DPMF Publications:
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A Critical Analysis of the Demobilization Programme in Uganda 
By Nathan M Byamukama


Introduction

In some African countries demobilization has been either an essential part of a peace agreement of rival armies and political factions ( e.g. Mozambique) or an attempt to increase security and stability in the immediate post-conflict period (e.g. Ethiopia). In contrast to other places in Africa where assembling and disarmament of soldiers alone had proved extremely difficult, in Uganda the general approach in post war politics and political background of demobilization was different. After the military victory in 1986, the National Resistance Army (NRA) integrated most soldiers of other armies and armed groups in order to control them and to fight remvernment however justified demobilization and projected it as an internal, homegrown government policy. Subsequently, Uganda Army Council sitting in May 1992 decided to demobilize up to 50,000 (fifty thousand)3 soldiers from the then National Resistance Army (NRA) (now UPDF).

Demobilization, as it was portrayed to the general Ugandan public, was something healthy and expected to provide the peace dividend in two ways: First it would cause a reduction of the military budget that would enable the government to divert scarce resources to fields like education, health and economic development. This peace dividend was expected to amount to the equivalent of US $ 14 million a year.

On the other hand, demobilization was supposed to reintegrate up to 50,000 soldiers, most of them relatively young and able bodied men and women into the production sector of society where they were expected to make a considerable contribution to economic development both on communal and national levels. The re-integration of former soldiers into the production sector was also important for internal security as it was perceived that veterans as people with military skills could present a potential for insecurity and destabilization in case they become impoverished outsiders of society.

Besides these financial and economic considerations of mostly the donors, there emerged a genuine need for a general re-organization of the Army by the government. The National Resistance Army (UPDF) had been formed as a guerilla army in the early 1980s. After Military victory in 1986, NRA was rapidly expanded to fight rebellions in various parts of the country, to re-integrate former opposition forces and to fulfill tasks in Internal Security normally done by the police. In the early 1990s, however, rebel activities had diminished in most parts of the country and the police had considerably been re-built. With a change in tasks, the army had to be transformed into a smaller but well trained and well equipped force mainly in charge of external security.

The Implementation of the Demobilization Programme

After the Uganda Government had agreed to suggestions from the donor community to reduce the military budget and the latter had pledged financial support for the demobilization exercise, in May 1992, a decision was reached by the Army Council to start a demobilization programme. The exercise of demobilization was to be implemented in three phases. It was planned to demobilize up to 50,000 soldiers, which would have been a reduction by approximately 50%. This aim was not fully accomplished as 36,358 soldiers were discharged in three phases between October 1992 and October 1995. This could be attributed to the nature and structure of the programme itself. This paper argues that whatever criticisms of demobilization we can identify in Uganda, they are largely attributable to the weaknesses of the organizers of the programme but not the soldiers themselves.

Nature of the Demobilization Programme

Soldiers selected for demobilization were grouped into certain categories defined by the programme design. The official reasons for discharge were old age, medical reasons, voluntary retrenchment, non-citizenship and those categorized as "Service no longer required"- a category that was later renamed "Reduction in Establishment" in Phase II of the programme.

Table I: Official reasons for discharge of all Veterans
Reasons for discharge  Phase I Phase I in % Phase II Phase II in % Phase III Phase III in % Total Total 
in %
Old Age 1999 8.7% 1160 12.5% 4.24 10.2% 3583 9.9%
Medical 4974 71.7% 2584 27.8% 1818 43.8% 9376 25%
Reduction in Establishment  7294 31.9% 4779 51.3% 1878 45.3% 13951 38.4%
Voluntary 8289 32.6% 785 8.4% 13 0.3% 9087 25.0%
Non-citizens 189 0.8% ---- ---- ---- ---- 159 0.5%
Claimed Non-citizens 153 0.7% ---- ---- ---- ---- 158 0.4%
Not Started ---- ---- ---- ---- 14 0.3% 14 0.0%
Total 22903 100% 9308 100% 4147 100% 36358 100%

To implement this large-scale exercise, a Uganda Veterans Assistance Programme (UVAP) was put up. UVAP was to demobilize, resettle and re-integrate those demobilized into the civilian life. A Statute (an Act of National Resistance Council, the then Uganda Parliament) established a civilian organization-the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) in October 1992 to manage the demobilization programme. A Secretariat was also put in place to service the Board. UVAB was given the mandate of autonomous parastatal body answerable to the Prime Minister's Office.

It was expected that many veterans would face many problems in their transfer to civilian life and would need support to become responsible for their families' needs. UVAB then was required to build a constant monitoring capacity to evaluate programme facilitation, financial transactions and the general situation of the veterans. The Government of Uganda and various donors provided funds for this.

During the first phase of this programme, 22,889 soldiers were demobilized and accompanied on their way home by approximately 50,000 dependants. This was implemented from December 1992 to July 1993. Phase Two of the demobilization work, during which 9307 soldiers were demobilized and returned home with about 40,000 dependants was implemented from April to July 1994. Phase Three in which the final batch of up to 17804 soldiers was demobilized took place in July 1995.

