
form many years because the state was a primary source of finance for these
organizations. However, the effect
of this strategy was that the state systematically denied itself a chance to
hear the voice of the people.”
The state
also used the law at times to frustrate or to make difficult the initiatives and
activities of these groups. For
example, Trade Union office bearers used to be forbidden by law to work
full-time for the Unions. Also,
before the 1992 Amendment, the minister could appoint his representative to sit
in all executive meetings of the Trade Unions.
All Trade Unions seeking to affiliate to an International Federation had
to seek the minister’s permission. For
many years, Botswana did not sign the ILO conventions.
Strikes and demonstrations by teachers, students, and trade unions and
other civil servants were illegal. However,
since 1997 alone, the state has ratified over 12 ILO conventions.
The biggest challenge now is to incorporate these international laws into
the constitution.
The
classification of organizations into political or apolitical is problematic.
However, past experience shows that in Botswana.
Most organizations including burial societies, sport and religious
organizations have focused more on their internal issues and programmes and have
not engaged the state at policy level. That
is why we have classified them as political.
The exception has been women’s groups.
Among the
groups that the state initially excluded and labeled are women’s groups.
There are basically the two kinds of these groups in Botswana, the
veteran old organizations such as the YWCA, or Botswana Council of Women.
These have been dealing with purely welfare matters for decades and they
enjoyed a good relationship wit the state.
Then
during the mid 1980s, radical women’s groups entered the political scene.
Examples here included Emang Basadi, and Metlhaetsile.
From the onset, these organizations set out to challenge the state on
policy issues. Emang Basadi was
formed in 1984 to pressure the government to repeal all legislations which were
discriminatory against women. At
first, the reception was bad. Overtime,
Emang Basadi together with other NGOs, began to network and push as a united
front. When not much progress was
being made, the groups under the leadership of Emang Basadi switched focus to a
political agenda. The organization
came up with a political education project to sensitize women about their
political rights, encouraging them to vote for candidates who are committed to
addressing the issues and concerns of women.
This strategy seems to have worked.
Summing up
what they considered to be gains in the 1994 elections, a newspaper editorial
stated as follows:
There are
4 women in parliament, compared with 40 men, that is roughly 9 percent.
In the last parliament there were two women against 38 men, and that was
about 5 percent of the seats in the legislative body.
On the face of it, the women’s gains in parliament are modest, but in
percentage terms the representation has increased by almost 100 percent.
Not bad for an institution whose majority of members held women in
contempt a mere five years ago. What is even more important is that the attitudes of
decision-makers towards women are changing.
In just 18 months women have succeeded in convincing their male
counterparts that they have an equal right to our national heritage . . . (The
Gazette; 1st February, 1995).
In
addition to the above, a leading women feminist and in fact a founder of one of
the leading women’s groups (Metlhaetsile Women’s Center) was appointed to
the bench in mid 1998 as a judge. This
is a recognition of women’s talents, and their rights. To others though, this has been seen as having the potential
to weaken the women’s organizations through the corruption of their leaders.
Others gains made have been recognition and closer working ties with the
government, and the latter has committed itself to repealing all discriminatory
legislations. At present the
government is seized with results of a major study which reviewed all laws
discriminating against women. Tougher laws on rape are now in force. Two weeks ago, the president of the country launched the
National Gender Framework.
The
women’s organizations made these gains due to the following factors.
Firstly,
the international climate which has been quite favorable and provided a push and
platform for women’s issues. Secondly,
the availability of donor resources which provided the means for the NGOs to
mobilize and strengthen their capacity. Actually,
without the donor resources, women’s groups and other NGOs in Botswana
wouldn’t be able to function. Almost
all of them are reliant substantially on donor resources.
The third
factor in the success of the women’s groups has been the availability of a
cone group of educated and committed women who provided leadership and who have
worked as volunteers to bring these organizations to where they are today.
During the
1990s, there have indeed been some major transformation in the political
landscape of Botswana. Not only has
there been a softening of attitude on the part of the government which has made
efforts to accommodate the so-called “political groups”.
