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DPMF Publications: |
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Democracy and Good Governance in
Kenya: Prospects and Obstacles |
The
process of political change in Kenya which culminated in the Dec 29, 1992
multi-party general elections was influenced by both domestic and external
factors. The democratization movement that has been sweeping across Africa since
the late 1980’s and which bears resemblance to the struggle for independence
in the 1950’s and early 60’s has not spared Kenya.
Like the independence movements, the current democratization movement
aims at freeing the African masses from socio-political and economic malaise.
Indeed,
the first 30 years of independence in Kenya turned out to be a disappointment
both politically and economically. The
attainment of independence in Kenya in 1963 had been welcomed by the masses on
the belief that the new state would introduce democratic practices both in
political life and economic management. However this was never to be, since the
rulers strayed away from popular expectation. One of the basic requirements of
democracy is that there should be a popular consensus on how state affairs are
conducted. Secondly, the
governors should be accountable to the governed according to procedures which
have been pre-determined. The Kenyatta government did not adhere to the above
principles but instead spent the first six years creating a unitary State with
extensive powers bestowed on the executive at the expense of the Majimbo
Constitution which had envisaged a decentralized State. The artificiality of the
State which comprised several ethnic groups due to the boundaries drawn by the
colonial powers gave leeway to Kenyatta to engage in patron-client politics once
he had entrenched himself in power. When
Moi succeeded Kenyatta in 1978 the same state of affairs continued, culminating
in the emergence of the state system which lacked genuine legitimacy.
It infringed on basic individual rights and sidelined a majority of the
population in economic activities thus ensuring a consistent regression towards
political and economic decay.
The second
struggle for democracy in Kenya is rooted in the above malaise and the upheavals
in Eastern Europe in the late 1980’s only acted as a catalyst in exposing the
regime’s dictatorial pasture to the international community.
Therefore
the purpose of this paper is to analyze the nature of the state at the dawn of
multi-partyism and to critically assess the brief experience of pluralist
politics in Kenya since 1992 by laying emphasis on the constitutional changes
enacted since then and their relevance or irrelevance to the quest for democracy
and good governance in Kenya.
In 1963,
Kenya adopted a multi-party liberal democracy based on the “Westminster
Model” of Government. According
to this model, the executive authority remained vested in the Queen.
The powers of the Queen in the country were however exercised on her
behalf by the resident Governor-General.
The Governor-General in turn was to be advised by his prime-minister and
the cabinet. (Gertzel, 1970: 125).
The
Independence Constitution negotiated at Lancaster House in London sought to
create among other structures, a diffuse legislative structure that would not be
susceptible to undue influence from the executive arm of the government.
The whole idea as expressed in the independence constitution was to
create a broad basis for executive accountability.
This was achieved through the demise of a regionalized state system that
was underscored by first a two-tier central legislature comprised of the Upper
House (Senate) and the Lower House (House of Representatives) with a provision
for the Senate to work as an effective check on both the Lower House and the
executive. And second, the
formation of regional governments and assemblies which had decision-making and
legislative authority over a substantial range of matters.
Thus,
under the independence constitution, the latitude of power exercised by the
Central government was in principle severely limited.
It was difficult for the executive to make major policy decisions without
the input of parliament, the regional assemblies or both.
Parliament was also supposed to have a major role in the working of the
constitution. Not only was its
co-operation essential in the exercise of emergency powers, but it also had the
powers to bring-down a government through a vote of no confidence.
Those structures were safeguarded by a rigid amendment procedures which
virtually imposed an embargo on Constitutional change in respect of certain
important matters (see also Ghai and McAuslan 1970; Okoth Ogendo 1972; Gertzel
1965).
Barely a
year after independence, Kenya became a republic (Dec. 1964) following
determined constitutional engineering and political manipulation.
The change marked the beginning of a move towards the centralization of
power on the executive. This was
preceded by the KANU-KADU merger which occurred in November 1964 when the
opposition party KADU dissolved itself thus making Kenya a de-facto one-party
State. Thereafter several Constitutional amendments mainly intended
to strengthen the hands of the executive at the expense of other state organs
were put in place between 1965-1969. By
the end of the first decade of independence Kenya had emerged as a dorminant one
party ‘personal rule’ regime (see e.g. Rosberg and Jackson 1982) in which
the personal ruler increasingly marginalized the role of the party in the
governance process. Indeed
throughout 1970s the Kenyatta regime was under the full control of an ethnic
oligarchy that directly shaped the structure of access and thereby influenced
the resultant inequalities in socio-economic life.
