Introduction


On May 29, 2001, the Obasanjo administration turned two years old. This has attracted varying analyses of the administration’s performance because coming from years of military repression and neglect Nigerians wanted and expected results.  The president himself captured the mood of the nation well in his inauguration speech when he said:

There is so much work to be done and Nigerians are understandably impatient. Having been misruled by a rapacious military for 15 years, there is no time for a government that has a leisurely disposition. (Guardian on Sunday, May 30, 1999: 16)

While there have been varying analyses, these have been from the standpoint of the economic, fiscal, monetary and educational polices,  but without a gender perspective or a particular attention to the needs of women. As so often happens, the needs and aspirations of women are subsumed under the category of male, yet it is common knowledge that women as vital development agents are affected differently by policy directives. They bear the consequences of bad policy formulation, conflict, poverty, maternal mortality and lack of participation in decision-making. (Basu, 1995). This paper argues that there has been little qualitative change in the lives of women since the Obasanjo regime. What positive development there has been is not a direct consequence of the leadership of the regime, but a systemic benefit as can only be engendered by a regime which comes after a military dictatorship such as Nigeria had experienced.   This is why the observable changes themselves are peripheral, because they have not challenged the existing structures of oppression. This contribution is an analysis of the experiences of women in past regimes. It examines what support structures or development there has been,  what  is happening now, what is lacking and what are the new challenges?

Compared to a military regime a civilian government is expected to be more responsive to the needs of the people. These expectations are well founded because, theoretically speaking, it is characterised by the principles of consensus; equity and justice, respect for fundamental human rights of all groups in society; women, youth, the infirm, wage earners inclusive. The question of how much the Obasanjo regime has protected these values is quite germane to an assessment of the democracy project in Nigeria since May 29, 1999. 

Two considerations inform this question. The first is that the Obasanjo regime has only been in office for 2 years. This means that there might not be as many parameters of change as would be expected in, say, 4 years. At the same time, since the regime only has a 4-year term, there should be a gender sensitive policy benchmark that would show a commitment to women’s empowerment.  At a second level, Obasanjo had ruled Nigeria as a military leader from 1976-1979. Then, his regime had not much to show in defence of itself as a gender sensitive regime. Moreover, the whole global agenda on women had yet to heat up. In his May 29,1999 inauguration speech, Obasanjo identified 18 problem areas that he feels his administration must deal with.  These ranged from crisis in the oil producing areas to transportation and housing for civilian and military populace. In order of priority, women and youth empowerment came up, as the eighteenth item the administration would address.

Women and the State

Since the mid 1970s women’s issues have been on governmental agendas. This was in response to the demands of the international women’s movement and the intervention of the United Nations. The UN demanded that all member nations set up “national machinery for effective equality.”  In response, the federal government of Nigeria in 1976 established a Women’s Development section in the Federal Ministry of Social Development Youth and Sports. This was upgraded to a division in 1986. However, before then, in 1982, the government set up an intersectoral national committee on women’s development (Salihu, 1995).  

As Dr Simi Johnson, chairperson of the committee puts it, the committee was charged with assisting the federal government on polices on women as well as liasing between it and voluntary bodies rather than formulating policies by itself  (Vanguard, 1987: 5). There was no radical shift in the state’s perspective to women’s development. The general policy framework of the country, in fact, negatively affected women. The civilian government of the 1980s engendered a situation resulting in the collapse of the service sectors of health, transport and power, which consequently put a lot of pressure on women as income earners and care givers. Unemployment and reduced earning power led to a higher cost of living and economic hardship (Abdullahi, 1995; WIN, 1983).

The military regime of Muhammadu Buhari, which usurped power from the Shagari government, attributed the decline in the nation’s economy and polity to corruption and indiscipline. The regime, therefore, launched an anti-indiscipline crusade tagged War Against Indiscipline (WAI). Unfortunately, women were a prime focus of this crusade.  The face of corruption was depicted as women sex workers and women in formal employment and petty trading. These were accused of moral  peddling and ignoring their social role as childcaregivers, as well as constituting eyesores to society. Under this regime, some states in Northern Nigeria gave unmarried women a deadline of three months to produce a  husband or lose their jobs, while a majority of landlords, who are male, evicted single women (Dennis, 1987; IDEA, 2001). The women’s group Women in Nigeria (WIN) fought to resist this form of executive oppression alongside other organizations and scholars who also documented the experience. 