It has now gone a step further and has thus stated that in the current
National Development Plan (NDP 8), which was adopted by parliament is 1997,
during this plan period as NGO/CBO policy will be formulated. This policy will define the parameters of cooperation with
NGOs. This process is already
underway. In June 1998, the
background paper on this issue has been submitted to the Rural Development
Council and the reception has been good. This
initiative is being co-ordinated by the Botswana Council for Non-Governmental
Organizations.
It is too
early to judge what the effects of the policy on NGO/Government relations will
be. What is certain though is that
a mere recognition of the need for some kind of collaboration means that the
state accepts that it can no longer choose some NGOs and excludes others.
However some people are already stating that if NGOs are not careful,
they will find themselves either co-opted or manipulated by the state.
Before the policy actually takes off, we can only speculate.
According
to leftwitch (1996:15) good governance as a concept can be understood in two
ways. The first is “the narrow
administrative, or managerial” view. He
has also suggested that “a system of good governance in this limited
administrative sense, therefore, would consist of a set of rules and
institutions (that is, a legal framework for development) and a system of public
administration which is open, transparent, efficient and accountable”
(Ibid:15). Such a system provides a
favorable environment for the private sector to play a leading role in
development. The second way in
which the notion of good governance has been understood is that good governance
means democratic governance. This
meaning is much broader than the technical meaning.
It combines the technical ‘efficiency’ and democratic politics.
The essential ingredients of this democratic polity have been considered
to be the following: “competitive party systems, regular free and fair
elections, an independent judiciary, a free press and the protection of human
rights” (Leftwitch, 1996:16). For
the purpose of this paper we have adopted this definition of Leftwitch.
This section will therefore begin with an evaluation of the Botswana
political system on the basis of both the technical/administrative and political
criteria.
Botswana
is widely regarded as a country that has been successful in its development
efforts. At independence, Botswana
was one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of about
US$60.00. By then, the country had
only 22 university graduates. More
Botswana were working outside the country than inside the country, particularly
in South African and the then Rhodesia. In
the whole country, only 8 kms of roads were tarred. The country was administered from South Africa, in Mafikeng,
and educational and health facilities were very limited. Actually, the colonial administration had largely left
provision of education to the few church groups within the protectorate.
A key features of Botswana’s colonial history is that the country
suffered acute neglect during its protectorate status.
Even taking into account the fact that colonialism was never about
development of local people anyway, the country’s neglect stands out as
distinct. Part of this neglect was
the result of the fact that Bechuanaland Protectorate (as Botswana was called
then), was going to be annexed by South Africa at some later date.
By independence therefore, the country did not even have a capital city
(was administered from Mafikeng), the country relied primarily on Aid from
Britain to finance both the recurrent and development expenditure.
Botswana’s
achievements today are considerable. She
is now classified by the World Bank as a middle income country, her per capita
income stands at around US$27000. She
has never experienced an economic crisis. She
has no external debt to worry about.
All these
achievements have been attributed to two main factors.
The first is “luck” or good fortune which is evidenced by the
discovery of large diamond deposits shortly after independence.
The second is the quality of public sector management, including the role
of the political leadership. Aid
has also been cited as another key factor.
As we have
stated in the earlier sections, Botswana’s poverty and inadequacies at
independence went beyond the scarcity of financial resources and skilled
manpower. The country also lacked
the institutional infrastructure for development.
The small civil service inherited at independence had been geared
predominantly to the maintenance of law and order.
It was inadequate for the demanding development agenda of the new
government.
During the
first ten years of independence, massive institutional infrastructure was
created in the form of parastals and ministries (see Parson, 1984 and Somolekae,
1998). The country established a planning machinery which has
evolved to be the pillar of Botswana’s success in development. This planning system described in detail by a World Bank team
(1984) and by Somolekae 91998) has been characterized as follows:
“It emphasized fiscal discipline, the expansion of the revenue base,
and securing value for money” (MFDP, 1986:1-1).