Moi
ascended to power in August 1978 in a smooth transition as per the Kenyan
Constitution. The primary concern
of Moi during his first two years in office was the neutralization of Kikuyu
hegemony that Kenyatta had put in place (Oyugi, 1994).
In order to shake the foundation of Kikuyu unity, Moi launched an assault
on GEMA. This was necessary because GEMA had been on the forefront in
the 1976 Change the Constitution Movement aimed at stopping Moi from succeeding
Kenyatta in the event of the latter’s death.
But for political expediency, GEMA could not go alone. The move was camouflaged in a resolution passed in July 1980
at a leaders Conference at the Kenya Institute of Administration near Nairobi to
dissolve all tribal associations. The
dissolution of GEMA was followed by the dismantling of its vast economic empire,
which was the source of its power and influence over the GEMA communities (Oyugi,
1994, 22-23).
While the
above process was in progress Moi also sought to entrench himself in power and
also ‘strengthened’ the ruling party KANU as an instrument to be used in
promoting personal political agenda. Building
in the Kenyatta heritage, he at once embarked on a political path that saw him
marginalize most of the important politicians in the Kenyatta regime.
He then set out on a mission intended to remove all real and potential
alternative centres of power. This
saw the subordination of the Central Organization of Trade Unions - COTU,
Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization etc. to the ruling party. Four years into his rule, he turned Kenya into a de jure one
party state to pre-empt the launching of an opposition by party two opposition
politicians - Oginga Oding and George Anyona.
By the mid
1980’s Moi had emerged as an effective personal ruler as he now had the
ability to condemn and re-cycle the once powerful politicians.
Thus after the 1983 elections Moi attempted to infiltrate institutions
and coerce individuals into having direct loyalty to him.
Furthermore the ruling party was made even “more powerful” as an
instrument serving the regimes interests.
The
executive control of the Government was entrenched further by the passage of Act
No.14 of 1986. It removed the
security of tenure of the Attorney-General and Controller and Auditor-General
exposing them to manipulation by the executive.
Suffering the same fate was the Controller and Auditor-General’s office
which as the public’s watchdog over tax-payers finances was weakened.
This trend was to continue when in 1988 further amendments to the
Constitution removed the security of tenure of judges and offices of the members
of the Public Service Commission. The
end result was that the above offices lost the capacity to make impartial
decisions. (Weekly Review, August, 1988). The
net result was that the amendments vested in the President an unqualified
discretion in relation to the appointment and tenure of the most crucial offices
in the Public Service. It is
important to note that the above bills were passed in Parliament without much
opposition. This can be explained by the fact that from the late 60s,
parliament had emerged as an institution that could only criticize but without
the temerity to block any executive initiative.
On the
economic scene Moi just like Kenyatta also concentrated on the promotion of the
economic interest of his tribesmen and their allies and likewise engaged in
factional inter-play to achieve his political objectives (see also Himbara
19...).
While it
is true that the period prior to the 1992 Multi-party elections never witnessed
serious debates on constitutionalism, it is worth noting that certain steps that
bear on the constitution had been taken in Kenya.
These include the Committee on the National Code of conduct established
in 1983 and whose mandate was to solicit views aimed at establishing a
“normative dialogue” between the State and the Citizens (Ngunyi 1996: 207).
It however died a natural death. The
point to stress here is that by the late 1980s Kenya had emerged as a regime
under personal rulers that cared least about socio-economic democracy.
As would
be expected, the demand for openness in the political system grew out of twenty
years of political oppression and economic discrimination characteristic of both
the Kenyatta and the Moi regimes. Pressure
for democratic change started earnestly in early 1990 in what Kenyans were later
to refer to as the multi-party debate. The
call came from both individuals and civic organizations and included leading
Clergymen who agitated for the political space to be widened.
In July
1990 Kenyan experienced unprecedented civil and political upheaval.
The civic energy activated by the campaign for pluralism had created two
opposing blocs, one a coalescence of forces committed to preserving the
status-quo and the other of those committed to fundamental reforms. It was against that background that the ‘ruling party’
(i.e. the president) established a review committee in June 1990 to address in a
constitutional context, the emergent polarisation within the party and state.
The
Committee took sixteen days going round the country to collate views of citizens
regarding the party’s nomination and election rules as well as the party’s
code of discipline. Although the
terms of reference of the committees were too narrow in scope thus falling short
of satisfying the majority of the citizens, the people were nevertheless
determined and did speak out on diverse opinions and issues aimed at
strengthening democratic institutions, improvement of public accountability,
restoration of faith in the electoral process and strengthening commitment to
the Rule of Law and respect for Human Rights.