In 1987, the Better Life Programme for women (BLP), a pet programme of president Ibrahim Babangida’s wife, Maryam, was initiated. Expectations were high that it would address cultural impediments against women’s rights, reduce poverty and improve social services. BLP’s aim, amongst other things, was to ensure a good quality of life for Nigeria’s rural populace, with particular emphasis on women. The Better Life Programme was to mark the beginning of what in Nigeria popularly became known as the first lady projects. Wives of executive members of government used public funds in pursuit of developmental projects which, in fact, did very little to transform the lives of the masses.  The projects had no legal status as bona fide government projects, yet they received government subvention. One good thing, however, which came out of the birth of the BLP was the heightening of awareness of the plight of women; aside from this, the programme did little in terms of qualitative transformation of the lives of its chosen constituency.  Its activities were variously critiqued as falling short of its objectives.  It was alleged to have not transformed the lives of rural women but rather to have given many elite women the opportunity to amass wealth and showcase their fineries, to the detriment of their less advantaged sisters. 

Ideologically, the BLP reinforced gender subordination in the guise of women’s activism. As a state sponsored women’s group, it mirrored the state’s conservative image of women as wives, mothers and secondary income earners. The BLP leadership was both hierarchical and completely unrepresentative of its professed constituency of poor, uneducated rural women  (Abdullah, 1995: 215). 

These problems of the BLP were further compounded by the lack of accountability of such sums realised through governmental allocations, launches and galas. Dimensions of mismanagement of power were also evident in the parallel relationship that existed between the official National Commission on Women (NCW) that was established through Decree 30 of 1989. Even when the decree was amended in 1992 and the functions of the BLP and the National Commission on Women were merged, the problem of the hierarchy of authority that preceded the merger persisted.

The national policy framework of the Babangida regime was the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) introduced in 1986. SAP encouraged stiffer fiscal measures with reduced government spending, privatization and free play of market forces as well as the devaluation of the Naira. Structural adjustment policy led to increased hardship by threatening the ability of Nigerians to survive due to a high cost of living; transportation became expensive as the increase in the price of petroleum from N2. 50k to N11.00k was without a corresponding change in income (Olukoshi, 1991). The Directorate for Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure, which was charged with poverty alleviation, did not work from a gender perspective, as it was not as concerned with the particular developmental needs of women, as it was with agriculture, water provision and construction of viable roads. Its reach was also limited (Salihu, 1995).

During the Abacha regime, the National Women’s Commission was upgraded to a ministry for women’s affairs and social development.  T his ministry retained the command structure of the NWC with Mrs. Abacha as the “commander.”  Personalization of power also continued through the Abacha years as the ministry also served as office for the first lady’s pet programme, the Family Support Programme (FSP), which had much the same focus as Mrs. Babangida’s BLP. 

The culture of first ladyism and the invention of wifism not only personalized power but also seriously undermined the extent to which the government could develop public policies that could address the structural inequalities of women (IDEA, 2001: 65).

Obasanjo and Women Femocracy

This took a different dimension under the Obasanjo regime. Aware of the negative publicity the first lady’s project attracted under the military, the civilian regime was more cautious. Many governors promised that there would be no such thing as the office of the first lady. The president himself had informed the public that his wife would be just Mrs. Obasanjo. This means there shall be no unaccounted budgetary allocations to a first lady project. We have, however, arrived at an era where a strong tool for women’s emancipation is lobbying. Women close to persons in power are in a better position to influence policy. As a departure from the past, these are now referred to as Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This is an approach popularised by the wife of Abubakar Abdulsalam, Nigeria’s head of state, who stayed in office less than a year after the death of Abacha. Mrs. Fati Abdulsalam, founded of the Women’s Rights Advancement Protection Alternative (WRAPA). Presently,  first lady Stella Obasanjo oversees a child care foundation, and the wife of the vice president has established the Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation  (WOTCLEF).

The NGO approach is designed to imply a complementary relationship with government without a necessary governmental support base. Yet wives of executive members continue to have their own projects, which enjoy as much publicity as the bona fide executive programmes. Institutions of government attend fund raising projects, the official media structures are used to air activities and, even though as NGOS they may choose their own modalities of accountability,  many Nigerians are still waiting to see the efficacy of these programmes. While these parallel efforts are being co-ordinated with a lot of support from federal and some state governments, other states have scrapped the ministry of women’s affairs at the state level. In Osun state in southwestern Nigeria, there is no first lady project, neither is there a women’s ministry. What exists is an assistant in the office of the governor who deals with women’s affairs without any structure, autonomy or a clearcut budget (Discussions, 2000). One tool that is readily available to the first ladies is lobbying. Aside from building support for their projects, the national and state level legislatures have been challenged to pass gender sensitive laws. One example is the bill sponsored in the National Assembly by the vice president’s wife, Titi Atiku, on human trafficking. The passage of these laws would serve to highlight the issue of implementation. This will be the real test of the administration’s commitment to women’s empowerment.