From as early as 1996, the government recognized that it could not do
everything hence adopted a policy that accommodated and left room for the
private sector. The Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning is responsible for the overall co-ordination of
planning. It alone negotiates for
foreign aid. Each ministry in
Botswana has a planning unit. This
does not mean that the ministry of Finance plans for other ministries. Its role is to coordinate.
Other ministries also have an input.
However, because it has final responsibility over how government money is
used, it has a bigger role. Only
this ministry for example can negotiate for aid, and when such commitments have
been secured, the Ministry of Finance signs on behalf of the government.
In addition, aid in Botswana has been fully integrated into the National
Planning System. There are no
separate or parallel structures handling and planning for aid resources.
This is in contrast to the situation in many African countries where a
proliferation of stand-alone projects has been the norm.
Centralization of planning has been done primarily to prevent the
proliferation of stand-alone projects (see for example, Van de Walle and
Johnston, 1996; Carlsson, Somolekae and Van de Walle, 1997) and the maximized
aid co-ordination and effectiveness.
In
addition to the above features, the Botswana planning system has been
characterized by discipline. Only projects which are in the plan and have been approved by
parliament, can be implemented. Most
importantly, planning and budgeting are integrated. This has always ensured that noting is implemented whose
recurrent cost implications have not been adequately evaluated.
The above
planning system has been quite effective. In
fact many writers on Botswana attribute Botswana’s development success to the
effectiveness of this system (see for example, Harvey and Lewis, 1990; Maipose,
Somolekae and Johnston, 1996). At
the center of this system has been an effective bureaucracy which had the
technical expertise necessary to draw plans and to effectively implement them.
In fact the bureaucracy in Botswana has become so powerful that some have
wondered about the implications of this to the country’s democracy in the
future. The writer has commented
elsewhere Somolekae (1993) that this situation has effectively meant that the
power of elected officials to make policy has to some extent been usurped by the
bureaucracy. The power of the
bureaucracy has also been accompanied by a lack of vibrant civil society.
Until the late 1980s, not much input into policy making was coming from
these groups despite the fact that in theory this system is decentralized and
highly participatory. Journalists
have always complained that the public sector is not transparent in its
operations. Recently, the
Vice-President announced the creation of press officers in different ministries
to facilitate the flow of information. It
is possible that such a move might lead to a much open and transparent system.
A recently
created institution is the office of the ombudsman.
Due to complaints from members of the public about the way the
bureaucracy works and interacts with them, the office of the Ombudsman has been
set up to provide a forum for the people in a lodging complaints about the
public service. Since it is a new
institution, it would be premature to make any judgment about its effectiveness.
However, it represents yet another milestone in improving the
institutional development of the country.
For many
years, it was assumed or generally believed that corruption was not a problem in
Botswana, or that even if it existed, it was quite limited.
However, the late 1980s, and early 1990s, press reports indicated that
the problem could be much more than it has been anticipated.
In addition, various government commissioned investigations into
operations of such parastatal as the Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC) showed
that the problem could be much greater than initially though.
Consequently, the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime was set up
in 1994. According to Good (1994:114) though
Corruption and mismanagement in Botswana is relatively pale and restricted. It is entirely an elite phenomenon . . . it is not systematic to the whole of the political economy as in Zaire. . . Nor is it as epidemic, afflicting the whole society such as in Nigeria, and there is decidedly no ‘culture of corruption’ as exists in Brazil. Its significance lies in contrast with the generally reputable and efficient government performance preceding the 1980s. . . Responsibility and accountability have been seriously reduced within the top most levels of the government but, to date, many state institutions and most citizens remain untarnished.
Four years after its
establishment, the Directorate has concentrated on both investigating this crime
and raising public awareness. Its
chief executive has been quoted as saying that by its very existence, the
directorate has started to deter corruption in Botswana.