However
the final report by the Committee either ignored or intentionally omitted the
very issues that Kenyans had suggested demanded urgent attention.
For example the report side-stepped all the major constitutional
questions raised in the different memoranda and concentrated on nomination
procedures, the 70% election rule, and the party’s disciplinary mechanism.
The ostensible reason given by the Committee for this avoidance was that
the proper forum for effecting amendments to the constitution was Parliament,
not the ruling party. (Kibwana & Wachira, 1996, 452).
These
partial reforms by the ruling Party in 1990 did not satisfy the masses.
The only concession being the president’s announcement that he had
instructed the Attorney-General to restore the security of tenure of judges, the
Attorney-General and the Controller and Auditor-General.
This
scenario resulted in civic bodies and opposition activists demanding for more
concessions from the government. In
February 1991, Oginga Odinga a leading opposition figure formed the National
Democratic Party (NDP) and sought it's registration.
He was however denied registration thus paving the way for other civic
bodies to also take the mantle to press for changes.
By mid 1991, the pressure for democratization was accelerating.
In June of that year, the Law Society of Kenya and the CPK Church joined
hands and unveilled the Justice and Peace Commission - Kenya (JPC-K) while the
opposition activists followed closely on their heels by forming a pressure group
known as the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) in July of the same
year. Those two bodies were formed
in response to denials by both the registrar of society and the High Court to
authenticate the existence of the National Democratic Party.
(Nairobi Law Monthly No.37, 1991).
The twin
assault of the JPC-K and FORD among other local pressure groups and the external
forces spearheaded by donor countries who accused Kenya of Human Rights abuses,
corruption and lack of democracy finally compelled the KANU National Governing
Council to recommend that Section 2A of the Constitution should be repealed
(this section provided for the existence of one party only).
Thus on 10th December 1991, Section 2A was repealed paving way for
formation of opposition parties before the 1992 general elections.
On 10th
December 1991, Parliament repealed Section 2A which had hitherto made Kenya a
de-jure one-party State. The
scenario was reminiscent of 1982 when Section 2A was inserted into the
Constitution. It took only one
sitting and Kenya once more opened avenues for the existence of a multi-party
State. However this particular
enactment fell short of providing an enabling environment for pluralist politics
since previous enactments which favored a one-party State were still intact.
The repeal
of Section 2A in the Constitution paved the way for prepositions for elections
under a multi-party system which were due in 1992.
The government went ahead and amended the National Assembly and
Presidential elections act in 1992 which were meant to create an enabling
pluralist environment for electoral competition.
The
election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992 endeavored to provide for, inter alia
the following:-
- enhancement of the powers of the Electoral Commission in the supervision of elections;
- political party nomination which was to be financed by each Party.
The
consolidation of electrical laws brought this supervision of local government
elections under the electoral commission and extending anti-defection law to
cover local authorities. The
electoral laws although meant to facilitate pluralism in electoral politics also
spelt doom for some opposition parties. For
instance previously preliminary elections were financed by the State; but the
new ruler’s effect was that the new parties which had no financial base, could
not easily conduct successful nominations.
In the
count down to the 1992 elections, parliament passed the Constitution of Kenya
(Amendment) Act of August 1992. The
bill which eventually became law was first published on 3rd March 1992.
The bill sought to restructure the State system to conform to a
multi-party framework. It proposed
among other issues the substitution of the vice-president post with that of the
Prime Minister, the limitation of presidential tenure to two five year terms,
the introduction of a reform ... in determining fundamental issues.
Legal aid for indigent citizens in human rights cases, extension of the
powers of the electoral commission to cover local authority elections and the
repeal of presidential emergency powers over North-Eastern province and
contiguous districts. (Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill 1992).
The
proposed Bill was however rejected by both opposition parties and individual
critics such as George Anyona and Timothy Njoya.
An inter-party consultative meeting was thereafter formed on 9th March
1992 when the parties formed a legal committee that would take the Government to
court over the Bill which they thought was basically meant to strengthen the
President’s powers. They observed
that the proposed changes should be discussed further before being enacted.
[Daily Nation, 8th, 9th, 10th March, 1992].
Arising
from the above complaints, the government withdrew the bill from the House.
In June 1992 the government republished the Bill, which now resorted to
the old scenario and retained the vice-president’s post at the expense of the
Prime-minister. It also mandated
the electoral commission to independently conduct and supervise the National
Assembly, presidential and civic elections.