Affirmative Action

The present regime has surpassed its predecessors in terms of appointments of women to key political positions, with seven women on the executive council. The federal and state parastatals also have more women permanent secretaries and directors. Women activists, however, regard this as far short of  Obasanjo’s campaign promise of 30% representation. At the federal executive level, a major setback for women’s empowerment was demonstrated by the removal of the female director of the Women’s Development Centre, a national institution that is concerned with research, information and advocacy for women’s rights. She was replaced, ironically,  with a male. This action totally disregarded the need to retain women in offices where they can serve as tools of empowerment. 

The Budget

The Obasanjo administration has not addressed the issue of a “women’s budget.”  It is unclear what percentage of the budget is set aside for women’s development, although it is agreed that in order to understand the dynamics of women’s oppression it must be seen as an integral part of development. Women’s development is an issue that affects the whole of society; hence, the need for  a gender perspective in developmental issues. This, however, does not preclude the need to focus specifically on women as an oppressed category.  The budget of the Obasanjo administration, which is devoted to poverty alleviation, does not specify what percentage will be spent towards alleviating the conditions of women as the poorest of the poor (IDEA, 2001). Budgetary constraints are a bane of some of the regime’s developmental policies. In Nigeria, women and youth constitute over 70% of the population, and  a vast majority of these live in the rural areas. This calls for a concerted, sustained effort towards poverty alleviation.  Yet local governments, those closest  to the people, are mostly given low allocations. If budgetary allocations are too small, then local governments cannot execute planned developmental projects. This makes a fallacy of  the regime’s claim that it is addressing poverty. The result is that many local governments are quick to justify the lack of viable women’s development policy to a lack of funds. A second explanation, of course, is traceable to a lack of prioritisation or a clear understanding of the need for a gender perspective to their work. 

Legal Framework:  Women and the Law

The Sharia has become a metaphor for religious imposition and the abuse of fundamental human rights since it was introduced by some states in northern Nigeria, the pioneer state being Zamfara. The Sharia is a body of laws largely regarded as divine Muslim injunctions. The Sharia has, however, been redefined as a set of laws that have developed more from the evolution and interpretation of a Muslim community over time than as a set of inimitable laws (Imam 2000). Sharia as a set of laws has been in existence in the northern parts of Nigeria since pre-independence. It has two parts:  personal law and  criminal law. That which has been in practice is the personal law. This presupposes that Muslims may choose to live under its jurisdiction in matters of social relations, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and contractual agreements. This is recognised in section 275 of the Nigerian constitution of 1999. The government of Governor Ahmed Sani Yeriman Bakura brought into force the criminal law dimension of Sharia through an act of parliament. This presupposes certain conditions affecting the rights of groups and individuals. 

Non-Christians in the new Muslim state saw this development as a moral crusade.  They anticipated a violation of their rights because Islamic fundamentalism sees the non-Islamic as a symbol of the profane (IDEA, 2001). Women’s rights activists, both Muslim and non-Muslim alike, protested the subordination of women under the Sharia system. This is represented by the physical abuse of women, a directive to all spinsters to marry or lose their jobs, and that women may not pillion ride on a motorcycle ridden by a male who is not a close member of the family, etc. (CDD News, 2000: 10). In a community where poverty and the  collapse of the transportation system makes motorcycle travel a popular mode of transportation, this last example is an infringement on women’s freedom of movement. 

A controversial case was that of a 16- year old mother, Bariya Magazu, who was given a sentence of 100 lashes of the cane for fornication less than six weeks after the birth of her child, despite a pending appeal initiated by some lawyers and women’s NGOs co-ordinated by the BAOBAB for women’s human rights on Bariya’s behalf. The men named as her sex partners were, however, allowed to go unscathed. Although the lashes in themselves may have been lightly applied, as reports claimed, this does not address the psychological trauma and stigmatisation to which the teenager was exposed. The judgement too was selective, as it  ignored the alleged perpetrators but punished the victim. The Obasanjo regime was silent on this and other related abuses. The regime has adopted a policy of non-interference on this issue, which jeopardises the rights of women. The Attorney General of the Federation did not  make a concrete statement that established the supremacy of the constitution and the rights of women therein. Many women, both Christians and non-Christians alike, continue to have their rights violated by the interpretation and implementation of the Sharia.