It might be too early to judge actually more so that some press reports
have revealed that some members of the public feel that the Directorate is
growing the “big fish” and focusing on small criminals.
May be such anxieties are unfounded.
What is clear though is that the truth is hard to establish.
(i)
As we noted in the earlier part of this paper, Botswana has maintained a
multi-party democratic system since independence.
To date, there are 11 political parties and a variety of interest groups.
However, we also noted that until 1994, the political landscape was
dominated by only one key player – the Botswana Democratic Party.
Tables 1 and 2 provided the evidence to this effect.
The
existence of a multi-party situation will not in itself be an adequate indicator
that Botswana’s polity has been democratic.
An additional issue concerns the extent to which elections have been free
and fair.
As the
reader will know, this concept alone controversial and defies easy definition.
It has no standard definition. What
is clear is that standards for judging an election as free and fair are
contextual, and may vary from time to time. As Elkit and Svensson (1997:35) have so rightly observed “.
. .Any categorization of various elements of the electoral process should be
approached with caution. . .”
The duo
provided a checklist which to a large extent can be considered comprehensive.
According to this checklist, a free election is one which entails the
freedom as well as the opportunity to choose.
In this context, fairness, on the one had, “means impartiality, the
opposite of fairness in unequal treatment of equals, whereby some people or
groups are given unreasonable advantages” (Ibid:35). Given that elections are some form of competition (for
power), we find this definition to be adequate.
Of late
thought, it is increasingly becoming common to refer to a successful election
meaning an election that has succeeded in bringing about a legitimate and
therefore acceptable government.
Botswana
elections have all been successful, but whether or not they have been free and
fair depends on whether you are a member of the opposition, or the ruling party.
Despite the successful elections, the opposition parties have complained
for many years that the elections were not free and fair.
They have alleged outright rigging and cheating.
It is even more interesting to note even some ruling party politicians
have on occasion challenged results of the elections (see, for example, the 1989
High Court petitions following that election).
A case
that stands out is the Tshiano ballot box in 1984.
After that election, the leader of the opposition BNF challenged the
outcome of the election following his defeat by the then Vice President Peter
Mmusi. Dr. Koma alleged that the
election had been characterized by a number of irregularities.
While the High Court was seized with the matter, an unopened ballot box
was discovered at the National Archives where the election material was being
stored. Both parties consented, the
High Court ordered a bye-election and the Vice-President lost to the leader of
the opposition. To the opposition,
this incident confirmed cheating, while to some people a possible explanation
apart from cheating could have been administrative sloppiness on the part of the
presiding officer.
At issue
in Botswana’s elections has been that the playing field is not level, and that
the election management body was not independent of the leader of the dominant
party, the ruling BDP.
For many
years the administration of elections was the responsibility of the Office of
the President. After numerous complaints of the opposition, and following
consultations between the government and the opposition parties, the government
introduced a minor change. It
created an Office of the Supervisor of Elections, and also located that office
away from the Office of the President. That
did not help to alleviate opposition concerns.
In fact they continued to complain and the then major opposition BNF even
threatened to boycott the 1994 elections. Consequently,
in 1995 the then President Masire announced some major electoral reforms that he
would introduce before the 1999 elections.
These were that an Independent Electoral Commission would be set up, the
voting age was to be lowered from 21 to 18 and an absentee ballot would be
created. A national referendum was
subsequently conducted in 1997 and all these reforms have now been effected.
The Independent Electoral Commission is already making preparations for
the 1999 elections.
The
other complaint has been the use of state media, both Radio Botswana and
the Botswana Daily News. Opposition
parties continue to complain that unless these are turned into some independent
media and removed from government, the ruling party will continue to enjoy undue
advantage over other parties. The
state is reacting to these concerns in the same way they have reacted to the
other electoral issues mentioned above. They
do not seem to pay adequate attention to the issue of perception as opposed to
fact, and the fact that in politics, perceptions can be as valid as fact and
reality. Thus, the status quo seems
set to prevail for some time.