In the case of Presidential election, the Bill added an additional
requirement that the winning President besides garnering the highest number of
votes cast as well as winning a parliamentary seat has to receive a minimum of
25% of all votes cast in at least five of the eight provinces. The provisions also provided for a run-off in the event that
the first round didn’t produce a clear winner.
Furthermore, the president's tenure was limited to two five year terms
while the presidents powers to unilaterally apply emergency powers over
North-Eastern Province was scrapped. However,
the referendum provisions were omitted. Subsequently
on 5th August 1992, Parliament by a majority vote of 140 against 1 passed the
Bill (Daily Nation August 6, 1992). It
is thus within the above framework that the multi-party elections were
conducted.
During the
run-up to the 1992 multi-party general election’s, most civil society groups
and certain opposition activists foresaw that there was need to rewrite the
Constitution in order to first facilitate an enabling environment for free and
fair elections, and second to enact Laws which would reflect the transition from
a one party state to a multi-party one.
This
realization arose from the fact that the existing nature of the state was
oriented to the one-party era. This
scenario saw civil society groups and the existing opposition political parties
call for Constitutional reforms to be enacted through a National Convention.
However this was not to be, mainly because key opposition leaders were
busy organizing their supporters with the belief that they would win the 1992
elections. The elections therefore
went on and KANU emerged as the winner. From that time on, the opposition
parties and civic bodies went back to the drawing board and came to the
conclusion that one of their major undoings in the 1992 election was the
constitution.
The
opposition parties and civil society groups then put constitution reform as the
main agenda after their debate in the 1992 multi-party elections.
Thus emerged in the Constitutional reform debate to opposing groups: One
comprised of the opposition parties, religious bodies and other pro-democracy
civil society groups, and the other made of the ruling party KANU which opposed
the changes which were being pursued by the former.
The opposition parties for a long time regarded the Constitutional
arrangement as flawed and impinging on their collective political ambition of
capturing State power. They thus
dedicated most of their efforts towards the attainment of certain electoral
reforms which would put in place an acceptable structure for fair political
competition.
On the
other hand, KANU’s staunch supporters although not quoting official policy,
were always quick in letting Kenyans know that they would only accede to
Constitutional Change if it accommodated a federal structure.
Such was the case in the countdown to the 1992 elections that any
opposition call for Constitutional Change would be met by similar calls for a
federal structure. The KANU
stalwarts were at it again after the 1992 elections when they openly declared
that they had a draft Majimbo Constitution that they would table in parliament. This call immediately gave momentum to the Constitutional
debate in Kenya. The first group to
react to the above call was the Church.
In March
1994, the 18 Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church released a pastoral letter in
which they called for, among other things, the complete revision of the
Constitution by a large constituent body of experienced and competent citizens
representing all segments of the society. They
argued that the revision of the Constitution should not be left to politicians
alone. (Daily Nation, 16.3.1994). This
position was later supported by the Church of the Province of Kenya (CPK) which
called for the setting up of an independent commission incorporating all shades
of opinion to redraft the Constitution. However
no meaningful response to this demand came from the State.
Thus in November 1994, the debate was revisited when the Law Society of
Kenya (LSK), the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and the Kenya Chapter of
the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) unveilled a proposal for a Model
Constitution (Model Constitution of Kenya 1994).
It was
under these circumstances that the state also conceded that the constitution as
it stood did not reflect the changed political climate.
The Attorney-General Amos Wako conceded this much when he told parliament
that constitutional reforms were likely to be put in place before the 1997
general election. The bone of
contention then was the format to be used in the enactment of the constitutional
reforms. The popular feeling seemed
to be that the decision ought to be left to some kind of constitutional
conference or national referendum but according to the state, the modalities
would be announced by Moi at an appropriate time subject to the government’s
decision to establish a constitutional review Commission.
The AG said the review would allow every Kenyan as a group or party to
present his or her views (W.R. Nov. 11, 1994, 12-13).
The
build-up towards constitutional reform was to gain momentum when Moi in his new
year message of 1995 assured Kenyans that the constitution would be reviewed
(Nation 1.1.95). Moi stated in his message that he planned to invite foreign
constitutional lawyers and experts to the country to embark on the process of
gathering views from Kenyans and which would then form the basis for reforms in
the Constitution. By putting
constitutional reform on the national agenda and in all probability declaring
1995 the year of constitutional reform, Moi seemed to be confirming that the
KANU Government was willing to undertake a serious review of the Constitution.
By his new
year pronouncement Moi seemed to have wrestled the mantle of constitutional
engineering from the opposition parties and civic groups.