In the government and donor's estimation, it was assumed that resettlement would take up to six months. During this period UVAB would distribute the material benefits, which were part of the demobilization programme. The period of re-integration was supposed to take two years after resettlement. It was expected that the vast majority of the veterans would have completely resettled and re-integrated two and half years after discharge and that UVAB would be dissolved once the objective was achieved. As it turned out not all their objectives were achieved. For example, though they had projected demobilizing 50,000 soldiers, they ended up demobilizing 36,358 leaving a difference of 13,642 as shown below (see table II).

Table II: Number of Discharged Soldiers
Phase I Trial-run, October, 1992 410
Phase Ia, December, 1992-February 1993 19,608
Phase Ib, July 1993 2,717
Phase I Senior Officers and Non-Citizens 168
Sub-total 22,903
Phase II, April to July 1994 9,308
Phase III, October, 1995 4,147
TOTAL 36,358

Problems of Demobilization in Phase I

With the army responsible in these fields, important aspects of demobilization were handled by UVAB under pressure from the army. One objective of the army was to discharge a large number of soldiers as soon as possible. By the time demobilization started, the Defence Budget had been based on the assumption that 23,000 soldiers would be discharged by the end of the financial year 1992/93. Thus, the army insisted on the discharge of Phase I veterans within two months after the budget was announced and put a lot of time pressure on UVAB.

Consequently, the biggest contingent of soldiers had to be discharged after very short preparation time. UVAB had still been in the process of formation, particularly as far as the organizational structures in the districts were concerned. Discharge during the first stage of Phase I took place with intervals of less than a week so that there was hardly any time to correct organizational short-comings once discharge had been started. Necessary streamlining of internal UVAB structures had to wait for the end of Phase Ia.

On the other hand, UVAB had to consider the donors' schedule for allocation of funds necessary for discharge. Under time pressure from the side of the army, this kind of coordination was sometimes difficult. This contributed to a delay in the payment of the second installment to veterans.

The army also insisted on certain locations for discharge. The facilities at Singo General Headquarters, for instance, were not considered appropriate for the discharge of more than 3000 soldiers a day as it was done twice in February 1993. According to veterans interviewed in Luwero district, there was lack of water at Singo-one of the centres. Both UVAB staff and the soldiers had to face hard conditions. Complaints by UVAB, however, were of no avail.

In Phase I, cooperation of the army with UVAB was far from being perfect. As it was put in the final report on Phase I,-"Within that process NRA however had to come to recognize UVAB as not being another Army Department but as an equal partner in a common task calling for close cooperation and an understanding of the problems on both sides"8 Indeed, cooperation improved considerably during Phase II. The army accepted pre-discharge counseling inside the barracks and presented a computerized list of soldiers selected for demobilization in due time before discharge which enabled UVAB to make a plan for transport and to prepare pay-sheets for he veterans in advance.

Table III: Funds Allocated to UVAB for Demobilization Phase I,II, and III (in US$)

 
Phase I Phase I Phase I TOTAL
Veterans Demobilized 22904 9307 4147 36358
Funds provided by            
Multilateral:
IDA
UNDP
UNCEF
2,100,000
300,000
250,000
1,000,000
185,000
---------
250,000
404,045
3,350,000
889,045
250,000
Total Multilateral 2,185,000 1,185,000 654,045 4,489,045
Bilateral:
SIDA
DANIDA
EU
GTZ
Netherlands
ODA
AUSAID
1,500,000
2,900,000
2,910,000
----------
2,800,000
1,500,000
5,457,500
2,500.000
2,500,000
----------
1,333
1,400,000
3,000,000
1,555,555
1,803,376
1,500,000
----------
----------
1,500,000
2,619,204
----------
5,803,376
6,900,000
2,910,000
1,333
5,700,000
711,204
7,013,055
Total Bilateral 17,067,500 10,956,888 7,422,580 4,869,391
Government of Uganda 2,401,615 1,356,665 1,111,111 4,869,391
Grand Total 22,119,115 13,498,553 9,187,736 44,805,404

Critique of Demobilization Programme

When UVAB was formed in October 1992, it started its operations immediately as the first phase of demobilization was scheduled for December 1992 involving more than 20,000 soldiers. The various services rendered to veterans by UVAB called for an extensive and efficient distinct network which also responded to the general policy of decentralization in Uganda. Thus, UVAB opened Distinct Veterans' Offices (DVO) in all districts except Kalangala District consisting of Islands in Lake Victoria with only three veterans who were administered by the DVO in Masaka District.

A District Veteran Programme Officer (DVPO) headed each DVO. UVAB recruited the DVPOs among the staff members of the respective district administration. In most cases they held the positions of District Executive Secretary and could only work part-time which caused problems in some districts. Districts with more than 1000 veterans got an Assistant District Veteran Programme Officer (ADVPO). Some of the districts with more than 1500 veterans even got two ADVPOs . District Veteran Officers also employed bookkeepers and other junior office staff. By mid 1995, UVAB had employed 222 people of whom 51 were based at the headquarters and 171 at the district offices.