Even though Nigeria has been signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) since 1993, its provisions are not incorporated within Nigerian laws. There is no existing legal framework that protects the rights of women. The Nigerian constitution accords Nigerian women a second-class status compared to men. Moreover, it does not confer citizenship on non-Nigerian male spouses. In a similar vein, section 13 of the constitution acknowledges the need for a federal character thus:

The composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria, ... thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies. (Section 13 (3) 1999 Constitution).

However, the constitution does not recognise the need for a gender character.  Indigenousness is measured in terms of the community of birth of one’s parents. Women who marry outside of this community are denied access to resources as members of their parental community, neither do they gain full acceptance by their husband’s community. This way they are left out of the benefit of any federal character. The nature of the Nigerian state is such that it is more possible for states to shift boundaries through redefinition of territorial limits and creation of states, than it is for women to declare citizenship through residency. The rights of the girl child are not protected. Section 29, subsection 3b, of the 1999 constitution states “any married woman is deemed to be of age.”  In a country where there is a predominance of child marriage with its attendant dangers, this is an endorsement of violence against women. 

The Obasanjo regime has initiated an interparty technical review committee on the 1999 constitution made up of the three political parties:  the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Alliance for Democracy (AD) and the All People’s Party (APP). Women’s organisations and other gender-based NGOs have made representation to the technical review committee.  There exists the danger that the process may be subverted as an inclusive populist process to constitution making. While the committee is progressive enough to recognise the exploitative status of women as contained in many memoranda that went to it,  its report does not address the structural imbalances that bedevils the country. Although the technical committee recognises the aspirations of women and is progressive on matters such as the creation of an equal opportunities commission to replace the federal character commission, it is silent on the issue of citizenship viz. dual citizenship, transfer of citizenship rights to a non-Nigerian male spouse and the status of the girl child (Technical Committee Report, 2001: 16).

The Policy Environment

In recent times the Nigerian economy has been experiencing new challenges. This is characterised by the decline of the Naira, from an exchange rate of N100 to U.S. $1 to N140 to U.S. $1 within a few weeks. The plunge in the value of the Naira had adverse effects on the prices of basic necessities such as food items, goods and services, which rose by over 30%. The hike in transportation costs and prices of food negatively affected living conditions. The arbitrary increase in the pump price of fuel by the Obasanjo government in May 2000 led to protests by the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC). Shortly after announcing an increase in the national minimum wage on May Day  (Worker’s Day, May 1st), the government unilaterally announced an increase in the price of petrol from N20 per litre of petrol to N30,  later slashing it  to N22 per litre after the protests by the NLC.  Diesel (AGO) and kerosene cooking fuel (DPK) were also increased. Even though labour later negotiated for N22 per litre of petrol, N17 for kerosene (DPK), and N21 for diesel, the hike imposed hardships on the people. The deregulation and privatisation agenda of the government in the petroleum sector further intensifies the distortion of the sector as parallel costing of petroleum  now obtains the filling station price and the black market rates. In many states, the oil producing states inclusive, there is a scarcity of petrol. A major effect of this was the increase in women’s labour, as women and children had to queue up for long hours at filling stations for kerosene. A corresponding increase in the cost of transport meant trekking long distances, or paying a higher cost for transportation, which in turn affected the cost of food items. All these hardships took their toll on the physical and mental well being of women.

While the Obasanjo administration has scored well in the immunisation programme against the five childhood killer diseases, it scores low on maternal health. There is no insurance policy for women. Nigeria still has the notorious status of a high maternal mortality rate. The rate of maternal mortality in Nigeria is about 1000 in every 100,000 women (UNDP Report, 1999). Women do not enjoy free antenatal or prenatal care. Hope lies in the fact that a national policy document on women was adopted in May 2001. This is a commendable action. While the document itself cannot be said to be without loopholes, it represents a bargaining chip for women. The next challenge is to make this document available and accessible to all those categories of people it seeks to protect.  In addition, there should be a realistic budget that will lead to an implementation of this policy.  