The country seemed to be unanimous that Moi’s signal was a clear
indication that Keyans now could reason together in the quest for constitutional
reforms. The KHRC however did not
relent in its efforts to ensure that the masses had an input in the
constitutional reform agenda. It
convened several seminars and workshops which were meant to solicit views from
civic bodies representing a cross sector of the Kenyan society - views which
were finally used to unveil the model constitution of 1994.
Critics were quick to correctly observe that the model constitution
represented the elite views and therefore the model constitution could not be
used as an achor representing the interests of Kenyans.
The civic bodies involved in the drafting of the model constitution later
dubbed themselves as the citizens coalition for Constitutional Change (4C’s).
A secretariat was thereafter set-up with a Steering Committee
representing various organizations within the Civil Society.
It’s main objective was to draw up a reform agenda which would ensure a
wider participation by the people. The
constitutional reforms, they noted should be enacted through a National
Convention. Their second objective was to de-politicize the whole process, a
feet which they soon found was impossible to achieve since they found that they
lacked the institutional capacity or the appeal to mobilize the masses without
the direct involvement of politicians. Their
initiative thus became still born as it did not take the constitutional reform
agenda any step further.
Although
the initial reaction to Moi’s message indicated that Kenyans were ready for
Constitutional Change, subsequent reactions as was to be expected saw KAMATUSA[1]
hardliners such as Nicholas Biwott and William Ole Ntimama and KANU hawks such
as Shariff Nassir and other prominent members of KANU insisting that the
constitution would only be chanted if it accommodated federal system of
Government. What followed then was
an acrimonious debate with both pro and anti-federalism activists restating
their claims. KANU hawks seemed to
hold the belief that their pro-majimbo stance would deter the opposite side from
demanding Constitutional Changes.
The upbeat
mood for constitutional reforms set-up by President Moi was to change
drastically in June of the same year. While
ruling out radical constitutional change in his Madaraka Day speech, President
Moi also made it clear that he had changed his mind about inviting
foreign-experts without being specific. The
president said that some events had taken place in the country which clearly
indicated that those advocating for constitutional reform were not altogether
sincere. He emphasized however that any constitutional changes that
may be effected would have to be carried out through Parliament which he said
was the only organ empowered to amend the Constitution. Opposition politicians immediately issued statements accusing
the President of reneging on his earlier promise to give Kenyans an opportunity
to participate in the country’s reform process.
The opposition parties were of the view that constitutional changes
should first be discussed by all Kenyans and that Parliament should only be
called upon to ratify what Kenyans had all agreed on. (W.R June 9, 1995, 9).
In August
1995 the ruling party further made drastic decisions on constitutional reform.
After a closed door meeting of the top organs of the ruling party, KANU
sent a message that it would not agree to be intimidated into implementing
constitutional reforms. The ruling
party also indicated that it would no longer be liberal in registering new
opposition parties and on the same note clearly stated that it would be
uncompromising with NGOs and diplomats who engage in politics. (W.R. August 25,
1995).
This rigid
position taken by KANU meant that the opposition and the civic bodies had to
re-evaluate their relevance in the constitutional reform agenda.
Thus for a long time preceding April 1997 the Opposition parties and
Civic bodies held in-house consultations and they were all unanimous on the need
for a Constitutional Convention. But
that is where the consensus ended; for the same bodies disagreed over who should
initiate the talks as well as who would manage the process of convening a
national Constitutional conference. Three
groups thus emerged due to the ownership question.
First was
the National Opposition Alliance which was launched in November 1995 and was
fronted by Messrs Mwai Kibaki (DP), Kijana Wamalwa (Ford-K) and Martin Shikuku
(Ford-A). The second group was
known as Opposition Solidarity and comprised Messrs Kenneth Matiba (Ford-A) and
Raila Odinga (Ford-K, now in NDP) who early in May 1996 called a press
conference to announce that they would commence plans towards convening a
conference to review the Country’s Constitution. The third Group comprised of
the Churches and other Civic bodies. It
was this latter group which came up with a set of minimum reforms which they
insisted should be implemented before the 1997 elections.
The minimum reforms that both the Church and the 4C’s demanded to be
put in place were as follows:-
First -
The Electoral Commission as established by Section 41 of the Constitution.
The two bodies argued that the sitting Electoral Commission which was
solely appointed by the President could not be independent.
They therefore recommended that an independent, non-partisan, and
inter-party electoral commission be established with fair representation from
the government, the opposition and the organized civil society.
They thus sought that Section 41 of the Constitution be amended.