However, the tasks of the district officers were manifold. They had to distribute, administer and to handle applications for all benefits in cash or kind given to the veterans after discharge and to select veterans for training programmes. They had also to monitor the situation of veterans and to present reports to the UVAB headquarters. Besides that, they were supposed to provide counseling and sensitization to foster economic and social re-integration. Each DVO was allocated a motorcycle to enable its staff to do field trips as the veterans were usually scattered all over the districts. Unfortunately, however, motorcycles did not arrive in the districts before mid 1993. So the field trips were limited, during the re-settlement of the first 20,000 veterans. A weekly Radio broadcast by Radio Uganda in English, Swahili and various Uganda languages was used to spread general information for veterans but, not every veteran had a radio nor could all veterans listen to the programme. Subsequently, this turned to be another problem in the implementation of the programme.

The District veteran offices were the main counter-part for veterans. However, it was found out that some offices were overwhelmed with administrative work and lacked time for individual counseling or even visits to veterans' homes. There had been seminars for staff training at different stages of the demobilization programmes but these seminars put more emphasis on administrative procedures than on counseling. The counseling capacity of many DVPOs was consequently rather limited, in particular as far as problems of social re-integration and gender issues were concerned.

According to the initial design of the demobilization programme veterans were expected to form district associations headed by an elected District Veteran Representative (DVR). These associa

tions and DVRs were the third layer of the UVAB Structure besides the headquarters and the district offices of UVAB. Indeed, many DVRs have been found assisting the District veterans offices in various ways. Many veterans associations, however, suffered from lack of interest of veterans, as they were not equipped with any resources. Veterans associations were (and to date) have not been very active in the field of re-integration or do not even exist anymore.

Attached to the District veterans office was a district veterans Advisory Committee (DVAC) consisting of members of the district Administration and the district Local Council.11 This Committee was supposed to meet once a month to advise and to supervise the DVPO. It was also formed to keep the relevant district authorities informed about the activities of the district Veterans Office. Except for this information, however, it seems that the impact of these Committees on the Implementation of the demobilization programme or the re-integration of veterans was rather limited.

Private consultancy companies did the monitoring of the resettlement of the 20000 veterans discharged in December 1992 and January 1993. This assignment included the collection of basic personal data of all veterans. Unfortunately, data collection and the filling of veterans information forms did not start before April 1993 when most of the veterans had already resettled in their home areas. At such a late stage, data collection proved to be very difficult and the results of the whole revaluation were far from being convincing.12. It was not surprising therefore that a new evaluation unit had to be formed in phase II.

After phase I, UVAB with technical assistance from DANIDA formed its own Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. Its task was to monitor both the resettlement and the long-term process of re-integration. Veterans were availed information sheets and bank forms upon discahrge. The bank forms enabled them to open bank accounts for their cash package.

These forms were used to get personal data of the veteran, family demography, health status, education, skills and land ownership. The bank form also inquired on the type of housing and asked the veteran to state what income-generating activities he/she had started or intended to start, apart from veteran investments and earnings.

Adding to data collection with these forms, the DVPO was told to list up changes in family status, death cases and criminal activities of veterans and to report them to the UVAB headquarters. However, DVPOs could only report cases they got to know about13. Many veterans _ or incase of their relatives _ did not bother to inform the DVPO on the above-mentioned issues after receiving all their benefits. They did not seem to see any sense in travelling to the District offices just to present this information. As a result, DVPOs tended to lose touch with many veterans after some time. A particular problem for any kind of monitoring was that probably a big number of veterans moved to other districts. Many veterans never reported residential changes as most DVPOs had discouraged veterans from requesting official transfer certificates.

In spite of these shortcomings, the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit did a commendable job in terms of collecting and processing the basic personal data of veterans. This data, together with knowledge of DVO staff and their mobilization capacity could provide background information for implementing agency. As there was some time lag between the collection of the two veteran information forms, the data even allowed some tentative conclusions or changes for instance in family status and health condition during the first month after discharge. Nevertheless, there are serious short-comings in the available information on socio-economic issues and trends as there was neither a verification of the information given by the veterans nor a systematic follow-up survey that could provide accurate information on re-integration patterns. In general, the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was not equipped to fulfill the enormous task of long-term monitoring.14.

The Cash package

The main benefit issued to veterans by UVAB was a cash package. It was termed "Transitory Safety Net package" as it was designed to help veterans during the transitory period of resettlement to acquire adequate shelter, to buy food before the first harvest or as income to buy agricultural tools and seeds, and to cater for basic medical needs. It was hoped that the package would enable veterans to start civilian life and to become economically self-reliant. Veterans were advised not to regard the package as first part of continuous payment or as a kind of salary.