(ii)
The Role of a Free and Independent Media
The
media has a central role to play in a democracy.
Not only does it inform, educate and provide a forum for public debate of
issues, it also provided the necessary checks and balances on the activities of
the government of the day. It is
obvious that, the press can not effectively carry out these functions if it is
not free to do so. Free of
harassment, or even legislative restrictions.
Until
the early 1980s, the private media in Botswana did not play any significant
role. Actually the most effective
(and therefore important) papers today all emerged in the early to mid 1980s and
these include The Botswana Guardian, 1983, Mmegi Wa Dikgang, in
1984 and the Gazette in 1985. Others
include the Midweek Sun, The Voice which are latest to appear in
the Botswana media scene. We have
excluded from this discussion, papers which only existed for a short while (such
as The Examiner) despite the fact that they made their own contribution
during their short life. All the
papers we are referring to here are weekly papers.
As K.
Dingake (1998:186) has noted, “The constitution of Botswana provided no
explicit protection for freedom of the press. . . The freedom of the press in
Botswana is embraced under the freedom of expression. . . basically the freedom
of expression relates to the right to hold questions, the right to be informed,
the right to inform or to communicate interference (Article 12(2) of the
constitution also provides limitations to these freedoms and these include
“interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or public
health, etc.).” Dingake (ibid.) is of the view that these limitations “are
so widely drawn that they have the effect of negating the essential content of
the right to freedom of expression” (ibid.: 187).
Because
of these restrictions the government has been accused of several acts which are
tantamount to harassment of the press. Good
(1997:7) has catalogued these acts. He
has noted that “An independent press only began to appear in Botswana in the
early 1980s, and since 1985 five journalists and two editors, both of the Guardian
newspaper, have been deported. . .A Zambian journalist John Mukela, was
deported, in August 1987, only two months after being named editor of the Guardian”.
Sechele Sechele (1998:419) has argued that
There are a number of laws in this
country which hamper access to information and affect the freedom of the press
in a number of ways. These include
the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime Act. Section 44 of this act – under which a Botswana journalist,
Prof. Malema appeared in Court in 1966 – prohibits publication of information
relating to an investigation being conducted in terms of this Act. . . It
derives pressmen their constitutional rights and freedom to hold their own
opinions, freedom to receive ideas and information without interference, freedom
to freely communicate ideas and information to the public generally or to any
person or class of persons.
In
addition, journalists have complained about the National Security Act, Police
Act, The Presidential Privileges Act. These
are adequately analyzed in Grant and Egner, 1987; Sechele sechele, 1998; Dingake,
1987; Good, 1997.
Other
problems are related to the internal problems of the media itself.
These have been identified by Sechele (1998:491-420) as
“Self-censorship by editors or publishers; poor institutional capacity of the
press establishment; professional training of staff or lack of therefore,. .
.” The latest friction between
government and the press this year had to do with the formation of a press
council to regulate the operations of the press.
Some in media circles have expressed fears that such a body if it
includes some government appointed people will be tantamount to undue
interference of government in press matters.
Discussions between the two are still going on.
A number
of writers on Botswana maintain that the country’s human rights record has
been good. The country has
enshrined in its constitution the fundamental rights and freedoms, and by large,
these have been honored in practice. However,
human rights activists in Botswana and some researchers have pointed to the
following as dark spots in Botswana’s human rights records.
The
first has been the country’s reluctance or refusal to ratify international
conventions. Until 1995,
“Botswana was a party to only two international human rights instruments; the
convention one Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination and the African
charter on Human and People’s Rights” (Otlhogile, 1996:320). Most of these were only recently ratified.
For example, in 1997 alone the government ratified 12 ILO conventions.
The
failure to sign these conventions has resulted in occasional backslides and
violations, such as, for example, lack of effective protection against gender
discrimination; the sporadic infringement of arrest and detention procedures,
and restriction of trade union rights. These
violations have not, however, raised doubt about the government’s overall
attachment to the goal of upholding individual rights but have certainly
affected the quality of individual rights” (Otlgogile, 1996:321).