Second -
The preservation of Public Security Act (Cap 57), Part II as read together with
Part III of Cap 57 gave the President power to, among other things, detain
persons without trial, restrict the movement of persons, control aliens, and
censor the media. The two bodies
stated that these provisions were subject to abuse by the executive arm of the
government especially in an election period.
They therefore sought the repeal of this Section to be replaced by
appropriate provisions to deal with natural calamities and disasters.
Third -
Section 56 and 57 of the Penal Code Cap 63 dealt with seditious intention and
publications. The two bodies observed that these provisions were subject to
abuse as they lent themselves to speculation and conjencture.
They therefore recommended that these provisions be applied cautiously
and that 56 (1) (b) be repealed.
Fourth -
Cap 128 of the Chief's Authority Act which gave Chiefs immense powers with
respect to persons in their jurisdictions.
They observed that this was one of the most outdated and abused laws in
the Statute books. They recommended
that it be repealed in its entirety.
Fifth -
The two bodies observed that Section 24 of the Constitution gives the President
absolute powers with respect to the Constitution and abolition of, appointment
to and termination of appointment from key public offices.
The offices of the Attorney-General, Chief Justice, Head of Civil
Service, Chief of General Staff, Commissioner of Police, members of the Public
Service Commission and Judges would all fall under this category.
In order to ensure the independence of these offices the two bodies
recommended that presidential appointments to and termination of appointment
from any of the offices be subjected to confirmation by 65% of the members of
the National Assembly.
Sixth -
The two bodies recommended that the “25% - 5 province” rule provided in
Section 5 of the Constitution should be amended to provide that in addition to
the above rule a candidate must receive a minimum of 58% of all the valid votes
cast in the election before he can be declared as elected president.
Seventh -
The two bodies noted that the Constitution makes no recognition of independent
candidates in an election, they therefore recommended that provision be made in
the Constitution as well as the local Govt Act (Cap 265) to allow candidates not
affiliated to any political party to run for presidential, parliamentary and
civic elections.
Eighth -
The two bodies noted that Section 33 of the Constitution gives the president
absolute powers to nominate twelve (12) members of Parliament.
They reiterated that his provision was open to abuse and could be used to
solidify the electoral majority of the party in power.
The two bodies recommended that nominated members of Parliament be
appointed from special interest groups that are unrepresented or
under-represented through the election subject to ratification by a majority of
65% of the elected members of Parliament.
Ninth -
The two bodies observed that the public order Act (Cap 56) severely restraint
the freedoms of association, assembly, and expression of the people.
They therefore recommended that Part III of Cap 56 as far as it relates
to control of public gatherings be amended to require only that
organizers of public gatherings notify the Police Officer commanding the
relevant division within reasonable time for purposes of provision of security.
Tenth -
The two bodies recommended that there was need to amend the Constitution to
provide space for the formation of a Coalition Government or a Government of
national unity catering for the broad interests of all sectors of the society.
They also sought that the exchequer should make a contribution to the
campaigns of each political party and Presidential Candidate’s campaign.
The Church
and the 4C’s maintained that if the above minimum reforms were implemented
then the goal of free and fair elections could be attained.
Meanwhile the National Opposition Alliance and the Opposition Solidarity
also continued to press for Constitutional Change although their strategies
differed. Those efforts however
received a set-back when the Attorney-General Amos Wako announced in June 1996
that Constitutional Changes could not be effected until after the 1997 elections
(Daily Nation 25, 6, 1996).
This announcement met protests from the Opposition political parties and
civic bodies who vowed to hold a Constitutional Convention at a date to be
named.
The
Attorney-General pronouncement was a reaction to the formation of the National
Convention Planning Committee (NCPC) which was formed as an umbrella body to
represent all the factional interests in both the opposition parties and the
civil society. The NCPC was thus
the mouth piece of all the groups represented within it.
The constitutional reform agenda was formed out of the realization that
the political class had a lot of factional interests that was derailing the
constitutional reform agenda. The
NCPC
went ahead and set-up sub-committees which were entrusted with working
out the modalities to be used when the Convention was called.
The NCPC
finally called for a delegates conference on 5th April, 1997 where the, National
Convention Assembly (NCA) was established and on April 6, 1997, the NCA resolved
that the former National Convention Planning Committee together with sixteen
provincial delegates and the representatives of the Youth Movement would serve
as the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC) which was to be the
executive organ of the NCA. It was
under the direction of the NCEC that the Constitution reform rallies of May 31,
July 7 and the strike of 8th August took effect.