The package was the same for all veterans irrespective of rank, age, length of service, or pattern of resettlement 15. Payment was in instalments in order to minimize risks during transport. The first instalments of Ushs.150,000/= was paid in cash to each veteran at the place of discharge. The rest of the package was transferred to bank accounts opened by veterans at the District branches of the Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) which has the closest network in the country. Phase I veterans received two more instalment. (See table IV)

Table IV: Cash package paid to veterans in Phase I
Clothing Allowance 36,000
Half setting-in and per diem 100,000
Medical care 14,000
Total first installment  150,000
Half setting-in and per diem 100,000
Half Ration allowance 63,000
Agricultural tools and seed 25,000
Medical care 3,435
Total second installment 191,435
Half ration allowance 63,000
Building materials 154,000
Total third installment 217,000
Grand Total 558,435

Due to logistic problems, however, the first 20,000 veterans had to wait for four to six months after discharge until they got these instalments. From phase II on words, the total amount of the cash package remained the same but payment was Ushs.150,000/= at discharge and Ushs.408,435/=as a second instalment effected after returning to their home areas.

The cash value of the package was based on the assumption that the average family size of a veteran was 3-17; detailed cash calculations of items deemed necessary during resettlement were also considered. The food ration allowance was shs.700 for each family per day and paid for 180 days. It had also been estimated that the average expenditure on medical care for each family member within six months was 5,500. Two hoes, a machete, and seeds were supposed to cost shs.25,000/=. The amount for building materials was planned to cover the cost for poles, doors, windows, nails, vents and hired labour necessary to erect a standard mud and wattle house with two bedrooms and one sitting room.

The issuing of the package of about shs.12.7 million for phase I alone was a challenging task in terms of logistics and accountability. The cash paid at discharge had to be transported at bank by helicopters. At some discharge points, about 3000 veterans had to be paid in one day which meant that up to $500,000 in cash had to be transported and up to 46 clerks were employed for counting and distributing the money.

The distribution of other installments raised the problem to invent a system that would guarantee high accountability and prevent any fraud and it was finally decided to handle the transfer by a rather complicated procedure through bank accounts to be opened by each veteran. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that only 118 of 22,903 phase I veterans failed to turn up at the DVPO for receiving their second and third instalments.

In addition to the cash package, UVAB distributed 20 corrugated galvanized Iron sheets and 5 ridges to each veteran. Like the amount for building materials given as part of cash package, the number of iron sheets was calculated on the standard house mentioned above. It was decided to distribute iron sheets instead of cash to encourage veterans to build houses and to abstain from spending the money on consumed goods. The iron sheets were supposed to arrive in due time after discharge so that veterans could start building immediately. Iron sheets for phase I valuing about $5 million were donated by USAID. Unfortunately, there was a delay in supply as USAID decided to import the iron sheets from USA16 and tender procedures as well as transport through Mombasa port took a lot of time. Thus distribution took place in the second half of 1993 when many veterans discharged six months earlier had already built temporary shelters and had spent that part of their package that had been given for the construction of permanent houses. The iron sheets weighing about 5000 tons were transported to the offices of the DVPOs and stored there. Veterans had to look for means of collecting and transporting them to their home areas by themselves, which could be quite expensive. As a result, those veterans living in areas remote from the district headquarters often sold their iron sheets on the spot. There are many reports that veterans sold their iron sheets at give-away prices at the district headquarters receiving much less than the local market value of at least shs.200,000, others stored them at home hoping that they will be able to build houses in future. The delay in the distribution, thus, jeopardized the concept of fostering house construction of veterans by providing iron sheets.

After the emergence of these problems during phase I, UVAB considered to give phase II and III veterans cash in lieu of iron sheets. Investigation among veterans, however, revealed that most of them preferred iron sheets and UVAB started the procurement of iron sheets in April 1994 when the discharge of phase II veterans began. Finally, the distribution of the iron sheets in phase II suffered from similar problems as before because there was a delay in funding these activities and the World Bank refused to accept the first tender. Most phase II veterans received their iron sheets some months after they had returned to their home areas. And this syndrome became the phenomenon of phase III veterans.

Given the cost of living in Uganda and the resettlement needs of veterans, it was found that the cash package was rather small. Among the fields identified for further support, additional payment for medical care was given priority. More veterans than expected were chronically sick or suffered from ailments that not only limited their capacity for achieving economic self reliance but also imposed costs for medical treatment not catered for by the cash package.

Addressing Health Problems

Veteran health problems had not been regarded as a major problem at the beginning of demobilization. The Army and the donors had agreed not to demobilize disabled soldiers based at the Mubende Causality Unit unless a comprehensive programme including medical rehabilitation and vocational training was in place.17 According to a sample survey on the socio-economic profile of soldiers conducted by the army, only 22% of the soldiers had minor disabilities and 7.5% were in poor health 18. Given the intention not to discharge disabled soldiers, the World Bank recommended a pilot fund to cater for 3% of the veterans who were chronically sick and in need of further medical support financed by UVAB in 1993.19.

An " Enhanced Health-Disabled package" was introduced in late 1993 equipped with Shs.107.2m. The DVPOs had to administer 80% of that amount to veterans in need of medical treatment of diseases originating from their time in the army. In order to access this fund they had to apply at the District offices. DVPOs sent the veterans to the District Medical Officer who would undertake a medical check up and make an assessment on the costs of treatment. The decision whether to accept the application was made by the District Medical Committee. In case of approval, the DVPO informed the applicant through the notice board at his office and issued a cheque to the veteran. Hardship cases requiring very expensive medical treatment and operations were transferred to the UVAB headquarters that was in charge of 20% of the fund to handle such cases.