For
almost the entire three decades since independence, discrimination of women on
the basis of sex continued as one key violation of women’s human rights.
Section 15 of the Constitution, while forbidding discrimination on the
basis of “race, tribe, place or origin, political operations, color or
creed,” did not mention sex. Thus
to many people, this constitution therefore entrenched sex-based discrimination.
This situation, coupled with the failure to sign international
conventions was seen by human rights activists as gross violation of women’s
human rights. Accordingly,
women’s NGOs made a lot of noise about the situation.
Nobody took heed until in 1991 when a woman, Unity Dow took the state to
court challenging the constitutionality of the Citizenship Act.
She complained that by denying her the right to pass on citizenship to
her children on account that she is married to a foreigner (an American) the law
was discriminatory. She won the case. Subsequently,
the state has also since commissioned a nation-wide study to review all laws
that discriminate against women, and also since ratified international
instruments forbidding gender-based discrimination.
Unity Dow herself is the first female high court judge.
Certainly, gender-based discrimination is fast becoming a thing of the
past.
A third
and equally thorny human rights issue has been the situation of the San people,
commonly known as the Bushmen. These
people are hunter-gatherers and have a completely different socio-cultural and
economic lifestyle to the rest of the population.
Their spokespeople and international human rights groups have complained
that the land rights of the Basarwa are persistently trampled upon.
The government denies this allegation.
The latest controversy concerning the San and the Botswana Government has
to do with the resettlement of the Basarwa outside the Central Kalahari Game
Reserve. Basarwa activists, with
the assistance of Ditshwanelo and the
Botswana Christian Council challenge government, claiming that such “forced”
relocation intended to create room for wildlife is a gross violation in human
rights. The controversy continues
and it would be too early to make any conclusion at this stage.
Has Botswana Made Progress in Democracy
and Good Governance?
As we
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the aim of this Botswana case study is
to access progress which Botswana has been making in the area of democracy and
good governance. Since the topic is
too wide and the time allowed for its preparation was essentially less that two
weeks, we have had to focus on key areas. We
started with developing some yardstick for judging or evaluating this progress.
Certainly this has not been easy and as the reader will realize, the situation
is not as straightforward as some may assume.
The instruction to evaluate progress suggests some linear development,
that one can identify real benchmarks to use in such an assignment.
However, the benchmarks too can be quiet subjective, and may be contested
depending on who is at which side to the debate.
For example, while some human rights groups are always painting a
negative picture of the human rights situation in Botswana, particularly as it
related to the Basarwa land issues, the government and ruling party politicians
have a completely different view. This
is what complicates any efforts to evaluate the progress of democracy.
Despite
these methodological concerns, it has been noted that the picture we have
painted of Botswana is largely a positive one.
The system has many times been responsive and has tried to accommodate
the concerns of those affected where necessary. However, from what we have observed this has depended on the
groups concerned, and their capacity to articulate their concerns and to
organza. This is quite clear when
it comes to the women’s groups. But
the same cannot be said of groups such as the trade union movement, which has
found it much difficult to get the system to respond. Part of the reason has been that trade union concerns are
completely different from gender concerns and they are much more complex to
resolve.
Civil
society has had the space to operate but the issue has to be looked at from a
historical perspective. The current
struggles between the press and the government are about space between the two,
the press insisting on having more space than government seems willing to give.
But the story of the women’s movement has a positive dimension even if
at first they experience the labeling and exclusion.
Decisions
of courts in Botswana are respected and there is no doubt that the rule of law
is very important principle in Botswana’s governance.
Botswana
has had successful elections for many years which have by and large been free
and fair. However, the system has
recently enhanced the credibility of the election process through the creation
of an Independent Election Commission. This
no doubt strengthen the democratic process.
Unfortunately,
the opposition has become weak again because of its recent divisions.
The 1999 elections will provide a true test of whether, and to what
extent the opposition in Botswana has any muscle left.