The
measures which the NCEC took to pressurize the government to effect reforms bore
fruit on July 17, 1997, when the government announced that it would effect
reforms before the General Elections. This
was preceded by President Moi’s initiation of dialogue on Constitutional
reforms when he met religious leaders from the Christian and Muslim Sections on
July 15, 1997. And on July 22, 1997
fifty-five Opposition members of Parliament and the non-parliamentary members of
NCEC met at County Hall and among others, agreed that NCEC was an umbrella body
which represented opposition interests and therefore would be the body to hold
dialogue with or negotiate reforms with the Government.
This was apparently a reaction to the leader of the official opposition
Wamalwa Kijana’s meeting with Moi. A
move which the NCEC viewed as a divide and rule tactic.
The
process of negotiation seemed to be prospering when in the first week of August,
both NCEC and KANU consented to Constitutional reform mediation by the religious
community. However during the
launch only the NCEC turned up while KANU stayed away asserting that it could
only negotiate with the elected representatives of the people.
It was under these circumstances that the Inter-Parties Parliamentary
Group meeting (IPPG) was born. The
IPPG strategically rendered the NCEC irrelevant as it restricted the reform
agenda to the parliamentarians. Furthermore most opposition politicians
abandoned the NCEC and decided to participate in the IPPG reforms. However about 12 radical MPs stuck with the NCEC and refused
to participate in the IPPG talks.
After two
weeks of deliberation in County Hall (parliaments’ annex) and a further two
weeks of debate in Parliament the IPPG came up with the following minimum
reforms which have since become law:-
First - an
additional clause in Section one to make a declaration that Kenya is a
multi-party democracy.
Second -
Section 41 to be amended to provide for minimum number of 4 and maximum 21 in
the membership of the Electoral Commission (EC) so that the opposition MPs get
appointed before the elections.
Third -
Section 33 to be amended so that the 12 nominated MPs are proposed on a .....
basis by all Parliamentary Parties (any party with a minimum of 7 MPs in the
House).
Fourth -
period of nominations to last two days
Fifth -
Campaigns to be managed exclusively by the EC with no interference from the
provincial administration.
Sixth -
The EC to be given powers to hire prosecutors to expedite the process of
election petitions.
Seventh -
Public meetings or procession to require notification to area Police boss but
meet-the-people tours and harambees need not be notified.
Meetings to last from 6 am. to 6 p.m to avoid night meetings.
Eighth -
Repealing all sections that deal with Sedition in the Penal Code.
Ninth -
Sections of the Chief's Authority Act that have become obsolete to be repealed.
Tenth -
Amend the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Act to provide for lawful equal
coverage of all political parties.
Eleventh -
Amendment to the preservation of Public Security Act to abolish detention
without trial.
Twelfth -
Amend Societies Act to give the registrar a maximum of 120 days in which he
should respond to any political party seeking registration.
Thirteenth
- Amend Section 7 to allow the winning President to form a government of
national unity or a coalition government.
The
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Bill was also debated in parliament and
provides for the establishment of a commission which will after the elections
start the process of gathering and collating views from the public on the
changes they wish to see in the Constitution.
The IPPG
reforms package has met condemnation from both the NCEC and the Church.
The NCEC on it’s part described the recommendations as greatly flawed
and that the reforms didn’t address the basic problems that caused the
Constitutional Crisis. Dr. Kamau
Kuria one of the NCEC’s Co-Convenor observed that the MP’s were not greater
than the people who elected them and they should not therefore be given the
powers to change the Constitution as they wish.
He submitted further that the problem manifested itself again in the
Constitutional Review Commission where the ordinary people would merely make
suggestions and Parliament would draft the final document. (D.N. Sept 12, 1997).
The Church
on its part observed that the reform Bills assented to by the Presented were
inadequate for a free and fair General Election and called for the extention of
the life of Parliament to enact further reforms. (D.N. Nov 8, 1997). However
their request was nipped in the bud when President Moi dissolved Parliament and
the country started gearing for the December 29, 1997 General Elections.
The
Constitutional reform debate in Kenya centred mainly on first, the need to enact
constitutional reforms before the 1997 General Elections, Second, the mechanism
to be used in enacting reforms before the 1997 general elections and thirdly the
depth of reforms to be undertaken whether minimum or comprehensive.
Under the
current constitution, parliament is the only institution directly empowered to
alter the Constitution. Section
47(1) of the Constitution provides that subject to this Section parliament may
alter this constitution. The
constitution further provides that a bill to alter it must be supported in the
National Assembly at it's sceond and third readings by the votes of not less
than sixty-five per cent of all the members of the Assembly excluding
ex-official members. This Section
therefore gives Parliament the final say in regard to any amendment to the
Constitution. However an amendment
to a State’s Constitution should ideally be effected after an input by the
citizens of that nation. The
proposed amendments should therefore be taken to the citizens for approval,
disapproval or an amendment of the issue at hand.