Table IV: Beneficiaries of the "Enhanced Health - Disabled Package " until March 1996.
Cases handled by District Veterans offices (80% of the overall budget) 2147
Hardship cases handled by UVAB Head Quarters (20% of the overall budget) 112
Total number of beneficiaries  2259

Applications started to come in slowly but finally exceeded the volume of the programme by more than 100%. As stated in table IV; applications of 2259 veterans (6.2% of all veterans) were accepted. Many others were put on a waiting list. The high demand cannot be taken as a surprise considering that 25.8% of Phase I, Phase II and Phase III veterans had been discharged on health reasons. On top of that, a number of veterans who had left the army voluntarily did so because of health problems.

Among Phase II veterans, 40.4% were found sick or in poor health after discharge 21 . In general the Enhanced Health-Disabled package was far from being sufficient. Many sick veterans probably did not apply because they did not expect significant support or because they could not manage to travel to the DVO to process their applications. In 1995, a World Bank Mission corrected the former assessment by stating that about 15% of the veterans was in need of medical support. However, funding failed to be adjusted to this late insight.22 During a research conducted by the Centre for Basic Research (CBR)23 some respondents expressed the view that a chronically sick soldiers should rather have remained in the army as NRA provides regular access to medical services and contribute to burial costs for deceased soldiers.

Addressing Problems of Skills

Another field that called for action was Education, Vocational training and improvement of agricultural and marketing skills. Most veterans lacked these skills as they had served in the army for many years and had joined at a young age, very few had acquired skills useful for income-generation in civilian life while in the army. This lack of skills was widely seen as a major obstacle to economic re-integration of veterans. Various plans were drawn to tackle this problem. The most ambitious one was to provide 3000 veterans technical training leading to a diploma, finance six weeks courses in marketable skills for another 7000 veterans, and to conduct group training in agricultural techniques for 10,000 veterans. The overall costs of the programme were estimated at about Shs.5.1 billion.

The "enhanced Education and Training programme" finally set up before Phase II was run on a smaller level. The budget of the programme was Shs.295m, of which Shs.73.5m were to be spent on formal education of veterans who had already acquired O'level certificates; Shs.148.6m on vocational training of veterans with primary school education; and Shs.73.5m on training in artisan and agricultural skills for groups consisting of veterans and non-veterans. As with the Health Programme, 20% of the budget was administered by the UVAB headquarters and 50% by the DVPOs, who would also handle the applications.

The programme started in August 1994 after vocational training centres capable of training veterans had been surveyed. Training took place in various kinds of artisanny like carpentry, tailoring, metal works, bicycle repair, brick-laying as well as animal tracking and silk production. Due to high demand many applications had to be rejected. Some vocational training centres refused veterans who did not have the minimum required education background. Some Participants of the programme complained that there was no provision for basic tools after the end of the course which prevented them from using the skills they had just acquired. The impact of this programme on the economic situation of the veterans can only be assessed at a later stage.

Table VI: Veterans Participating in Vocational Training Programmes sponsored by UVAB until March 1996.
Cases handled by District Veterans Offices (80% of the overall budget) 1774
Cases handled by UVAB Headquarters (20% of the overall budget) 115
TOTAL 1889

The overall expenditure for the demobilization of 32,211 soldiers in Phase I and II covered by UVAB was 34,522 billion or , taking the fluctuations of the exchange rate into account, between $32-33m. As shown in the following table, only 10.6% of all expenditure was spent on administration despite the extensive district network of UVAB. The high degree of accountability and the fact that more than 80% of the budget was given as benefits to the veterans certainly deserve commendation.

Table VII: UVAB Expenditure for Phase I and II October 1992 to December 1995 in Uganda Shilling.
Expenditure Phase I Phase II Total Phase I & II In %
Cash package paid to veterans 12,742,810,315 5,206,211,390 17,949,021,705 52.0
Iron sheets including transport 6,523,908,451 2,337,850,000 886,158,451 25.0
PTA (School) fees 457,422,145 450,000,000 907,422,145 2.6
Health Care Fund ---------- 107,200,000 107,200,000 0.3
Vocational Training & Scholarship ---------- 295,000,000 295,000,000 0.8
Sub total Direct benefits 19,724,140,911 3,396,261,390 25,120,402,301 81.5
Transport of Veterans & discharge costs 1,964,066,917 797,163,440 2,761,230,357 8.0
GRAND TOTAL 23,724,994,000 10,797,886,013 34,522,880,013 100
Balance Transferred to Phase II     2,250,905,340  

As mentioned at the beginning, one important aspect of the mandate given to UVAB was to foster economic and social re-integration of veterans. The provision of benefits beyond the "Transitory Safety Net Package" reflected this objective although health and vocational training programmes could not satisfy the demand. UVAB also developed plans to establish revolving loan funds to encourage veterans to start income-generating activities, particularly in agriculture and trade. The initial plan was a proposal to support farming and small scale enterprises of 42,250 veterans with a loan scheme of total $4.6m. At a later stage UVAB thought of loans for 500 veteran groups amounting to $1.5m.26. However, neither the Uganda Government nor International donors were willing to fund such activities run by UVAB.