Women and the Legislative Process

The percentage of women in the legislative arm is quite negligible. At the federal level, there are only 12 women in a house of 360 members. At the upper house, from the total of 180 senators there are only 3 women.  The picture is a lot more dismal at the state level.  Despite this poor number, a positive development is the opening up of space for women’s issues as front burner issues. This handful of women has been contributing to bills on different forms of violence against women. A collective of civil society organisations is sponsoring a national bill on Violence Against Women. The women’s caucus of the lower house is sponsoring a bill on Violence Against Women, with emphasis on rape.  Edo State House of  Assembly has passed a bill now signed into law against Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) in the state. 

Civil Society Initiatives

A number of NGOs have been concerned with issues of women’s empowerment. A huge opportunity created by the civilian era is the realisation of civil and political rights. Organisations prepare bills and lobby legislators for sponsorship.  One of these is the “Child Labour and Trafficking in Persons” bill proposed by WOTCLEF. The bill has passed the second reading and is back to the Committee on Women for further deliberations. The Women’s Aid Collective (WACOL) Enugu, South Eastern Nigeria, and the Women’s Rights Advancement Protection Alternative (WRAPA) have been active in lobbying for a bill on violence against women. Women’s human rights is also a strong focus for BAOBAB, a women human rights group involved in research, information and advocacy on women. It pioneered the awareness campaign on the challenges of Sharia for women. Project Alert, an information and communications organisation, documents reported cases of gender based violence. 

The Centre for Democracy and Development, an NGO with a broad West Africa focus, has been working with many Nigerian Women and youth groups towards strategic leadership training for women in engaging with the policy process. This is a capacity building process to help gender based organisations do their work better. Another civil society initiative is the Citizen’s Forum for Constitutional Reform (CFCR). The CFCR is a coalition of 59 NGOs from all parts of Nigeria working towards constitutional reform in Nigeria.  The forum respects values of diversity, inclusivity, accountability and legitimacy. It has carried out an in-depth analysis of the constitution from a gender perspective. CFCR is demanding the justiciability of economic and social rights in the constitution, equal citizenship status for women and men and a viable gender and justice commission. ABANTU for Development  has conducted a series of capacity building training sessions on policy advocacy for women.

Conclusion: Challenges for the Future

So, what do Nigerian women want? A consortium on gender puts it graphically: in order to get away from the “sloganisation” of gender and to ensure that the challenge of balancing women’s multiple roles and identities does not continue to underplay the gender dimension, there is need for the institutionalization of certain processes. This institutionalization demand built in mechanisms that would compel officials to be sensitive to the needs of women.  In the absence of such mechanisms as quotas and special initiatives for women, there is need to mainstream gender issues in public discourse and accord it a proper place in public policies (IDEA, 2001: 120)

Everyone has a role to play in ensuring gender equality, from women inpublic life, to civil society organisations, to women and gender sensitive men. One main challenge for the women legislators is working towards a women’s budget. Each year budgets are churned out without a clearcut explanation on what percentage of sums set aside for health, education, housing and agriculture is to be spent on women. The budget is quite crucial in ensuring the implementation of any policy document on women that may be adopted. Existing laws need to be reviewed even as the institutions responsible promulgate new ones. 

Women’s groups have to challenge themselves and the few women legislators to take ownership of the available pool of human resources available in the NGO community and the wider community. 

References

Abdullah, Hussaina.  “Wifism and Activism: The Women’s Movement” in Basu (ed.), The Challenges of Local Feminism: Women’s Movements in Global Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 
Agozino, Biko and Idem Unyierie. “Nigeria:  Democratizing a Militarized Civil Society.” CDD Occasional Paper Series, No.  5, 2001.

CDD News.  Centre for Democracy and Development magazine, No. 1, Vol. 1, May 2000.

Citizens’ Forum for Constitutional Reform (CFCR). The Position of the Citizens Forum for Constitutional Reform on the Review of the1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Lagos: CFCR, 2001.

Democracy in Nigeria Continuing Dialogue for Nation Building. Capacity Building Series,  No. 10.  Stockholm: IDEA, 2001.

Mama, Amina. “Feminism or Femocracy? State Feminism and Democratization in Nigeria.” Africa Development, XX, 1995.

Report of the Presidential Committee on the Review of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Vol. I and II, February 2001.

Salihu, Amina. “Rural Women and Agricultural Production in Northern Nigeria:  A Case Study of Giwa and Makarfi Local Governments in Kaduna State.” MSc thesis, Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1995. 

The Guardian, “Projecting First Ladyship,” May 26, 2001.

The Guardian on Sunday, May 30, 1999.

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