Several mechanisms could therefore be used to solicit views for example a
referendum, a Constitutional Convention, a Constituent Assembly, a Presidential
appointed Commission or Parliament which was used recently.
However
there are several factors which make Kenya’s parliament unsuitable as the sole
mechanism for enacting Constitutional reforms.
Historically parliament has performed the role of using constitutional
amendments to strengthen the executive. Secondly,
the composition of the dissolved parliament was fitted towards KANU and in any
case the amendment did not have any input from the citizens. Kenya’s 7th
Parliament was an ineffective one which ‘slept’ for 41/2
years and only woke-up when members realized that their role had been usurped by
the NCEC thus necessitating the pulling up of the IPPG decoy.
The IPPG
package is for all purposes a step forward but questions about the
government’s commitment to the process still linger.
The speed with which President Moi dissolved Parliament immediately after
he assented to the bills to become law caught many IPPG proponents unaware.
There seemed to be a consensus that the life of parliament needed to be
extend for the IPPG reforms to take root.
Secondly,
the IPPG has been criticized for not incorporating recommendations by the Kenya
espiscopal conference, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the
National Convention Executive Council (NCEC) and the Law Society of Kenya (LSK).
(Daily Nation, Nov 8, 1997).
Thirdly,
critics have correctly observed that the IPPG package left the extensive
Presidential powers unscathed. The
absolute right to dissolve parliament which he recently used is a case in point.
Fourthly, the amendment to Section 41 of the Constitution has not ensured
the independence of the Electoral Commission. The President still has the majority in the Commission,
Justice Chesoni who has been adversely accused since 1992 is still the Chairman,
and the appointment of 10 Commissioners from the Opposition is left to the
goodwill of the president which any future president can still abuse.
Fifthly -
The 50% majority rule on top of (25% - 5) in five province for the winning
President hasn’t been enacted as well as the provision for independent
candidates.
However
the response of KANU has been that some of the above issues have to be referred
to the masses before being enacted. They
will therefore have to wait for the Commission to start its duty.
The
re-introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya was expected to propel further
the build-up towards plural politics in Kenya.
However the first five years experience have been quite a disappointment.
Although the repeal of Section 2A in 1991 legalized the formation of more
political parties, a lot of statutes which reflected the one-party rule
tendencies were left intact thus showing the space meant for plural politics.
The IPPG
reforms have repealed some of those statutes. However the executive powers still
remain unfettered. The new law now
starts with a preamble that Kenya shall be a multi-party democracy.
This therefore means that the constitution must reflect the tenets of
liberal democracy. It becomes
essential therefore that the concept of separation of powers must be
re-examined. The president's
current powers have allowed the holder of the office to manipulate both the
legislature and the judiciary thus infringing on their role as the ‘Check and
balance’ on the executive.
It is
therefore mandatory that as the Commission goes around collating views, it
should take the recommendations towards the curtailing of presidential power
very serious. The notion of
participatory democracy should also be embraced in Kenya. This is important
since in Kenya’s history at no time has the citizens been directly involved in
determining their destiny. The independence Constitution of 1963 was negotiated by a
majority of self-appointed leaders who to a large extent got legitimacy arising
from the Colonial situation and basically they were negotiating for a
Constitution to facilitate transition. Subsequent
amendments to the Constitution up to 1990 were always done at the whims of the
executive and the recent IPPG amendments although arrived at by the
representatives of the people lacked the input of the citizens, who since
independence have never directly participated in determining the Constitution
they want.
Although
Representative Democracy does not foresee a situation where each citizen can
directly have an input in Constitution-making, it is also obvious that most
parliamentarians lack Constitutional knowledge or expertise to oversee the
process. The solution then can be found in a Constitutional Convention.
The Convention is normally a Conference of delegates elected from
different regions or sectors of a country with a mandate to deliberate on the
country’s Constitution. The
proponents of this mechanism argue that delegates to conventions are more likely
to be representative of the popular will of the people in constitutional
matters. This arises from the fact
that delegates to the Convention are elected basically to represent the views of
their sectors on Constitutional issues. This
is in contrast to members of Parliament who are in the National Assembly to
represent their constituents multiple interests.
The Convention seems to be the most realistic way of bringing the
Constitutional Crisis in Kenya to rest and not the Commission appointed by the
president.
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