UVAB was therefore confined to counseling activities that would encourage veterans to form income generating groups and loans outside the UVAB structure, for instance the Poverty Alleviation Programme and the Entandikwa -Scheme27 initiated by government. However, few applications of veterans to these two schemes seem to have met success. 

Discharge and Transfer of Veterans:

Demobilization started immediately after UVAB had been formed. To become accustomed to the discharge and transport procedures a "trial run" was done involving the discharge of 410 soldiers from the Military Police. It took place at Ggaba near Kampala on 17 October 1992. The demobilization of big numbers of soldiers started on 18 December, at Lubiri Barracks in Kampala. Within the following two months, UVAB had to discharge more than half of the total number of soldiers that eventually were demobilized. This first phase lasted until 15 February and a total of 19,608 soldiers were discharged. Other discharge points besides Lubiri Barracks were at the General Army Headquarters at Singo in Luwero District and at Loro, Lira, Gulu, Tororo, Moroto and Mbarara. Most of these places are the headquarters of army divisions.

About 3,000 more soldiers had been prepared for demobilization but could not be discharged because they did not turn up at the barracks. Some of them had died in the meantime. Other reasons for their absence given by the army were severe sicknesses, detention on disciplinary grounds, deployment in operation areas, and transfer to other units before discharge. To cover at least some of them, UVAB organized an extension of Phase I in July 1993 referred to as phase Ib. It took place at Singo, Tororo and Gulu. The number of soldiers discharged was 2,717.

Phase II started on 16 April 1994 until 12 May 1994. 6,474 soldiers left the army at Lubiri, Gulu, Tororo and Mbarara. After that UVAB was not able to proceed with Phase II because it had not yet received the funds covering the transport costs and the cash package for the veterans. The rest of Phase II had to be postponed and was finally completed from 6 to 29 July 1994 with the discharge of 2,834 soldiers at Gulu, Tororo and Singo.

Last Phase of Demobilization-1995

The last Phase of demobilization was planned for the first half of 1995. It was intended to discharge about 17,000 soldiers to reach the objective of 50,000 agreed upon at the beginning of the programme. However, shortage of funds and reluctance on the side of the army to present a discharge list before funding could be assured delayed the implementation of this last Phase of Demobilization (Phase III) and eventually reduced the number of soldiers discharged to 41,147. Phase III took place in October, 1995.

The whole process of discharge was based on cooperation of UVAB with the army. The army had to fulfil many preparatory tasks:

A number of veterans had been informed about their discharge only one or two weeks in advance. Some of them came more or less straight from military operation to the discharge point. With such abrupt termination of their service, these veterans found themselves ill prepared in terms of planning their future and quite often did not even have time to inform their families about their return. In this respect, the selection of soldiers by the army showed long term consequences for the whole process of integrating soldiers into civilian communities.

Post 1995 Situation and the Impact of demobilization

In 1995, the demobilization programme ended. This however did not mean that we do not have any more soldiers leaving the army and others joining nor does it mean that all those that were retrenched have had a smooth sailing ground in their respective communities. In 1996 there were new rebel incursions and it is said that in 1996 alone 3,00029 veterans were recalled to the army. President Museveni himself had remarked that army "retrenchment was redeployment". Many more veterans were called back in 1998 when Uganda's intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) became necessary. In my interaction with the veterans, I noticed a problem with the recalling of veterans back into the force vis-à-vis those who stayed. Those who stayed in the force argued that it was unfair to them because the veterans who returned were given both the retirement/gratuity package as well as the other allowances with those in the field. They wondered whether it was a mistake for them to have remained committed in the force.

These complaints notwithstanding, by the end of the year 2000,"the only 9,591 veterans were still waiting for their terminal benefits amounting to Shs.11billion"30. This bill will be met by the Uganda government alone. Mr. Benjamin Kazoora,31 the UVAB inspector of operations observed that " I think the Government is doing very well. To me the 30billion paid so far is a lot of money because the funds are coming from the state treasury, not anywhere else". He promised to have all the arrears of the veterans cleared in the 2001 financial year.

It should be noted that not all veterans discharged under the category "reduction in establishment" left the army willingly. In spite of the re-integration problems and complaints on their economic situation however, most of the veterans I interviewed had been happy to leave the army. On the other hand many soldiers who suffered from health problems left the army voluntarily.

Regarding the policy of retrenchment and its implementation, both the Government and the veterans themselves state that it was not properly done. In January 2001, President Museveni regretted the exercise. He was quoted in the press as telling the veterans who had met him in the district of Soroti that "…although demobilization was a very important strategic plan to reduce manpower to acquire better equipment, the exercise was done in a hurry to avert the crisis in the region at that time" 32. He however promised the veterans that when re-elected in March 2001 he would look after the well fare of all veterans "who served in all the armies like the Kings African Rifles, Uganda army, Uganda National Liberation Army, National Resistance Army and the Uganda People's Defence Forces" adding that "they will be paid their pension promptly"33.

Interaction with veterans while collecting this data revealed that some of them had a general problem in coping with different challenges of civilian life and in swallowing the necessity to become self-responsible. I found some veterans who bitterly complained of neglect and waited for support instead of at least trying from humble beginnings by their own means. Others were still complaining of not getting their demobilization benefits. In the case of benefits, however it looked like part of the problem was lack of communication and information to update them about the status of their benefits. There was for example a case of Veteran James Sentongo who complained through newspapers34 that he had not been paid his gratuity package by Govern ment. As it turn out however, it looked like a case of dishonesty or impatience as Mr. Mweru Samuel Byachi, the Public Relations/Welfare office Uganda Veterans Assistance later indicated with evidence that Sentongo had been paid one instalment and another one would be ready35.

In such cases the term "dependency syndrome", while referring to the current relationship between the veterans and the state may be justified as the veterans still stick to the idea that the Government or army official body is responsible for them. The army establishment is aware of this and in situations of political competition, like what is obtaining in Uganda, there is fear that the veterans can shift their allegiance from President Yoweri Museveni who started the process to another political candidate who aspires for a political system (multiparty) opposed to the existing "Movement" system. One of the historical members of the Movement system and a former army commander, Major General Elly Tumwine who supports Yoweri Museveni intimated to this fear when he wrote:

"Our veterans take heart. Nobody should deceive you or try to misuse you. We know why you contributed and we know the different reasons why you left the army. There are some genuine veterans who legally left the army and were officially demobilized or retired and are facing some hardships in life or have not received their entitlements. Some of these genuine cases have a justified reason to pressurize for their rights, but they should use a method that does not plunge the country in chaos"36.

In spite of this fear, Uganda has not witnessed any violent means by veterans of demanding their rights like was the case in Zimbabwe, for example, in 1996. More so the original attitude of society about veterans has changed. People at the beginning of demobilization were uncomfortable. They felt the soldiers are a different breed of people. In Parliament when they were debating the policy on demobilization and setting up the board, some members called it " releasing the army on the population". This comment did not go well with the army representatives in Parliament. Maj. General Elly Tumwine then said "That is an abuse for some of us who were in the army. As if they were saying that soldiers were being held on a chain and are now being released to attack the population"37. This was in 1994. Six years later, Hon Maj. Gen. Elly Tumwine , Chairman of the Historical Commanders and Member of Parliament representing the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) observed: "The majority of genuine veterans have continued to serve their country patriotically and a good number are respected in their communities".38

At a policy level however, there was a realization that everything was not in order. Not everybody got his/her demobilization benefits and they wanted to know when they would get it. Maj.Gen.Elly Tumwine again observed that it "is not to say that everything desirable for the genuine veterans has been done, some mistakes have been made, and a few limitations in the administration have hindered the veterans from getting their benefits. However, if one used the case of the 36,358 demobilized veterans, many have received their entitlements including their gratuity. So far a total of 28,549 have been paid gratuity of Shs30.59 billion representing 78.5 %. The target is to hit 90% level of payment by the end of February"39.


Conclusion

I have tried to analyze the implementation of the veterans Assistance Programme in Uganda and to look into re-integration problems of veterans in the country and lessons to be drawn from the Ugandan experience. Social re-integration of veterans is a complex process in which direct intervention by any agency is unlikely to have a decisive impact. Nevertheless, interventions in the economic re-integration of veterans are still necessary. They may improve the economic status of veterans and their families. In doing so they may indirectly enhance the social acceptance of veterans.

However, if the programme is mishandled by the government, the donor community and other intervening variables like war and diseases, the objectives for which it was intended may take long to be achieved. In the case of Uganda for example, there is an element of `new mobilization' of soldiers. This has come about as a result of the increase in rebel activities by Kony incursion in the North, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Western part of the country and the UPDF involvement in the DRC. This has again increased the defense budget contrary to the original objectives of demobilization. Yet again as recent as November 2000, five years after, President Museveni could still say that one of the reasons for him to seek a last term as President would be to "professionalize the army"40 by training it, a reason that had led to demobilization, in the first place. He cited sickness (read HIV/AIDS), which has depleted senior officers of the army, yet sickness was a ground for demobilization. It would mean therefore that those who were sick still did not all appreciate this ground to leave the army. It is not clear how professionalization now will succeed without upsetting army structure and causing internal conflicts, since sickness still persists, within the army as new "safe" army recruits occupy the positions of their hitherto (sick) commanders.


Bibloiography

Birungi Harriet: A situational Analysis of wives of Veterans and female Veterans, Uganda (UVAB) Feb, 1995

Ddungu Elias, Some Constitutional Dimensions of Military politics in Uganda, Kampala, (Centre for Basic Research) 1994. Centre for Basic Research: The Demobilization of Military Personnel in Uganda. An assessment.

Mondo Emilio, Final Report on Phase I Demobilization operation December, 1992-August, 1993, Kampala (UVAB) 1993

_____________, Report on Phase II & III Demobilization operations, September 1993 _ Sept. 1994.

Muzale, Patrick John Evaluation of 2nd Phase of Veterans Assistance Programme, Kampala, Uganda.

NRA Proposal for Retrenching and Retraining 20,000 soldiers through Training Colleges, first Draft, Kampala Feb 1993.

Tumwine Elly (Retired Major Gen.) Post conflict Demobilization in Africa, the Uganda Experience Presentation at the GCA/OAU Workshop on Demobilization and Reintegration 9-11 November, 1994, Kampala.

World Bank, Aide Memoire on Veterans Assistance Programme, Third Phase Demobilization, Kampala Uganda, 4.2.1995.

Newspapers
The New Vision
The Monitor

End Note

1 Currently a Research Officer with the Uganda Human Rights Commission. He has BA(Pol.Sc), Dar, PGD-law(Dar), MSc-IR (UZ).

2 See e.g. in Petter Langseth & Justus Mugaju, Post-Conflict Uganda: Towards an Effective Civil Service, (Fountain Publishers, Kampala, Uganda (p.50-52)).

3 This (50000) was almost half of the total number of forces that Uganda had at the time.

4 NRA changed to UPDF after Constitution promulgation in 1995. (See also articles 208 and 209 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995).

5 Adopted from Emilio Mondo (UVAB), Final Report on Phase II Decentralization operations September, 1993 _ September 1994, Kampala, 12 December, 1994, p.6

6 Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) Statute 1992.

7 World Bank Mission Aide Memories Uganda Veterans Assistance programme; Demobilization Programme. Information provided by UVAB Monitoring and Evaluation Unit.

8 Emilio Mondo (UVAB), Final Report on Phase I Demobilization Operations December, 1992- August, 1993, Kampala, 31, August, 1993, p.5

9 Ibid, P.5

10 Information provided by UVAB accounting unit 1995

11 For composition of the District Veterans Assistance Committees, see Annex 1. Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) Statute, 1992, section 12.

12 For instance, the age of almost 26% of the veterans was unknown. See M/s Management Systems & Economic Consultants Ltd./Midland Consulting Group, A final Monitoring and Evaluation Report, Kampala, July 1993, p.17.

13 See the CBR Report op.cit.

14 Assessments on social and economic re-integration in certain areas and with special thematic emphasis were undertaken by consultants using qualitative research methods rather than broad quantitative data collection. The most valuable reports are: Hilda Maria Tadria, Evaluation of second phase of the veterans assistance programme, Vol.III: Social Impact Assessment, Kampala January 1995. Harriet Birungi, A situation Analysis of wives of veterans and female veterans, Kampala February 1995. Gudrum Otto, proposal for the implementation of re-integration programme for female NRA veterans and wives of veterans, Eschborn 1995.

15 Only non citizens received a higher cash package because they were given cash instead of in-kind benefits.

16 These American iron sheets were good quality but had a different shape from those common in E. Africa. This caused additional problems in some areas as veterans could be identified as such by the shape of their iron sheets.

17 DANIDA has submitted a programme proposal for the rehabilitation and reintegration of disabled soldiers but implementation had not yet started by April, 1996.

18 Ministry of Defence (Special Task Force of the NRA) A draft report on the study of personal and socio-economic characteristics of the National Resistance Army Personnel, Kampala, May 1992, p.39f.

19 World Bank, Aide-Memoire, Uganda _ Veterans Assistance program second stage Demobilization, Kampala, 24.09.1993.

20 Information provided by the UVAB Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, April 1996.

21 UVAB, report on Phase II demobilization Monitoring and Evaluation, Vol.11, Kampala 1995.

22 World Bank, Aide Memoire on Veterans Assistance Program. Third Phase Demobilization, Kampala,04.02.1995, p.8

23 UVAB/COW/Consult, reintegration of NRA Veterans Strategic Considerations Programme Development and Preliminary Budget, 1994-97, Kampala, May 1994, p.13f

24 Information provided by the UVAB Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, April 1996.

25 Information provided by the UVAB Accounting until April 1996.

26 National Resistance Army (NRA), Report on the Proposed Veterans Assistance Programme, Kampala, July, 1992, p.39f.

27 See: UVAB/COWI/Consult, reintegration of NRA Veterans' Strategic Considerations, Programme Development and Preliminary Budget; 1994-97, Kampala, May 1994.

28 See also UVAB Report 1995

29 see for example The New African, 1996 p.24

30 See "Veterans paid over 30.3 billion" in The New vision December 19,2000 p.6

31 Ibid

32 Reported in The New Vision, 23 January, 2001 p.12 (Title is: "Veterans to get pension")

33 Ibid

34 see Veterans Angry (The Monitor, Dec.1 2000)

35 See in The Monitor 15 December 2000

36 See letter to the New Vision entitled " Keep your politics from armed forces" (The New Vision,

31 January,2001 p.26)

37 see Tumwine Elly (Maj. Gen retired) Post-Conflict Demobilization in Africa: The Uganda experience, Presentation at GCA/OAU workshop on demobilization and re-integration, 9-11 November, 1994, Kampala.

38 See in The New Vision, 31 January, 2001 op.cit p.26

39 Ibid

40 See The New Vision, 27 November 2000.



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